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This thesis analyses norm contestation about sustainable development in the context of international 
public investment law disputes in which environmental policies have been challenged as violation of an 
investor’s rights. Existing conflicts between economic and environmental policy at the domestic and 
international level can pose problems to policy makers. To better understand the dynamics present when 
problems arise and their origins, I argue that institutional factors influence the respective power of 
organizations engaged in strategic social construction and norm contestation in international economic 
law disputes.  
The thesis perceives institutional factors to include both procedural and substantive case 
characteristics. I examine what, in addition to facts provided in such cases, could matter in the 
determination of a case outcome, whereby my outcome of interest is an environmental policy permissible 
ruling in such investor-state disputes.  
The study investigates procedural characteristics of transparency and of public participation, 
constituting intra-institutional factors, because they depend on the governing rules for dispute settlement 
of the organization administering the dispute, where applicable. Substantive case characteristics of 
horizontal integration between international economic and environmental law regimes are assessed as 
inter-institutional factor. I thus construct specific procedural and substantive case characteristics to 
capture both: power distribution among organizations, and, some of the outcomes of norm contestations 
resulting from national and international law-making processes.  
I then explore whether –and find that indeed – transparency, public participation and horizontal 
integration as well as interpretation approach seem to show an influence on case outcomes, that is in the 
realm of an international law-application process. Suggesting that existing conflicts between 
environmental and economic policies could be understood as the outcome of norm contestation processes 
in different arenas engaging different actors, I then explain how my findings further inform the law-
making process and thus can have policy implications. However, resulting policies in turn depend on 
outcomes of norm contestation among various actors in the law-making process and the decisions taken 
by states. This circular flow involving various processes at the domestic and international level is 
explicated with a model of interactions among actors in the context of norm contestation about 
sustainable development. 
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 1 
1.0  NORM CONTESTATION IN THE CONTEXT OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC INVESTMENT LAW DISPUTES – AN INTRODUCTION  
1.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
1.1.1 Introduction: What stands in the way of realizing the idea of sustainable development? 
Over the last 70 years, international public law has evolved through simultaneous developments in trade, 
investment, and environment.1 These developments play a crucial role for the realization of sustainable 
development. In fact, the International Law Association (ILA) recognizes a distinct sustainable 
development law with a body of principles and practices. However, much contestation around how to best 
realize sustainable development can be observed from negotiation history, including of the recent Rio+20 
United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, and the UN 2030 Sustainable Development 
Goals agreed upon in 2015. Yet, there remains a need to understand what stands in the way of realizing 
the idea of sustainable development. Prompted by this need, my investigation is guided by the research 
question “What explains variation in environmental policy permissibility2 in international trade and 
investment law?”3 The focus lies on identifying conditions that allow for the possibility of my outcome of 
                                                     
1International economic law has changed in trade law from the GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement or GATT 1994, 
and has changed in international public investment law from Pre-World War II treaties of friendship, commerce and 
navigations to bilateral investment agreements. In addition, specific development interests have entered international 
economic law from the 1962 UN Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources GA Res. 1803 
(XVII) (Dec. 14, 1962) to the 2001 WTO Doha ‘Development’ Round. Also developed under advocacy of 
developing countries was the 1974 UN Center on Transnational Corporations that focused on foreign direct 
investment. Its office was closed in 1993 and its work transferred to UNCTAD. International environmental law has 
evolved from the 1962 Convention on civil liability for nuclear damage to many Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements, such as the Rio Conventions. 
2The term “permissibility” has been used in the literature. Gus Van Harten, Contributions and Limitations of 
Empirical Research on Independence and Impartiality in International Investment Arbitration, 1 SOCIO-LEGAL 
ASPECTS OF ADJUDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DISPUTES 27 (2011). 
3The study focuses on disputes involving international public investment law which is a subset of international 
economic law, and is also contained in free trade agreements besides specific bilateral investment agreements, as 
also noted in the United Nations Report of the International Law Commission Sixty-ninth session (1 May-2 June and 
3 July-4 August 2017), GAOR Seventy-Second Session Supplement No. 10 (A/72/10). This choice to focus on 
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interest, i.e., international economic law dispute cases that result in rulings permissible of the 
environmental policy challenged in the case. 
What matters in such cases – why and how? I suggest horizontal integration between international 
economic and environmental law plays a major role in such case outcomes. Growing environmental 
problems and their effects on livelihoods have led to the development of environmental policies and 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), such as the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change with the objective to: “ … prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system, […] within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to 
ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a 
sustainable manner”.4 Such and similar important objectives of other international environmental law 
regimes provide a normative answer to why horizontal integration between them and international 
economic law regimes matter. I find more scientific answers in my observations of how horizontal 
integration plays out in economic law disputes in which environmental policies are challenged. My study 
finds horizontal integration: can occur at different levels, within the economic treaty text invoked by a 
claimant or outside of it; can influence the interpretation of factual actions by the respondent, of legal 
provisions in the economic treaty text invoked and of the respondent’s and claimant’s obligations; and 
may be submitted as argument by various actors, including the disputing parties, amicus curiae or tribunal 
or dispute panel. This complex dynamic interplay further varies with observations of transparency and 
public participation in a dispute as well as the interpretation techniques employed by tribunals.  
The results of my investigation include: observable inter-linkages between horizontal integration 
and dispute case outcomes; possible influence of institutional practices of transparency and public 
participation on the consideration of horizontal integration and interpretation; some unexpected 
tendencies; and recommendations for policy makers, NGOs and practitioners of international law. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
international investment arbitrations or disputes, enabled a richer analysis of norm contestation because many of the 
international trade law principles, standards or norms, such as most-favoured nations, national treatment or the 
concept of “like circumstances” still applied, while also in addition more specific investment-related norms such as 
“fair and equitable treatment” or “legitimate and reasonable expectations” could also be addressed.   
4Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
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1.1.2 Policy Problem: Existing conflicts between economic and environmental policy at the 
domestic and international level 
My research question is driven by a problem that policy makers currently struggle with: the problem of 
existing conflicts between economic and environmental policy at the domestic and international level.5  
The reason for my directional research question is twofold: First, the study concerns horizontal 
integration at the international law level based on the assumption of a general hierarchy of international 
law mandating domestic implementation. Second, I suspect inequality in legal and institutional force 
among international regimes, with more advanced compliance and enforcement mechanisms found in 
economic regimes. Therefore, while one could ask: What explains differences in the integration of 
economic policy concerns in international environmental law?” I instead ask: “What explains variation in 
environmental policy permissibility in international trade and investment law?” 
The policy problem is significant for at least three reasons: First, under international law, 
different regimes have equal status, each in their own issue area.  They should not conflict. How could a 
country comply with conflicting obligations under different international law regimes? Second, despite 
their legal equal status, international economic regimes have been viewed in practice as more powerful 
than environmental legal regimes. A government may face the dilemma then to weigh the sustainable 
                                                     
5  
 
The illustration above shows (in green) the expected horizontal integration of international law across subject 
matters, such as between (in the multilateral context) the Multilateral Trade Law (WTO) and Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (MEAs). It shows (in blue) the vertical integration of international law into domestic 
policies. Indicated (in red) are actual conflicts between domestic economic policies and environmental regulations, 
such as reducing costs for domestic industries to increase their international competitiveness versus imposing 
pollution fees or requiring emission permits to protect the environment. Also (in red) we see how domestic 
environmental regulations can conflict with international trade laws; And conversely (red) arrows indicate how 
domestic economic policies – such as exploiting natural resources such as tropical forests – can conflict with MEAs 
such as CITES, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. The bolt part in the illustration— that 
is international and domestic economic policy— indicates my noted reason for my directional research question. 
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development benefits of implementing an environmental policy against the economic risks of facing trade 
sanctions or being sued for costly monetary compensation?  
Third, some international economic regimes provide more power to specific actors than 
international environmental regimes.6 This raises important questions about legitimacy, procedural 
integrity and possible systemic bias.7 
1.1.3 Approach: Norm contestation at the stage when policies or their implementation are legally 
challenged 
Following from the idea, (based on the theoretical framework used in this study and explained in Chapter 
2), that international policy is the result of political power struggles among different multi-centric 
organizations engaged in strategic social construction and norm contestation, my theory suggests that 
institutional practices as asymmetric transparency and unequal participatory access or representation of 
stakeholders impinge on the power of organizations and in turn affect policy outcomes. Norm 
                                                     
6 Differences among actors’ powers and obligations in international public law relevant to sustainable development 
can be observed in several instances. Anthony VanDuzer et al. note “international human rights law imposes 
obligations on states to protect and fulfill the human rights of individuals subject to their jurisdiction and to provide 
remedies for violations, but few human rights treaties impose duties directly on non-state actors such as an investor. 
For the most part, international investment agreements (IIAs) also do not impose such duties. The absence of 
obligations on investors to respect human rights and promote sustainable development can make it difficult for a 
host state to meet its obligations to protect its citizens, which include the responsibility to regulate effectively the 
operations of foreign investors subject to their jurisdiction to ensure that they do not violate human rights”. 
Moreover, the authors note “IIAs contain international legal rules that in many cases trump the application of 
domestic law of a host state to a foreign investor, for example requiring the state to compensate a foreign investor 
fully for the economic value of any property the government takes, even if this government act is in accordance with 
domestic constitutional laws and regardless of the public purpose, such as the creation of a national wildlife 
preserve”. In addition, the authors note that only foreign but not domestic investors have access to the complaint 
mechanisms in IIAs and consequent claimed remedies for government acts, acts that might be part of the host 
country’s’ sustainable development policy, such as putting a price cap on drinking water. See: Integrating 
Sustainable Development into International Investment Agreements: A Guide for Developing Counties prepared by 
J. Anthony VanDuzer, Penelope Simons and Graham Mayeda, for the Commonwealth Secretariat (August 2012) at 
25 and 27 available at https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/6th_annual_forum_commonwealth_guide.pdf . Different rights 
among actors can also be seen in terms of participatory rights. While IIAs provide for investment –state dispute 
settlement mechanism, participation, transparency and observer rights to disputes are not necessarily granted to 
members of the public or NGOs. To some it seems even contradictory that a state provides on the one hand for 
investors’ protection and direct dispute settlement provisions in IIAs, including the possibility for investors to 
challenge government environmental policies, while that same state may also have supported the idea and signed the 
Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters. In such a case the public may have rights in government policy formulation but no 
information on why and how such policy could be challenged by an investor under IIAs. 
7 Susan Frank notes these issues in the context of investment treaty arbitration. Susan D. Franck, Development and 
Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (2009). Kati 
Kulovesi assesses some of these issues in the context of the WTO dispute settlement system. Kati Kulovesi, The 
WTO dispute settlement system and the challenge of environment and legitimacy (2008) London School of 
Economics and Political Science. 
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contestations occur, among others, under different international regimes and within different institutional 
processes. Relevant to norm contestations around the concept of sustainable development are particularly 
international economic and environmental regimes. Horizontal integration between the outcomes of norm 
contestations among different international regimes is therefore important to avoid policy conflict. 
The development and implementation of international law includes four broad processes: 
international negotiations; domestic ratification; policy development and implementation; and disputes 
and arbitrations as examples of compliance mechanisms in cases where disagreement about policy 
implementation exist. Thus, norm contestation may continue even after treaty and policy negotiations 
have concluded and take place in the interpretation process that occurs when policies or their 
implementation are legally challenged. My study focuses on the latter, dispute or arbitration cases.  It 
allows me to investigate whether institutional practices of transparency and public participation also 
affect the norm contestation process in international legal disputes, by way of influencing the 
consideration of horizontal integration and legal interpretation in international economic law disputes. 
Naturally, policy development and implementation practices, such as good governance and following due 
process, are important factors in determining the permissibility of a challenged environmental policy.  
Thus, institutional practices of transparency and public participation in the legal dispute process 
itself could also play a role in case outcomes, possibly influencing, through the submissions of arguments, 
the consideration of horizontal integration at various levels and in turn the interpretation of specific treaty 
provisions and of states’ obligations. This approach to better understand but one of many challenges to 
the implementation of sustainable development, (i.e. potential rulings on the impermissibility of 
environmental policies) provides me with a specific population (cases), pre-identified by dispute parties to 
pose a policy conflict within a narrow context (legal analysis), and specific forums (dispute settlement 
mechanism).8 
                                                     
8 I discuss the limitations of my study in chapter 9. As Gus Van Harten notes, there are also important limitations of 
an outcome-based approach: data on outcomes as a measure of actual performance is open to a range of alternative 
explanations such as variations in the strength of parties’ claims, diversity of fact situations, possible inflation by 
claimants of amounts claimed, varying experience levels and incentives among arbitrators and varying political 
influences of states and private actors. They may also not capture interpretations of the law that may reflect bias 
independently of outcome. As to this latter point, I include in my study in part relevant interpretations of the law by 
examining through legal content analysis horizontal integration, such as the mentioning of or referencing to 
multilateral environmental agreements in international economic law dispute cases. Gus Van Harten, Contributions 
and Limitations of Empirical Research on Independence and Impartiality in International Investment Arbitration, 1 
SOCIO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF ADJUDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DISPUTES 27 (2011). 
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1.1.4 Theoretical Research Argument 
RESEARCH QUESTION: What explains variation in environmental policy permissibility in 
international economic law disputes? 
 
THEORY: Institutional factors influence the respective power of organizations engaged in 
strategic social construction and norm contestation in international economic law disputes. 
In search for a better understanding of what stands in the way of the implementation of 
sustainable development and guided by the research question “What explains variation in environmental 
policy permissibility in international trade and investment law?” my theory, that institutional factors 
impinge on the power of organizations and in turn affect policy outcomes, leads me to several testable 
hypotheses. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Horizontal integration increases the prospect of environmentally permissible 
dispute outcomes.  
 
First, I hypothesize that horizontal integration increases the prospect of environmentally 
permissible dispute outcomes. A test may confirm that the presence of horizontal integration in existing 
disputes more frequently have environmentally permissible outcomes than those cases without horizontal 
integration. This constitutes an inter-institutional factor in my investigation because it looks at the 
integration between international economic and environmental institutions or regimes. Lack of horizontal 
integration in existing disputes illustrating a pattern of environmentally impermissible outcomes would 
also indicate some support of my hypothesis. In addition, finding a general trend of lack of horizontal 
integration in international economic law disputes cases may also imply unequal powers attributed to 
international environmental institutions compared to international economic regimes, an issue inviting 
further study. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Transparency in economic law disputes increases the prospect of 
environmentally permissible dispute outcomes. 
 
My second hypothesis is that transparency in economic law disputes increases the prospect of 
environmentally permissible dispute outcomes. Support for the hypothesis will be confirmed if dispute 
outcomes that are environmentally impermissible are more frequently associated with cases with less 
transparent dispute and arbitration procedures (i.e. where no public information and access was provided 
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to: a notice of commencement of the dispute; dispute documents during the dispute; or the final decision 
of the dispute). This study is limited to data from publicly-disclosed disputes only. As there may exist 
undisclosed cases, it is possible that there might be differences between known and unknown disputes, so 
that this study’s analysis and conclusion remain limited to publicly disclosed disputes.9  Within this body 
of publicly disclosed dispute cases, however, one can test potential effects of differences in transparency 
practices on case outcomes.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Public representation and participation increases the prospect of 
environmentally permissible dispute outcomes. 
 
My third hypothesis proposes that public representation and participation10 increases the prospect 
of environmentally permissible dispute outcomes.11  Testing this I may find dispute cases that have 
resulted in environmental policy permissible rulings are more open to public participation, i.e. in which 
non-disputing parties and stakeholders are able to provide expertise on points of law, offer historical and 
cultural context to a dispute and reveal how a dispute has wider ramifications beyond the interest of the 
disputing parties.  
 
These three hypotheses developed out of the ideas that:  
• Institutional factors influence the respective power of organizations engaged in strategic social 
construction and norm contestation in international economic law disputes; 
• International economic law disputes are examples – and the result of – ongoing strategic social 
construction and norm contestation between multi-centric organizations; 
• International economic law dispute outcomes vary for different reasons, including the presence of 
horizontal integration, public representation and participation and transparency in the dispute 
case; and  
• The presence of these indicators increases the prospect of environmentally permissible dispute 
outcomes. 
 
                                                     
9 Ibid. p.19. 
10 For example, participatory access provided by the international institutional arrangement housing the economic 
law and disputes by allowing for public observance of hearings and submission and acceptance of amicus curiae 
submissions. 
11 Testing this we should find that dispute outcomes that are environmentally permissible occurred more in IIAs that 
are more open to the public than in IIAs with less access. 
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This study makes relevant observations testing these hypotheses and reveals to what extent these 
ideas can and cannot be confirmed by existing international economic law disputes in which 
environmental policies have been challenged. 
 9 
2.0  UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
There exists a wide range of literature on international regimes (S. Krasner, D. Drezner, R. Steinberg, S. 
Picciotto), on international trade and investment law (S. Charnovitz, P. M. Dupuy, R. Howse, E. 
Neumeyer, A. Guzman), and on sustainable development (W. Sachs, H. Daly, D. Meadows, P. Hawkin, 
A. Lovins). Few studies center at the intersection of these spheres (H. Mann, K. von Moltke, Aron 
Cosbey, N. Bernasconi-Osterwalder) with a specific focus on institutional practices relevant to the 
evolution of international economic and environmental law. 
While studies on the lessons learned from multilateral negotiations point to the importance of 
institutional practices, research on systemic case outcomes in international investment disputes or 
arbitrations has focused primarily on the prospect of actual bias arising from selected individual factors as 
opposed to perceptions of bias arising from institutional factors.12 
In the context of multilateral environmental negotiations, D. Davenport, L. M. Wagner and C. 
Spence (2012) have illustrated how “innovative processes and techniques […] have been used to help 
move coalitions toward a negotiated conclusion at points when the talks have stalemated”.13 In the context 
of multilateral trade negotiations, Martin Khor (2009) observed from the account of key meetings and 
conferences of the WTO that the non-transparent processes of decision-making in the negotiations gave 
rise to perceptions of manipulation and of bias of the system towards the major developed countries.14    
This claim of bias is addressed by Franck (2009) in the context of international investment 
arbitration, exploring whether arbitration inappropriately favors either the developed or the developing 
world and investigating whether there is a relationship between ‘development status’ and arbitration 
outcome.15  Like Franck, whose dependent variables include the development status of the nationality of 
                                                     
12Gus Van Harten, The Use Of Quantitative Methods To Examine Possible Bias In Investment Arbitration, in 
YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2010-2011 (Karl P. Sauvant ed. 2012) 
at 862. 
13PAMELA S. CHASEK AND LYNN M. WAGNER (EDS.), THE ROADS FROM RIO –LESSONS LEARNED 
FROM TWENTY YEARS OF MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS (Routledge. 2012), at 
39. 
14 Martin Khor, Analysis of the Doha Negotiations and the Functioning of the WTO (South Center  2009) at 34. 
15 Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARVARD 
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 435(2009). Gus Van Harten, The use of quantitative methods to examine 
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adjudicators and of the host country, McArthur and Ormachea (2009) examine primarily individual 
factors in relation to possible bias in dispute case outcomes, including: the economic status of the home 
and host country and the quality of the host countries’ institutions.16 In contrast to these two quantitative 
studies, Gus van Harten has advocated qualitative methods to the study of investment arbitration 
outcomes and has highlighted how institutional aspects of investment treaty arbitration give rise to the 
perception of bias. He identifies a lack of: accountability, openness, coherence and independence of 
arbitrators as major flaws in the current system.17 Thus, empirical studies have focused on bias, and some 
have noted that such studies: “are subject to significant limitations”; seem unable to provide “conclusive 
proof of bias”18 and “encourage examining empirical findings in light of research about other tribunals 
and other features of international adjudication”.19 
A specific focus on international economic law disputes and sustainable development has recently 
been pursued by Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Lise Johnson (2011 and 2012). The authors 
highlight how the lack of transparency and opportunity for public participation in international investment 
arbitrations, which often challenge domestic environmental laws and regulations, has weakened the 
perceived legitimacy of the dispute settlement system and the decisions rendered under it. They also 
document the trend to enhance some aspects of transparency of international investment arbitration, but 
find still shortcomings with respect to the transparency of the proceedings.20 
My study complements this literature in several ways: by concentrating on international economic 
law dispute cases rather than negotiations; by looking at institutional rather than individual factors that 
may influence case outcomes observable at the systemic level; by testing different institutional factors, 
i.e. transparency, participation and horizontal integration (as aspect of inter-institutional structure) – and 
recognizing the complex interactions between them – in contrast to institutional factors investigated by 
                                                                                                                                                                           
possible bias in investment arbitration, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
POLICY 2010-2011 (Karl P. Sauvant ed. 2012) at 866. 
16 Kathleen S McArthur and Pablo A. Ormachea, International Investor-State Arbitration: An Empirical Analysis of 
ICSID Decisions on Jurisdiction 28 THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION 559(2009). Gus Van Harten (Ibid) notes that 
only one variable in McArthur and Ormachea (2009), namely the legal basis for the claim (contract versus treaty) 
engaged an aspect f the institutional context. 
17 GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (Oxford University 
Press. 2007) at153. 
18 Jonathan Ketcheson, Investment Arbitration: Learning from Experience, in SHIFTING PARADIGMS IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (Steffen Hindelang and Markus Krajewski ed. 2016) at 105. 
19 Catherine Rogers, The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators, 12 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014). 
20 Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Lise Johnson, Investment Treaties & Why they matter to sustainable 
development (International Institute for Sustainable Development 2012). Bernasconi-Osterwalder Nathalie and Lise 
Johnson, Transparency in the Dispute Settlement Process: country best practices (International Institute for 
Sustainable Development 2011). Bernasconi-Osterwalder Nathalie and Lise Johnson, A Critical Opportunity for 
Transparency in Investor-State Disputes as Government Delegations and Arbitration Experts Meet in New York 
(International Institute for Sustainable Development February 2012). 
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others, such as independence of adjudicators; and by bringing into focus the sustainable development 
component of international economic law dispute cases aiming at case outcomes that result in either 
environmental policy permissible or impermissible rulings instead of previous focus on bias outcomes 
based on development status. 
My research interest was prompted in response to the work of many different authors but three 
conceptual or theoretical frameworks stand out in influencing my theory: John Ruggie’s ideas of 
embedded liberalism, norm-governed and norm-transforming change; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn 
Sikkink’s theory of norm cascade; and Raymond C. Miller’s Multi-Centric Organizational Model and 
World View.  
In this chapter I will discuss how each of their contributions form the intellectual basis for my 
research. They inform my research approach to the issue of sustainable development, the dynamics 
involved in the institutionalization process of sustainable development and my assumptions about main 
actors and the arenas in which they interact. 
2.1 JOHN RUGGIE’S EMBEDDED LIBERALISM, NORM-GOVERNED AND NORM-
TRANSFORMING CHANGE 
John Ruggie (1982)21 described post-World War II international economic and political order as the 
compromise of embedded liberalism.22 In the context of sustainable development, embedded liberalism 
calls for policy flexibility of nation states to ensure a balance between economic openness and 
environmental protection. Ruggie also made an important distinction between norm-governed and norm-
transforming change.23 Norm-governed change occurs at the level of rules and decision-making 
                                                     
21 Ruggie explains: “unlike the liberalism of the gold standard and free trade, its multilateralism would be predicated 
upon domestic interventionism”. He notes: “it was an achievement of historic proportions for the United States to 
win adherence to the principle of multilateralism, particularly in trade. […] Differences among the industrialized 
countries concerned the forms and depth of state intervention to secure domestic stability, not the legitimacy of the 
objective”. G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar 
Economic Order, 36 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1982) at 393-4. 
22 Embedded liberalism calls for policy flexibility of nation states to ensure a balance between economic openness 
and domestic welfare, in order to secure domestic stability. See: Encyclopedia of International Political Economy § 
1 (Barry R. J. Jones ed., Routledge); The Princeton Encyclopedia of the World Economy  (Princeton University); 
and  BENJAMIN COHEN, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY –AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 
(Princeton University Press. 2008). 
23 Ruggie explains: “As long as purpose is held constant, there is no reason to suppose that the normative framework 
of regimes must change as well. In other words, referring back to [the] analytical components of international 
regimes, rules and procedures (instruments) would change but principles and norms (normative frameworks) would 
not. […]. Insofar as they continued to reflect the same sense of purpose, they would represent a case of norm-
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procedures, leaving the normative framework of existing regimes intact. In contrast, norm-transforming 
change occurs at the level of the normative framework itself, something truly transformative.24 
The relevance of Ruggie’s contribution on the subject of international regime change to my study 
is twofold: First, Ruggie’s notion of norm-transforming change captures the important kind of change I 
am interested in explaining. It is relevant to the inquiry of what prevents the implementation of 
sustainable development, as both procedural and normative changes may be necessary to avoid that 
sustainable development remains an oxymoron.25 Moreover, procedural changes may constitute important 
instruments to pave the way for a normative change or paradigm shift. Ruggie correctly identifies the 
post-WWII international economic and political order as norm-governed change: i.e., a change that 
remained within the normative framework of economic liberalism embracing free trade and economic 
growth. Ruggie suggested: “as long as purpose is held constant, there is no reason to suppose that the 
normative framework of regimes must change as well, […] rules and procedures would change but 
principles and norms would not”.26 However, many believe today that a norm-transforming change is 
necessary for sustainable development, in order to address the physical reality which confines economic 
growth within a finite ecological system or environmental limits (Herman Daly, 1989, 1992, 1996).27 
This suggested contradiction between the norm of global economic growth and the potential for 
global sustainable development28 lies at the heart of the policy problem of existing conflicts between 
economic and environmental policy at the domestic and international level. My study looks at what 
institutional factors facilitate particular resolutions in international economic law dispute cases ruling on 
the permissibility of an environmental policy. Could there be procedures at play preventing –or allowing 
for – the possibility of norm-transforming change? 
                                                                                                                                                                           
governed as opposed to norm-transforming change”. G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions and Change: 
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1982) at 384. 
  BENJAMIN COHEN, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY –AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 
(Princeton University Press. 2008). 
24 Ibid. 
25 Sustainable development is considered an oxymoron as long as development is understood as economic growth. 
RAYOND C. MILLER, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: CONTRASTING WORLD VIEWS   
(Routledge. 2007) at 165. 
26 John Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic 
Order, 36 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1982) at 384. 
27 HERMAN DALY AND JOHN B. COBB, FOR THE COMMON GOOD  (Beacon Press, . 1989). Herman Daly, 
Operational principles for Sustainable Development, EARTH ETHICS (1991).; Herman Daly, Allocation, 
distribution, and scale: towards an economics that is efficient, just and sustainable, 6 ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 
(1992) at185-193; and HERMAN  DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT   (Beacon Press. 1996). 
28 This could also be described as the conflict between the norms of international economic regimes and 
international environmental regimes of MEAs. 
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Secondly, Ruggie’s description of embedded liberalism is no longer reflecting reality,29 as both 
WTO rules and international investment rules have severely reduced policy flexibility or policy space for 
nation states to pursue domestic welfare spillovers from economic openness. In some instances,30  this has 
already led to domestic instability.31 The issue of policy flexibility is important to the implementation 
process of sustainable development and is addressed in my investigating characteristics of international 
economic law disputes that result in either environmental policy permissible rulings. Picciotto (2003) 
observes that WTO agreements have prioritized harmonization32 but have greatly demoted reciprocity and 
interface in the management of regulatory interdependence. He finds this pressure towards global 
homogeneity tends to override local preferences as embodied in national laws, policies, and regulations.33 
My study focuses on conditions leading to environmental policy permissible dispute outcomes. Can we 
observe institutional factors that seem to be able to re-embed international economic law and balance it 
with national environmental policy preferences? And, should national environmental preferences be prone 
to change, as seen in the U.S. Trump administration communications suggesting a directional change 
                                                     
29 Ruggie and Abdeleal (2009) find: “while the legal rights enabling [Transnational Corporations] TNCs to operate 
globally have expanded significantly over the past generation, their activities are not adequately encompassed by 
global regulatory frameworks. This results in growing governance gaps—between the scope and impact of their 
activities, and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse consequences. The more than 2,500 bilateral 
investment treaties are a case in point”. The authors “propose that policymakers revisit the principles of embedded 
liberalism in the hopes of embedding, and thereby legitimating, the practices of transnational corporations, the 
governance of financial markets, and the rules of international organizations. The core principle of embedded 
liberalism is the need to legitimize international markets by reconciling them to social values and shared institutional 
practices. This principle implies the need to bridge gaps in the governance of ﬁrms that produce, buy, and sell 
around the world, ﬁrms whose rights have in the recent era of globalization outstripped the global frameworks that 
should regulate them”. John Ruggie & Rawi Abdelal, The Principles of Embedded Liberalism: Social Legitimacy 
and Global Capitalism, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION. (David Moss, and John Cisternino, eds. ed. 
2009) at 153-4. 
30 One example is the challenge of Argentina’s emergency policy measures taken in response to the December 2001 
economic collapse. Gus van Harten notes, the investment treaty tribunal in CMS v Argentina 2005 ordered 
Argentina to pay $133 million to CMS Energy, a US-based investor in the gas sector. The arbitrators concluded 
among other things that, regardless of whether the government acted in good faith in adopting policies that harmed 
CMS Energy’s business, Argentina bore an ‘objective’ responsibility under international law to ensure stable and 
predictable business environment for foreign investors, even in the midst of financial meltdown. Further, the 
arbitrators decided that the investor’s right to compensation was not extinguished or moderated by circumstances of 
public emergency. (IMF blocked the release of $2bn to Argentina blaming the government’s failure to impose 
austerity measures. In response to the economic collapse Argentineans took to the streets, 30 people died; in just two 
weeks five presidents were forced from office GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 
AND PUBLIC LAW (Oxford University Press. 2007) at 1-4. 
31 Ibid. In a way, as predicted by Ruggie, as embedded liberalism was to secure domestic stability. 
32 I would argue that harmonization is not necessarily the problem; it is the underlying purpose of harmonization that 
matters. Harmonization towards green economies based on open technology transfer could be an effective way 
towards the implementation of sustainable development. (See draft negotiation text and conference themes of Rio + 
20, which were: How to build a green economy to achieve sustainable development and lift people out of poverty, 
including support for developing countries that will allow them to find a green path for development; and How to 
improve international coordination for sustainable development by building an institutional framework). 
33 Sol Picciotto, Private Rights vs Public Standards in the WTO, 10 REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL 
ECONOMY (2003) at 391. 
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towards further dis-embedding liberalism, can institutional factors support stabilizing progress in the 
evolution of international public law, that is, protect against a weakening of the institutions of embedded 
liberalism?34 
My study complements and challenges Ruggie’s contribution to regime change. I agree with 
Ruggie and Abdelal’s observation that new liberalism succeeded in “disembedding national markets”35 
and my study of international economic law disputes observes both existing, as well as lack of, policy 
flexibility or policy space under international economic regimes. However, my study challenges Ruggie 
and Abdelal’s optimistic view that “globalization is likely to be undone by national policy reactions 
driven by societies that have grown increasingly skeptical of newly disembedded global markets”.36 This 
view assumes public awareness. My study incorporates variables such as transparency and participation in 
institutional procedures that tests this assumption of public awareness and a possibility of reaction that 
underlines the authors’ optimistic view. The study observed that in some dispute cases, the presence of 
transparency and participation characteristics may even have an effect in the opposite direction, 
prompting tribunals to carefully stick to their case specific mandates. While my interest in norm-
transforming change is prompted by Ruggie’s contributions, his work37 does not provide an answer to my 
question: what permits or prevents norm-transforming change? A more useful theoretical framework for 
my interest in norm-transforming change is provided by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s theory 
of norm cascade. 
                                                     
34 Consider Karl Polanyi description of “the social history in the 19th century as the result of a double 
movement: While on the one hand markets spread all over the face of the globe, on the other hand a network of 
measures and policies was integrated into powerful institutions designed to check the action of the market relative to 
labor, land, and money”. In his view, society protected itself against the perils inherent in a self-regulating market 
system”. KARL  POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION   (Beacon Press 2nd edition ed. 1944) at 79-80. 
Less optimistic of lasting directional progress, Mark Blyth proposes the possibility of counter-double movements. 
He suggests “the political struggle between disembedding and reembedding the market continues today”. MARK 
BLYTH, GREAT TRANSFORMATIONS: ECONOMIC IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY  (Cambridge University Press. 2002) at 4. 
35 John Ruggie & Rawi Abdelal, The Principles of Embedded Liberalism: Social Legitimacy and Global Capitalism, 
in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION. (David Moss, and John Cisternino, eds. ed. 2009) at 152. 
36 Ibid., p.153. 
37 Specifically, giving the physical reality of ecological limits to economic growth, I am not satisfied with Ruggie’s 
and Abdelal’s holding on to the possibility of a return to embedded liberalism which Ruggie identified as norm-
governed change controlled by the normative value of economic growth. The authors state: “The fundamental 
challenge for the social legitimacy of TNCs is rooted not in shifting perceptions, but in an underlying institutional 
reality” (p.154). Says Ruggie: “The disembedding of markets and the asymmetrical rules governing TNCs have, 
more recently, undermined the very global project neoliberalism was meant to enhance. Now this era of 
globalization must be saved, and not by the neoliberal ideology that led in signiﬁcant part to globalization’s current 
crisis of legitimacy. Rather, policymakers should return to the intellectual and normative framework that made the 
renaissance of global markets possible: embedded liberalism” (p.161). John Ruggie & Rawi Abdelal, The Principles 
of Embedded Liberalism: Social Legitimacy and Global Capitalism, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION. 
(David Moss, and John Cisternino, eds. ed. 2009). 
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2.2 MARTHA FINNEMORE AND KATHRYN SIKKINK’S THEORY OF NORM CASCADE 
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s theory of norm cascade38 connects with Ruggie’s idea of 
‘norm-transforming change,’ because the authors are interested in the role norms play in political 
change—both the ways in which norms themselves change and the ways in which they change other 
features of the political landscape.39 While Ruggie’s embedded liberalism does not necessitate a change in 
the normative framework of international economic regimes, my research looks at the conflict between 
the established norm of economic growth and the emerging norms of sustainable development. I suspect 
that the dominant or established norm of the development focus on economic growth may limit 
environmental policy choices. Finnemore and Sikkink find the following explanations for the way norms 
produce social order and stability: norms channel and regularize behavior, and they often limit the range 
of choice and constrain action.40 The problem is explaining change. The authors suggest that in an 
ideational international structure, idea shifts, and norm shifts are the main vehicles for system 
transformation. “Norm shifts are to the ideational theorists what changes in balance of power are to the 
realists”.41 Ruggie also notes “having identified the possibility of system transformation at the macro 
level, corresponding micro practices that may have transformative effects must be identified”.42 My study 
investigates the possibility of transformative effects of such “micro practices” such as institutional 
transparency and participation in international economic law disputes. 
2.2.1 Institutions, norms and concepts 
To avoid conceptual confusion, which Finnemore and Sikkink43 believe arise from the different language 
of norms44 versus the language of institutions,45 I refer to the New Oxford American Dictionary, which 
                                                     
38 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1998) at 887-917. 
39 Ibid., at 888. 
40 Ibid., at 894. 
41 Ibid., at 894. 
42 John Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 
52 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1998) at 876. 
43 Finnemore and Sikkink explain: one difference between “norm” and “institution” is aggregation. The norm 
definition isolates single standards of behavior, whereas institutions emphasize the way in which behavioral rules 
are structured together and interrelate (a collection of practices and rules). The authors contend that “used carefully, 
norm language can help to steer scholars toward looking inside social institutions and considering the components of 
social institutions as well as the way these elements are renegotiated into new arrangements over time to create new 
patterns of politics” Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1998) at 891. 
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defines norm as “a standard or pattern, especially of social behavior, that is typical or expected of a 
group”. Institution is defined as “an established law, practice, or custom”. In my research, for example, 
social institutions include the market. And one norm within the market as institution is the norm of 
private property right protection. Another social institution addressed in my research is development, and 
an example of a norm within development as institution would be the norm of focusing on economic 
growth. Sustainable development is not yet a proper social institution, because while evolving it has not 
yet been fully institutionalized: it is not yet ‘established law, practice or custom.’ We may therefore speak 
instead of “the concept” of sustainable development.46 Sustainable development, however, does include 
various norms, such as public participation and access to information.   In my study, I understand 
sustainable development to be an intellectual and potentially legal concept that might evolve into a social 
institution, just as the market evolved into today’s dominant social institution. 
2.2.2 Strategic social construction 
In my research, I look at “the mechanism by which norms exercise influence,” that is for example: how 
norms of public participation and transparency vis-à-vis the established norm of confidentiality influence 
dispute outcomes. Finnemore and Sikkink identify “one of the most politically salient processes” is 
“strategic social construction,” in which actors “strategize rationally to reconfigure preferences, identities, 
or social context”.47 My research focuses on the arena of international public investment disputes or 
                                                                                                                                                                           
44 Regarding different types or categories of norms, according to Finnemore and Sikkink, we can differentiate 
between regulative norms, constitutive norms, and prescriptive norms. Regulative norms order and constrain 
behavior. For example, private property rights are norms of the market understood as institution (i.e. an aggregation 
of practices and rules or different norms). Private property right protections constrain behavior. The WTO 
Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) orders behavior. For instance, TRIPS Article 27 
mandates all WTO members to make patents available and prohibits members from excluding patents from any 
specific sectors. (Before the TRIPS agreement, countries like India could refuse to patent pharmaceuticals). 
Constitutive norms create new actors, interests, or categories of actions. Examples here are the norms of public 
participation and access to information, which I focus on in my study. Prescriptive norms carry a quality of 
“oughtness” and an evaluative dimension. The authors explain: “we only know what is appropriate by reference to 
the judgments of a community or a society”. Norm-breaking behavior generates disapproval and norm conforming 
behavior is either praised or is so taken for granted that it provokes no reaction whatsoever. Yet, “there are no bad 
norms from the vantage point of those who promote the norm”. Ibid., at 891-2. 
45 The different language of norms used by political scientists versus the language of institutions used by 
sociologists. 
46 The invention of new legal concepts is normally a rare occurrence and always challenging. Where some such 
concepts, for instance those of the “most favored nation treatment” and of “self-determination” have evolved, 
maturing from idea to legal standards or norms, others, such as that of the “common heritage of human kind or of a 
“New International Economic Order” (NIEO), have faded away, having lost their initial evocative appeal. NICO  
AND FRIEDL WEISS (EDS.) SCHRIJVER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE   (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 2004) at xi. 
47 Ibid., p.888. 
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arbitrations where such “strategic social construction” can take place.48 Norms, both existing and 
evolving, are being interpreted in disputes. One could also say that ideas receive emphasis during disputes 
and influence outcomes. “Ideational causation” as norm-based reason for action,49  can be identified from 
dispute content and outcome, because specific ideas50 provide the reason for action, such as a government 
having to pay compensation claims to the winning corporation; or they provide reasons for governments 
not to take actions, (the regulatory chill effect), such as governments hesitating to implement a policy.51 
The concept of ideational causation is therefore relevant to my study, but not its main subject.52 I don’t 
attempt to investigate the policy outcomes or policy changes prompted53 by a dispute outcome. Instead, I 
                                                     
48 I am of the view that “strategic social construction” can be observed in both the negotiation process of 
international law and in the interpretation of the negotiated treaties during arbitrations and disputes. But in this study 
I only focus on the latter arena. 
49 Finnemore and Sikkink look at “conditions under which norms will be influential in world politics” and advise 
researchers to “specify ideational causal claims and mechanisms clearly”. The authors use ideational “causation” in 
a way that recognizes that ideas and norms are often reasons for actions, not causes in the physical sense of the 
world. In my research, norm-based “reasons for action” can be identified from a dispute outcome. Martha 
Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION (1998) 
at 888 and 890. 
50 For example, an arbitration ruling requiring a government to compensate a company may be based on the idea of 
“regulatory takings” or the idea that a government policy is “tantamount to” an expropriation or an “indirect” 
expropriation. “This ‘tantamount to’ clause has been used under NAFTA’s Chapter 11 to file cases claiming that 
government regulatory policies, including those that treat domestic and foreign investors the same, are equivalent to 
takings because they restrict investors’ actions”. NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Cases Lessons for the Central 
America Free Trade Agreement. (2005) at 2. “Ideational causation” is here exemplified by the content and outcome 
of the dispute based on the idea of “regulatory takings” which itself is based on an established norm (in this case the 
Hull Rule). The requirement of “prompt, adequate, and effective” compensation has become known as the ‘Hull 
Rule’” in reference to Secretary of State Cordell Hull who at the time stated “no government is entitled to 
expropriate private property, for whatever purpose, without the provision for prompt, adequate, and effective 
payment therefore”. Andrew T.  Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 639(1998) at 645. 
51 Tienhaara’s (2006) study of an Indonesian case involving a dispute over mining contracts in protected forests, 
which the author finds to provide evidence supporting the regulatory chill hypothesis. In this case, even though 
NGOs got actively involved to advocate for environmental protection, the Indonesian government retreated in part 
from its forest law that prohibited open-cast mining in protection forests. “According to several observers, the 
government had been ‘burned’ in previous arbitrations and was not eager to try their luck again”. Kyla Tienhaara, 
What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: Investor-State Disputes and the Protection of the Environment in Developing 
Countries, 6 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (2006) at 94. 
52 My study does not investigate ideational causation, but rather accepts this concept as a reason for action by the 
relevant actors, i.e., governments, corporations and third parties in a dispute. This perception matters for the 
dynamics in strategic social construction or norm shaping that actors engage in during negotiations and disputes, 
which is the focus of my study. The perception of “ideational causation” among actors in a dispute is what causes 
them to engage eagerly in strategic social construction, that is to defend a status quo norm or fight for norm cascade 
in the battle of norm contestation. 
53 Finnemore and Sikkink advise researchers to evaluate those claims (of ideational causation) “in the context of 
carefully designed historical and empirical research”. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm 
Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1998) at 890. 
 18 
focus on factors or case characteristics that may influence the dynamic of norm contestation that centers 
on strategic social construction during a dispute.54 
“Because norms embody a quality of ‘oughtness’ and shared moral assessment,” Finnemore and 
Sikkink state, “norms prompt justification for action and leave an extensive trail of communication 
among actors that we can study”.55 In my research, this ‘trail’ of communication can be found in the legal 
reasoning in cases leading to a specific dispute outcome ‘destination.’56 However, my focus is not to show 
that sustainable development as a concept or normative framework exists;57 rather, I want to investigate 
what prevents behavioral change in the direction of norm internalization.58 Sustainable development is not 
                                                     
54 In other words, my focus lies on norm change or transformation based on treaty law rather than norm change or 
transformation based on customary law. Nevertheless, I recognize that the division between the two is not that 
simple. Sometimes treaty law may influence or lead to new customary law; conversely, it may hinder the 
development of new customary international law. Richard B. Bilder and  Oscar Schachter Jonathan I. Charney and 
Maurice Mendelson, Disentangling Treaty and Customary International Law  § 81 ((APRIL 8-11, 1987) at 157-164. 
55 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) Ibid., at 892. 
56 Finnemore and Sikkink explain this means “we can only have indirect evidence of norms just as we can only have 
indirect evidence of most other motivations for political action” (Ibid., p. 892). While others have investigated direct 
evidence for sustainable development (See for example S.  Gamper-Rabindran, NAFTA and the Environment: What 
Can the Data Tell Us, 54 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 605(2006). Such as 
changes in air pollution or other environmental measures, my approach focuses on these indirect measures of norms 
of sustainable development. One reason I focus on sustainable development as a concept with evolving norms is the 
growing recognition of ecological limits to economic growth, which warrants logically a Kuhnsian shift away from 
the dominant economic growth norm in the current development paradigm (although Kuhn did not apply his concept 
to social sciences or legal studies). As Finnemore and Sikkink suggest, “idea shifts and norm shifts are the main 
vehicles for system transformation” (Ibid., at 894). 
57 Significantly, Finnemore and Sikkink “separate norm existence or strength from actual behavioral change in their 
operationalization” (Ibid., p. 892). 
58 Regarding the “life cycle” of norms theory, Finnemore and Sikkink explain the dynamics of norm evolution with 
their “life cycle” of norms theory. This three-stage process involves: First, norm emergence during which norm 
entrepreneurs seek to persuade a critical mass of states to embrace new norms, leading to a threshold or tipping 
point. The second stage, norm cascade, is characterized by a dynamic of norm leaders motivating other states to 
become norm followers. It is based on pressure for conformity, the desire to enhance international legitimization, 
and/or the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem. The third and final stage in the “life cycle” of norms 
occurs with norm socialization to achieve norm internalization. At this stage, “norms become so widely accepted 
that they are internalized by actors and achieve a “’taken-for-granted’ quality that makes conformation with the 
norm almost automatic”. The authors recognize that “internalized norms can be both extremely powerful (because 
behavior according to the norm is not questioned) and hard to discern (because actors do not seriously consider or 
discuss whether to conform)” (Ibid., p. 904). Applied to the context of my study, a simplified outline of the 
emergence of the concept of sustainable development, for example, could include the following: The UN General 
Assembly Resolution on Development and Environment of 1972, which recognized that “no environmental policy 
should adversely affect the present or future development possibilities of the developing countries”. (See: UN 
General Assembly Resolution on Development and Environment A/RES/2849 (XXVI), 17 January 1972). The 
Stockholm Declaration legitimized the human environment as an area of international concern, recognizing that the 
protection of the environment “is the urgent desire of the peoples of the whole world and the duty of all 
governments”. (See: Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 11 
1.L.M. 1416, June 16, 1972).This aspiration was expressed in the general principles of the 1982 World Charter For 
Nature, of which the first principle states: “Nature shall be respected and its essential processes shall not be 
impaired”. (See: World Charter for Nature U.N.G.A. RES. 37/7; 22 I.L.M.455, October 28, 1982.) All these 
aspirations and earlier recognitions then were formulated by the 1987 Brundtland Report into the popular description 
and definition of sustainable development as “development which meets the needs of the present without 
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yet achieved since state and non-state actors behave not in conformity with sustainable development 
principles. However, the evolution of the concept of sustainable development has led to a reaction by 
those wanting to protect the dominant development norm that focuses predominantly on global economic 
growth. While participation and transparency are norms of the concept of sustainable development, one 
reaction to this evolution is to prevent these norms from challenging the norms of confidentiality that 
have been established in international investment law.59 
2.2.3 Dynamics of strategic social construction and norm contestation 
Influenced by Ruggie’s idea of norm-transforming change, I am interested in the dynamics of norm 
contestation. In this study, I look at institutional factors, (including institutional transparency and third 
party representation and participation), as mechanisms that may facilitate or prevent norm cascade and 
norm internalization. Finnemore and Sikkink’s theory of norm cascade identifies three important aspects 
in the dynamics of strategic social construction and norm contestation: First, norm entrepreneurs face 
firmly embedded alternative norms,60  and conceptions of appropriateness. In international investment 
arbitration, for example, the norm of institutional transparency has long been seen as inappropriate 
because of the embedded norm of confidentiality that dominates in commercial arbitrations. Second, the 
authors point to organizational platforms or arenas in which norm contestation takes place and 
acknowledge that the structure of international organizations can influence norms they promote,61 as can 
the epistemic communities residing within them.62 While the focus on institutional structure and on 
                                                                                                                                                                           
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. (Our Common Future. (1987). The 1992 
Rio Declaration adopted this definition in Principle 3, that “the right to development must be fulfilled so as to 
equitably meet the development and environmental needs of present and future generations”. (See: Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26; 31 I.L.M.874, June 13, 1992). One decade later we 
find the title of an international conference entailing the concept, namely the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development. The 2012 Rio plus 20 Conference initiated the path to the UN Sustainable Development Goals 
adopted in 2015. 
59 We can recognize here a dynamic that is characterized by the power struggle among different actors, which lies at 
the heart of Raymond Miller’s multi-centric organizational framework or model, discussed below. 
60 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1998) at 896. 
61 The authors note: “Often, entrepreneurs work from standing international organizations that have purposes and 
agendas other than simply promoting one specific norm. Those other agendas may shape the content of norms 
promoted by the organization” (Ibid., p. 899, FN 49). 
62 For example, professional training and expertise of bureaucrats in these organizations can aid or block the 
promotion of new norms within standing organizations (Ibid., p. 899). Economists, ecologists, and lawyers all carry 
different normative biases, systematically instilled in their professional training (Ibid. p. 905). See also Peter Haas’s 
study on epistemic communities. Dezalay and Garth (1996) observed that arbitrators tend to come from a discrete 
professional community, nested in networks of cross-connected players who affiliate around prominent centers of 
arbitration, such as the International Chamber of Commerce. See: Y. Dezalay and B. Garth, 1996, Dealing in virtue. 
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professional bias contribute in important ways to our understanding of norm change,63 I focus on 
procedural mechanisms within institutional arrangements, such as institutional transparency and 
participatory access, hypothesizing that they may matter for the possibility of norm cascade. Third, 
Finnemore and Sikkink illustrate the different stages in a norm life cycle in which “change at each stage is 
characterized by different actors, motives and mechanisms”.64 However, these actors (norm entrepreneurs 
with organizational platforms, states, international organizations networks, law professions, bureaucracy) 
are not well defined and in my view better describe the agents through which actors achieve their strategic 
social construction. Raymond C. Miller provides a better-developed framework to understand central 
actors engaged in norm contestation, one that takes into account the different worldviews or paradigms 
from which these actors come from and their respective motives or objectives.65   
2.3 RAYMOND C. MILLER’S MULTI-CENTRIC ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL AND 
WORLD VIEW 
As Finnemore and Sikkink note, a norm is a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given 
identity, so that norm advocacy depends on the worldview or paradigm the actors come from.66 And 
existing paradigms, as identified by Raymond C. Miller, are conflicting. He contrasts three dominant 
paradigms or worldviews in the field of international political economy, relevant to the policy issue of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
University of Chicago Press, referenced in: Gus Van Harten: “Contributions and limitations of empirical research on 
independence and impartiality in international investment arbitration,” Oñati Socio-Legal Series, Vol.1, No 4, 2011. 
Moreover, Gus Van Harten has alerted us to the way in which “longstanding safeguards of judicial independence in 
domestic systems of justice have been abandoned in the unique context where foreign investors bring international 
claims against states”. According to Van Harten, “without secure tenure for the judges who decide public law, one 
must ask, where does the judges’ career interest lay? Where one can credibly show that the judges may be 
financially or economically beholden to public or private interests that have a stake in the case or in the 
interpretation of the law, then the appearance of independence—and appearances are key in this respect given the 
difficulties of proving or disproving actual bias—is seriously undermined. “See: Gus Van Harten, Five Justifications 
For Investment Treaties: A Critical Discussion, 2 TRADE, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (2010). 
63 Finnemore and Sikkink recognize that “routes to normative change may be indirect and evolutionary: procedural 
changes that create new political processes can lead to gradual and inadvertent normative, ideational and political 
convergence. “I investigate whether a procedural change in international economic law disputes that would adopt 
transparency and third party participation could lead to a new political process or change in the power dynamics of 
norm contestation that could allow for the possibility of a gradual ideational or norm-transforming change. 
Finnemore, M. and K. Sikkink (1998) at 905. 
64 Ibid., at 895 and 898. 
65 RAYOND C. MILLER, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: CONTRASTING WORLD VIEWS   
(Routledge. 2008) at 105 and 217. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) do recognize this in part in their definition of a 
norm as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” [emphasis added], (Ibid., at 891). 
66 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1998) at 891. 
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sustainable development by juxtaposing economic liberalism, institutionalism for which he developed the 
Multi-Centric Organizational (MCO) model, and Marxism. He thereby highlights their different beliefs 
about central actors, about decision-making, and about value creation that determine their different 
perspectives on preferred policies, including development policy. Contrasting worldviews thus is 
important to an understanding of norm contestation, and to Finnemore and Sikkink’s notion that “there 
are no bad norms from the vantage point of those who promote the norm”.67 The dominant norms 
associated with the market understood as institution have been so widely accepted that they reach norm 
internalization in Finnemore and Sikkink’s life cycle of norms. 
Of these different worldviews or paradigms, I have adopted the MCO perspective68 as an 
analytical framework for my study. My reasons for this choice are fourfold: I choose the MCO model 
because of its diversity of the central actors, because of its interaction model of power negotiations, 
because of its political and economic decision making arenas, and because of its criticism of the dominant 
paradigm of economic liberalism.69 
In this view, the market as institution with specific norms and views stands in opposition to the 
institutionalization of sustainable development norms. For example, the market model’s emphasis on 
individuals seeking to maximize material gain stands in opposition to the sustainable development norm 
of equitable sharing of limited resources; private property stands in contrast to the concept of the 
commons; competition as the accepted mode of behavior stands in contrast to the need for cooperation on 
transboundary issues such as such as in climate change; the focus on efficiency stands in contrast to 
                                                     
67 Ibid., at 892. 
68 Adherents to the MCO school of thought argue that the central actors are not individuals, as assumed by economic 
liberals, nor are the central actors classes, as proposed by Marxists. Instead, the MCO school argues that central 
actors are multi-centric organizations, including corporations, government agencies, labor unions and non-profit 
associations or NGOs. The decision-making process also differs. In the MCO model decisions are derived though 
power negotiations, rather than by the supply and demand dynamic in the market suggested by economic liberals, or 
by the capitalist mode of production proposed by Marxists. Actors engage in different decision-making arenas: 
political arenas include legislatures, regulators, and courts, and economic arenas include oligopolistic business 
structures. The outcomes in the MCO model are determined by power rather than market efficiency as assumed by 
economic liberals. RAYOND C. MILLER, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: CONTRASTING 
WORLD VIEWS (Routledge. 2008) at 105. Authors of the MCO school of thought critically view the market itself, 
understood as institution or aggregate of norms, to be the result of norm creation or construction. Karl Polanyi’s 
Great Transformation notes important norm elements of the market as institution, such as the commodification of 
nature (which is relevant in my study). He argues that the market actually turns real things into “fictional 
commodities” that have harmful consequences. Raymond C. Miller (2008) at 90. 
69 This critique leads adherents to the MCO school of thought (depending on their location on the MCO school of 
thought spectrum) to propose either reform, as in Ruggie’s call for a return to embedded liberalism, or to propose 
radical system transformation. Among the latter belongs Herman Daly who emphasizes the environmental limits of 
our global ecological system within which the global economy must function and beyond which development policy 
or economic growth cannot be realistically pursued. 
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sufficiency;70 the focus on economic growth stands in contrast to the recognition of ecological limits; the 
normative prescription of laissez-faire government stands in contrast to the need for government 
regulations; supply and demand as the value determining mechanism stands in contrast to an 
understanding of the inherent value in natural capital. 
The MCO model, therefore, fits well the situation of the evolution of the concept of sustainable 
development, currently undergoing norm contestation through strategic social construction by various 
actors engaging in power negotiations over the gain or loss of norm institutionalization. I apply this 
framework in my study of what institutional factors or norms in international economic disputes prevent 
the possibility of norm-transforming change. The central actors in the MCO model match with those in 
my study, i.e., governments, corporations, and third party public representatives. And the MCO model’s 
decision-making dynamic of power negotiations fits the strategic social construction dynamic that I 
assume to be at play in norm contestation: actors engage in power negotiations over – or in strategic 
social construction of –norms in a battle of norm contestation. The MCO model’s political decision-
making arena includes legislatures, regulators, and courts, which matches with my study of international 
economic law disputes integrating law-making and law-applying processes. And the model’s criticism of 
the dominant economic liberal paradigm fits well with the idea of prescriptive qualities of norms and my 
interest in norm-transforming change towards sustainable development. 
2.4 LEGAL THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
The above explicated theoretical frameworks, based on theories from the fields of international political 
economy and global governance, inform my assumptions about main actors, dynamics involved in the 
institutionalization process of sustainable development and the arenas in which thy interact. In addition 
this study, focusing on the specific ‘arena’ and context of international economic law disputes in which an 
environmental policy was challenged, required knowledge of legal studies, such as on: historic 
development and relevant principles and rules of international law, including evolving standards; existing 
legal and institutional frameworks including established constitutional and administrative arrangements; 
and established legal and institutional practices and techniques. Legal theory therefore contributed to my 
understanding of existing legal and institutional frameworks, principles and rules as well as techniques 
                                                     
70 For Wolfgang Sachs focusing exclusively on "doing things right" (i.e., efficiency) without first figuring out how 
"to do the right things" (i.e., sufficiency) is like putting the cart before the horse. WOLFGANG SACHS, PLANET 
DIALECTICS  (Zed Books. 1999). 
 23 
and thereby enabled me to develop the indicators and measurements of this study. Specifically, these 
inputs informed the boundaries within which central actors engage and thereby allowed me to organize 
and categorize complex elements of this study for a meaningful analysis, taking into account: dispute 
rules as well as practices and criteria for public participation and transparency; legal arguments, their 
relevance and applicability; and a variety of approaches to – or methods of –treaty interpretation. The 
author therefore took an interdisciplinary approach, combining the scholarly fields of International 
Relations or International Affairs and of International Legal Studies. Relevant legal theories or ideas 
informing this study, include inter alia: the concept of fragmentation71 in international law; the theory of 
‘self-contained’ or ‘special regimes’ in international law;72 the idea of a systematic or unifying role of 
general international law; as well as public law approaches73 vis a vis the notion of “a constitutional 
function of international economic law”.74    
                                                     
71 For an application of the concept to international environmental law, see: BODANSKY DANIEL AND JUTTA 
BRUNNEE AND ELLEN HAY (EDS.), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW  (Oxford University Press. 2007). With regards to international economic law, see Alan 
Boyle, dispute resolution and applicable law, chapter 7 in the above-cited Oxford Handbook of International 
Environmental law. Applied specifically to international investment law, see S. Di Benedetto who explains two 
notions of fragmentation applied to international investment law: one focusing on its “fragmentation into a 
multiplicity of autonomous legal instruments [and] the settlement of investment disputes by independent investment 
tribunals”; and the other focusing on cases in which rules or principles belonging to different regimes may apply to 
the same matter in a potentially conflicting way”. SAVERIO DI BENEDETTO, EDWARD ELGAR 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT   (Edward Elgar) at 22-23. He also quotes 
the International Law Commission’s observations of “‘fragmentation does create the danger of conflicting and 
incompatible rules, principles, rule-systems and institutional practices’, as well as noting ‘the emergence of 
specialized and (relatively) autonomous rules  or rule-complexes, legal institutions and spheres of legal practice’ 
such as trade law and environmental law” referring in footnote 1 to the International Law Commission, 58th 
Session, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemie, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006. 
72 Saverio Di Benedetto discusses this theory in detail and refers to the International Law Commission’s report on 
fragmentation to “delineate three possible meanings to the concept of self-contained regimes”. He suggests: One 
meaning applies to cases ‘where a special set of secondary rules claims priority over the secondary rules in the 
general law of State responsibility[;] self-contained regimes may consist of ‘interrelated wholes of primary and 
secondary rules’ having primacy over general rules on the matter[;] and this legal notion may concern entire fields 
of international law (such as human rights law, trade law etc.) and imply ‘rules of general international law are 
assumed to be modified or even ‘excluded’ in the ‘administration’ (interpretation and application of rules) of these 
fields”. SAVERIO DI BENEDETTO, EDWARD ELGAR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT   (Edward Elgar) at 25-31. The author also notes on page 33 in footnote 34 the ILC Reports 
conclusion that “the notion of a ‘self-contained regime’ is simply misleading and accordingly it is suggested that the 
term ‘self-contained regime’ be replaced by ‘special regime’”. 
73 See here: Gus Van Harten, who argues for the adaptation of ‘a public law framework’ in investment treaty 
arbitrations, calling for “the application of principles developed domestically and, to a lesser extent, in the 
international sphere, in cases where courts and tribunals directly resolve regulatory disputes between individuals and 
the state”. He suggests “tribunals should be cognizant of a wider regulatory concerns overs, including the 
countervailing interest that are represented by public opposition to particular business activity; the implications of a 
particular investment for the host economy; the impact on the host state’s ability to prioritize social stability, public 
health and morals, and environmental concerns over the objectives of economic efficiency and investor confidence; 
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The study leans on theories from legal studies that focus on the methods of treaty 
interpretations,75 such as whether a textual or objective, intentionalist or subjective, teleological,76 an 
integrated approach77 or meta-teleological78 approach, or a combination thereof. These ideas are reflected 
in my selection of the study’s horizontal integration indicator and related measurements. 
 
Legal studies’ general ideas of fragmentation in international law, a unifying role of general 
international law as well as public law approaches are noticeably linked to the study’s focus on horizontal 
integration between two distinct branches of international public law, i.e. economic versus environmental 
law. For example, this study treats each of them in a “quasi-unified” manner. With regards to 
international economic law, S. Di Benedetto, for example: speaks of a “quasi-unified regime” when 
referring to international investment law; treats it as a unified concept, notwithstanding its lack of 
comprehensive multilateral rules;79 and at the same time recognizes “the formal patchwork origins of the 
rules applied [and] ongoing differences in treaty clauses and arbitral decisions”.80  
                                                                                                                                                                           
and the overall coherence and legitimacy of the integration project”. GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT 
TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW   (Oxford University Press. 2007) at 143-144. 
74 ERNST-ULRICH   PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC FOREIGN 
TRADE LAW AND FOREIGN TRADE POLICY IN THE US, THE EU AND SWITZERLAND  (Higher 
Education Press. 2004). 
75 See for example: M.O.  HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920–1942. 
A TREATISE   (1943) at 640–661; H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (1958); E.  MCWHINNEY, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES. JURISDICTION, JUSTICIABILITY AND JUDICIAL LAW-MAKING ON THE 
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL COURT (1991).; O. SPIERMANN, INTERNATIONAL ARGUMENT 
IN THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE. THE RISE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
JUDICIARY   (2005).; Christoph Schreuer, Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment 
Arbitration, 3 TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2006).; and Ole Kristian Fauchald, The legal 
Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An empirical Analysis, 19 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2008). 
76 “The objective approach [ ] focuses on the analysis of the words that are actually used in the text itself; the 
subjective approach, [ ] focuses on determining the intention of the parties to the treaty; and the teleological 
approach, [ ] focuses on the object and purpose of the treaty”. : KJETIL MUJEZINOVIć LARSEN, THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS TREATY OBLIGATIONS OF PEACEKEEPERS   (Cambridge University Press. 2012) at 23. Gerald  
Fitzmaurice, Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-54: General Principles and Sources of 
Law, in BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1953) at 1-70. 
77 Referring in the context of this study to treaty interpretation that, for example “take[s] account of environmental 
considerations and norms from international environmental law”. KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF 
CAPITAL   (Cambridge University Press. 2013) at 313. 
78 Referring to “the scheme of treaties” [and] “in support of a systematic approach to treaty interpretation”. See: 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2011-2012 at 93. 
79 SAVERIO  DI BENEDETTO, EDWARD ELGAR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT   (Edward Elgar.) at 9-10. 
80 Ibid., at 12. 
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International investment law provisions can be frequently found in Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs), besides their location in bilateral investment agreements. International trade law exists both 
within the multilateral WTO context as well as in bi- and multi-lateral “WTO+” and FTA law. In this 
study international economic law encompasses both investment and trade law. They share some 
similarities in terms of coverage and provisions. The WTO, for example contains the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
that covers establishment (investment) under service sector. FTAs also contain investment provisions 
including under their service sector chapters. They also share similar legal provisions, such as the 
principles of national treatment and most-favoured nations. 
 
Similarly international environmental law covers different subject matters as well as areas with 
synergies, and exists in multilateral and sometimes bilateral form of treaties. S. Di Benedetto notes here 
as well that authors have used the term “patchwork” to describe the picture of both international rules on 
foreign investment, “and to qualify another branch of public international law, i.e. international 
environmental law”.81   
The public law approach among legal scholars and approaches to treaty interpretation are related 
to the study’s focus on the horizontal integration in the application of principles and norms between 
international economic law on the one hand and multilateral environmental agreements on the other. 
Legal studies focus less on the actors engaged in the process, though some legal scholars have 
implied the “potential of tribunals,” in their interpretive arguments, to “take into account interests other 
than those represented to them by investors and host countries [through] instruments that ensure 
transparency and participation”.82 This ‘potential’ is explored in this study by including three indicators 
hypothesized as relevant to dispute outcomes, comprising: horizontal integration; public representation or 
participation; and transparency. The study takes into account various actors engaged in power 
‘negotiations’ over – or in strategic social construction of –norms in a battle of norm contestation in the 
context of embedded liberalism, which explains the theoretical framework choice. 
                                                     
81 Ibid., at 9. C. MCLACHLAN, L. SHORE AND M. WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION. SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES   (Oxford. 2007) at 5; PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW   (Cambridge University Press ) at 4. 
82 Ole Kristian Fauchald, The legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An empirical Analysis, 19 EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008) at 359. 
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2.5 LINKAGE BETWEEN THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS AND THE STUDY 
My theory proposes that institutional factors influence the respective power of organizations engaged in 
strategic social construction and norm contestation in international economic law disputes. The theory is 
informed by the three theoretical frameworks introduced above and was developed because the 
literature’s focus on bias did not fully answer my questions around existing conflicts between 
environmental and economic policies, their origins and the outlook for overcoming such conflicts. Neither 
did the literature’s concentration on bias, although helpful, fully satisfy my need to gain a better 
understanding when I focused on only one arena where such conflict can be observed, namely 
international investment arbitration, and when I centered my attention on only one narrow research 
question: What explains variation in environmental policy permissibility in international economic law 
disputes? In this section I explain how my research question and my specific approach allows me to apply 
my theory with the aim to gain a deeper understanding to my questions about existing conflicts in 
international environmental and economic law.  
2.5.1 Overview of arenas, actors and norm contestation in the context of this study 
Figure 2.1 below illustrates the main three arenas in which norm contestation takes place, captured in the 
first column to the left. First, norm contestation takes place in the arena of domestic government or 
politics, shown at the bottom of this figure and second in the arena of international governance, illustrated 
above the domestic level. This positioning has two reasons: it illustrates the vertical link describing that 
outcomes of international governance in form of international law informs policy implementation at the 
domestic level, in some instances this can be understood as a top-down approach. The positioning is also 
well suited when we think of bottom-up approaches in international governance, such as seen in the 
recently adopted Paris Agreement in which parties determined their own nationally determined 
contributions. The third arena in which norm contestation takes place and is observed in this study is the 
arena of international disputes, illustrated at the top of Figure 2.1. This arena is placed at the top of this 
illustration to describe that: domestic policies and their implementation may be challenged in 
international investment arbitration; arbitrations are informed by the outcomes of international 
governance or international treaties; and arbitration outcomes again inform domestic policy makers in a 
vertical manner as to whether the policy challenged was determined by the tribunal as permissible or 
impermissible under international public law.  
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Figure 2.1 also illustrates the actors engaged in norm contestation, (second column) as well as the 
direction of norm contestation in the context of this study, namely toward embedded liberalism in the 
context of sustainable development (third column on the right). An important distinction in the norm 
contestation activities listed in the third column as ‘advocating’ and ‘defending’ public interest is that 
states, in contrast to non-government actors, have an “obligation to regulate economic activities in a 
public interest”.83 The number 1 in this illustration suggests one starting point in the arena of domestic 
government, where domestic government representatives from various policy areas and administrative 
levels engage in norm contestation to design, legislate and implement policies. Other indirect actors 
engaged in this norm contestation process are businesses and civil society representatives that advocate 
various public interest policies, depending on their respective background. Number 2 in this illustration 
takes us to the arena of international governance, as noted it is situated above domestic government 
because it informs, through vertical integration what policy objectives at the international level have been 
agreed on to be implemented at the domestic level. In the international governance arena, the main actors 
are government representative of various nations. However, each nation may select their government 
representatives for this arena from different ministries such as from the Ministry of Economy for 
economic regime negotiations and from the Ministry of Environment for environmental regime 
negotiations, indicated in two separate arrows in Figure 2.1. Also at the international governance arena we 
find other indirect actors engaged in this norm contestation process. These are again businesses and civil 
society representatives that advocate various public interest policies, depending on their background. 
Once international regime negotiations have resulted in formulated commitments or obligations of parties, 
may they be called their specific tariff or service sector schedules in economic regimes or “nationally 
determined contributions” as in the recent Paris Agreement, policy implementation takes place at the 
national level, indicated in this Figure 2.1 with the number 3. When a government’s domestic policy 
implementation is challenged by a foreign investor as violation of the investors’ economic rights, a 
dispute can be brought to an international investment arbitration indicated with a number 4. In this arena 
investors are notably no longer “other indirect actors” but as disputing party qualify as direct actors at 
equal footing with governments, while civil society organizations remain indirect actors. This unequal 
power situation can be adjusted through some procedural case characteristics, moving along a spectrum 
from no information about a case at all to permission to participate through an amicus curiae submission 
                                                     
83 “A recognition of the ‘right to regulate’ in international investment law indicates a similar if not the same 
paradigm shift as with regards to sustainable development: It should not be seen (or misused) as embracing 
unfettered or unchecked public powers, but it can be understood as relating to a more balanced approach which not 
only focuses on the rights of the investor but also on the obligation of the State to regulate economic activities in a 
public interest”. Steffen Hindelang and Markus Krajewski, Conclusion and Outlook Wither International Investment 
Law?, in SHIFTING PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW - MORE BALANCED, LESS 
ISOLATED, INCREASINGLY DIVERSIFIED (Steffen Hindelang and Markus Krajewski ed. 2016) at 381-382.  
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for example. The arrow on the left side of Figure 2.1 connecting the first arena with the third points in 
both ways because not only can a policy implemented be challenged in an international investment 
arbitration, but the outcome or ruling of such dispute informs in turn domestic government action, for 
example to pay compensation and or revise or change the initial policy. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1:Overview of arenas, actors and norm contestation 
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2.5.2 Application of my theory in the context of norm contestation in the arena of international 
investment arbitration 
How then does my research question, on what explains variation in environmental policy permissibility in 
international economic law disputes, and my specific approach allow me to apply my theory with the aim 
to gain a deeper understanding to my questions about existing conflicts in international environmental and 
economic law? 
There are several benefits to focusing on norm contestation in the arena of international 
investment arbitration. Besides narrowing the research focus to a specific forum (dispute settlement 
mechanism), and as noted before providing me with a specific population (cases) pre-identified by dispute 
parties to pose a policy conflict within a narrow context (legal analysis) there is also another important 
benefit to this choice of arena. Focusing on norm contestation in the arena of international investment 
arbitration is not disconnected from the outcomes of norm contestation in the arenas of domestic politics 
(the policy design and implementation being at issue in the dispute) and of international governance (the 
consideration of public international law in the determination of the dispute). And another interconnection 
between the outcomes of norm contestation in different arenas observable in international investment 
arbitrations lies in that the decision taken by a tribunal informs again policy design and implementation at 
the domestic governance level, as well as norm contestation at the international governance level. This is 
further discussed in the following sections of this chapter, specifically where I present my model of 
interactions in the context of norm contestation about sustainable development in international investment 
arbitration illustrated in Figure 2.3 below. 
Having noted the benefits for my choice to focus on norm contestation in the arena of 
international investment arbitration, an explanation is in order on what I did to offer new insights to what 
existing literature has explored so far. Specifically, the research question aimed at explaining norm 
contestation in the context of international investment law disputes in which environmental policies have 
been challenged as violation of an investors’ rights.  I examined what, in addition to facts provided in 
such cases, could matter in the determination of a case outcome. My outcome of interest is an 
environmental policy permissible ruling. By looking at institutional factors observable at the systemic 
level that may influence case outcomes the study attempts to explain influences on case outcomes in a 
different light or perspective than some of the literature that has focused on individual factors or bias. To 
me and in the context of this study institutional factors include both procedural and substantive case 
characteristics. I tested the hypotheses that cases in which procedural characteristics of transparency and 
public participation are present should result in environmental policy permissible outcomes. These 
procedural case characteristics are linked to the power of actors, with transparency and public 
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participation present reducing the power inequality among actors. The transparency and public 
participation characteristics constitute intra-institutional factors, because they depend on the governing 
rules for dispute settlement of the organization administering the dispute. In contrast categorized as inter-
institutional factor that can have an influence on case outcomes is horizontal integration between 
international economic and environmental law. It is understood as inter-institutional factor because it 
concerns the horizontal integration between two distinct international regimes. I tested the hypothesis that 
cases in which the substantive case characteristic of horizontal integration is observed should result in 
environmental permissible outcomes. Horizontal integration is categorized as a substantive rather than 
procedural case characteristic because it refers to the substantive legal arguments. And, notably, 
horizontal integration is based on the outcomes of norm contestation between various actors in the arena 
of international governance. Finally, building on the literature’s focus on bias, the study developed as 
more specific alternative explanation –and examined— the possible influence of an interpretation 
approach taken by a tribunal on case outcome. 
2.5.3 Observing embedded liberalism in the context of sustainable development as continuous 
compromise and result of an ongoing norm contestation process 
If the compromise of embedded liberalism was truly reached after World War II the issue of 
governments’ policy flexibility in achieving economic openness while serving domestic welfare should be 
settled and we should not see cases in which environmental policies are being challenged. Yet, such cases 
exist and they point to an understanding of embedded liberalism as continuous compromise, resulting 
from an ongoing norm contestation process at various levels. 
Recognizing that each such case is different, the question “what determines dispute outcomes in 
such cases” is difficult to answer. However, one may dare to ask, “What factors matter in the 
determination of dispute outcomes?” Findings of this inquiry: provide answers to the status of embedded 
liberalism; illuminate an uncompleted and ongoing norm contestation on the promotion of sustainable 
development in general and more specifically between economic and environmental policies’ design and 
implementation; and clarify inequalities in the power struggle among actors. 
So, if the idea of embedded liberalism would be fully and ideally realized in the context of 
economic and environmental policies, we would find harmony and mutual supportiveness between these 
two policy areas as the norm.  One would expect disputes to only occur in cases where environmental 
policies have been developed in gravely unjust, corrupt, protectionist or arguably unacceptable unilateral 
manners. However, the variance in the challenges and defenses of environmental policies and subsequent 
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determination of disputes outcomes provide insights into the actual status of embedded liberalism and its 
associated norm contestation process. 
A tribunal may find the disputed environmental measure impermissible because it violates the 
responding state’s obligations under the international economic law treaty under which the dispute was 
brought, or international law in general. The case outcome can also depend on what interpretation 
technique the tribunal applies and how it considers, inter alia: presented84 legal and factual arguments of a 
case; including purpose and objective of –as well as rights and obligations provided for in –the invoked 
economic treaty; and integration or hierarchy of the economic treaty in relation to other international 
environmental law instruments and agreements. 
In analyzing how a tribunal considers these elements specifically, this study observed indicators 
of horizontal integration, transparency and public participation with the aim of answering the question 
what factors matter in the determination of dispute outcomes. For example, the study observed that 
transparency and public representation and participation indicators have affected how a tribunal considers 
presented and /or possible legal and factual arguments of a case. However, as noted above not necessarily 
following the expectations of an amici curiae. In the Glamis v. United States case the tribunal stated its 
awareness of wide public anticipation of the case outcome and expressed its reluctance to decide on 
controversial issues presented in some of the amicus curiae submissions. Specific case characteristics 
indicating horizontal integration were in turn observed in the amicus curiae submissions. In its 
submission to this case the Quechan Indian Nation cited several international legal instruments, including 
a multilateral environmental agreement85 and submitted that the United States “was obliged under 
international law to safeguard the rights and interests of the Quechan people”.86  
To illustrate how the study can clarify the status of embedded liberalism in the context of 
economic and environmental policies and its associated ongoing norm contestation, let’s consider two 
case scenarios. 
 
In the first case scenario, a tribunal finds an environmental policy impermissible. Reasons for the 
decision may include findings that:  
                                                     
84 A tribunal may also initiate legal considerations not presented by parties. 
85The International Environmental Agreement data base project of the University of Oregon at 
https://iea.uoregon.edu/ provides more information on MEAs, such as the: Convention on Biological Diversity, with 
its instruments, including inter alia the Cartagena Protocol and Nagoya Protocol; CMS; CITES; Plant Treaty, 
Ramsar Convention, World Heritage Convention, Basel Convention, Rotterdam Convention, Stockholm 
Convention; Minamata Convention on Mercury; Vienna Convention; Montreal Protocol; UNCCD; UNFCCC with 
its Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement. Another good source is see for example United Nations Information Portal 
on Multilateral Environmental Agreements at https://www.informea.org . 
86 See supplemental amicus curiae submission of the Quechan Indian Nation in Glamis v. United States, 16 October 
2006, at 9. 
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• the challenged environmental policy has been developed in gravely unjust, corrupt, protectionist 
or unacceptable unilateral manners;  
• a violation of obligations under the invoked economic treaty occurred, including in consideration 
of the treaty’s purpose and objective; or  
• the challenged environmental measure has been developed or implemented in a manner that lacks 
due process, cost-benefit analysis or based on scientific reasoning. 
 
In the second case scenario, a tribunal finds an environmental policy permissible. Reasons for the 
decision may include findings that: 
• none of the above claims (of corruption or protectionism) have been shown in this case;  
• instead, the environmental policy is clearly linked to environmental objectives or to obligations 
under MEAs, which could also be specified in the economic treaty invoked; and/or  
• the policy has been implemented in a coordinated multilateral manner in line with international 
standards.  
 
As the study will show, in both of these scenarios, the latter two considerations: reveal the current 
status of embedded liberalism; depend on the norm contestation observable in the claim and defense 
arguments presented; and vary based on the interpretation technique employed. The status of embedded 
liberalism can be found in the requirements or qualifying considerations for a policy to be found 
permissible or not. The norm contestation can involve legal arguments that: widen the environmental 
policy space of treaty provisions; lead to broader understanding of concepts such as like circumstances or 
juxtapose legitimate versus reasonable expectations of investors; and call for considerations of 
respondent’s environmental objectives, including obligations under international legal instruments and 
agreements external to the economic treaty invoked. A sketch of possible juxtaposition of views in this 
context and examples of the study’s observations of the status of embedded liberalism and norm 
contestation are captured in Figure 2.2 below. 
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Figure 2.2: Sample observations of the status of embedded liberalism and norm contestation 
RULING IMPERMISSIBLE BECAUSE: RULING PERMISSIBLE BECAUSE: 
Policy found to be protectionist, including “green protectionism” 
MEA obligation not applicable because not ratified by all parties  
Policy found to be specifically linked to an MEA 
objective 
MEA found applicable even if not ratified because of 
universal nature of the MEA 
Environmental protection intention too vague for application and only 
in preambular language vis a vis economic objective and purpose 
provision 
Treaty includes sustainable development concept as 
overriding objective including in preambular or 
operational paragraphs noted by tribunal as significant 
Policy found to be arbitrary  Policy found to be linked specifically to an 
environmental purpose  
Policy found to be unilateral Policy implemented in coordinated multilateral manner 
or front-runner sovereignty upheld 
Policy found to be gravely unjust or implemented in a corrupt manner Policy found to be enacted in good faith 
Policy found to be not implemented in accordance with due process 
(timely, transparent, participatory manner)  
And without initial consultations 
Policy found to be implemented in accordance with due 
process (timely, transparent, participatory manner) 
And with initial consultations  
Policy found to lack of cost-benefit analysis, with no reference to 
scientific assessment and not in accordance with international standards 
Policy found to be based on an independent cost-
benefit analysis, and an independent scientific 
assessment and in accordance with international 
standards established by international bodies 
Exceptions or defenses seen as not applicable, because of threshold, 
specific qualifier in relevant provisions or doctrines 
Non–treaty or treaty-specific environmental exception 
or defense accepted as relevant and applicable 
ABSENCE OF HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION REFERENCE COULD KEEP LIMITED 
ENVIRONMENTAL SPACE IN ECONOMIC LAW CONTEXT: 
HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION REFERENCES COULD BROADEN 
ENVIRONMENTAL SPACE IN ECONOMIC LAW CONTEXT: 
Narrow understanding of concepts as “like circumstances” Broader understanding of concepts as “like 
circumstances”  
Narrow understanding of “legitimate expectations” of investor Higher threshold for “reasonable expectations” of 
investors, especially in highly regulated sector 
 Environmental impact assessment not seen as necessary or 
determining 
Environmental impact assessment accepted as 
established norm 
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An additional example is found in the Quechan Indian Nation amicus curiae submission to 
Glamis v. United States, which directly points to a specific ongoing norm contestation by: noting that “in 
the past decade, an emerging corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement has articulated new values 
and defined new norms for corporate good practice in relation to environmental and social performance 
on issues ranging from toxic emissions to human rights”; emphasizing CRS87 “is an evolving concept” 
with a “template [that] is emerging at the global level that entails seven norms of good practice”; and 
listing these and “the goals of these emerging norms”.88 Here, the interpretation technique employed by a 
tribunal plays an important role as this may alter whether it: permits a norm contestation that involves 
presentations by an amicus curiae; accepts legal arguments as relevant and recognizes such as applicable 
to the case; and considers two levels of horizontal integration. For example, in contrast to a tribunal 
employing systemic-integration interpretation technique, a tribunal employing a treaty-based 
interpretation technique may, in practice, reject consideration of MEA obligations by the responding state 
that are not mentioned the economic treaty under which the claim was brought. 
Finally, the third theoretical framework suggests decision-making processes are based on power 
struggles among actors. Power inequalities among actors in an institutional context can be related to: 
access to the negotiation or dispute processes to present a wide range of considerations; inter-institutional 
factors such as strong enforcement powers developed under international economic law regimes versus 
weaker compliance mechanisms that are still evolving under international environmental law regimes; or 
institutional bias. 
Recalling the first case scenario above, another underlying reason for an environmental policy 
impermissible outcome could be that a tribunal’s considerations may be related to an institutional biased 
based on the epistemic community to which arbitrators belong. For example, a tribunal that assumes a 
hierarchy of economic over environmental norms, may interpret the purpose and objective of the invoked 
treaty strictly thereby upholding economic norms and dismissing more vague preambular language calling 
for mutual supportiveness of sustainable development policy goals. This may not so much be an intended 
biased, but the result of arbitrators being versed in international economic law and less familiar with 
simultaneously evolving international environmental law instruments. 
                                                     
87 Some have noted described Corporate social responsibility as internationally recognized standards, referring to 
OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprise  (OECD  2011) and European Commission, A Renewed EU 
Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility (2011). Frank Hoffmeister, The Contribution of EU Trade 
Agreement s to the Development of International Investment Law, in SHIFTING PARADIGMS IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW - MORE BALANCED, LESS ISOLATED, INCREASINGLY 
DIVERSIFIED (Steffen Hindelang and Markus Krajewski eds. 2016) at 363. 
88 See supplemental amicus curiae submission of the Quechan Indian Nation in Glamis v. United States, 16 October 
2006, at 12-3. 
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Here, variation in the interpretation technique plays again an important role and can be observed 
in various cases, and the study considers as alternative explanation the interpretation approach taken by a 
tribunal. Viñuales juxtaposes the following two examples: In “Parkerings v. Lithuania, the tribunal 
interpreted the most-favored nation (MFN) clause of the applicable investment treaty in light of different 
considerations, including the fact that the projects of the two investors did not have the same 
consequences for a UNESCO protected side,” and thereby “carved out some space for the incorporation 
of environmental consideration in assessing the scope of the MFN clause”.89 In contrast, he notes in 
Grand River v. United States, the tribunal regarded “‘relevant rules’ under the VCLT cannot override 
agreed treaty text and the Parties’ agreements regarding its interpretation,” a “conception” which Viñuales 
suggests, “would deprive Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT of its main purpose, which is to introduce 
flexibility in the interpretation of international norms”.90 This issue of systemic integration was arguably 
also noted by the International Law Commission in its recent 2017 Report, stating: 
 
“The rules of international law relating to the protection of the atmosphere and other 
relevant rules of international law, including inter alia the rules of international trade and 
investment law, of the law of the sea and of international human rights law, should, to the extent 
possible, be identified, interpreted and applied in order to give rise to a single set of compatible 
obligations, in line with the principles of harmonization and systemic integration, and with a view 
to avoiding conflicts. This should be done in accordance with the relevant rules set forth in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, including articles 30 and 31, paragraph 3 (c), 
and the principles and rules of customary international law”.91 
 
Considering interpretation approach as alternative explanation, the study investigated and 
confirmed the potential influence of treaty-specific versus systemic-integration interpretation 
approaches92 taken by a tribunal on case outcomes and in combination with other hypothesized case 
features and characteristics. Importantly, the study investigated and focused on interpretation practice not 
                                                     
89 E. JORGE VIñUALES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW   
(Cambridge University Press. 2015) at 152-3. 
90 Ibid., at 154-5. 
91 United Nations Report of the International Law Commission Sixty-ninth session (1 May-2 June and 3 July-4 
August 2017), GAOR Seventy-Second Session Supplement No. 10 (A/72/10). 
92 These are defined below in the paragraph. In addition, the raw data collection included also observations of 
interpretation approaches: of mutual supportiveness; applying the principle of contemporaneity; and suggesting 
potential institutional biased. This latter politically sensitive category was observed for example based on 
jurisdictional assertion. 
 36 
the legal correctness thereof, which others have elaborated on.93 The study thus refrains from clarifying 
what a tribunal should have done to correctly apply for example VCLT Article 31, such as in a “single 
combined operation” but rather observes what interpretation approached a tribunal took. For this reason, I 
specified interpretation approaches that are unique and for this study’s purpose alone, though recognizing 
that VCLT Article 31 “neither stipulates a hierarchy of various distinct means of interpretation nor offers 
a tentative catalogue of various means of interpretation among which the interpreter may choose,” but “on 
the contrary obliges interpreters to consider all potentially relevant means of interpretation before 
eventually adopting one of them”.94 I specified as treaty-specific interpretation technique as focusing on 
VCLT Article 31 (1), (2) and (3) (a) and (b). In the context of this study, an observed treaty-specific 
interpretation approach means that the tribunal focused mainly on the text of the economic law treaty 
under which the claim was brought, and agreements, instruments, and state practice related specifically to 
that economic law treaty.95 In addition to an interpretation approach that is treaty text-based, an observed 
systemic-integration interpretation approach displays a tribunal taking also into account sources that are 
external to economic law treaty text under which the claim was brought as provided for in VCLT Article 
31(3)(c) to take into account any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties. The rationale behind identifying these observations96 is that references to such sources of 
                                                     
93 Katharina Berner examines the applicability of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in 
international investment disputes and highlights their potential to reconcile investment protection and sustainable 
development concerns. She notes: “unless parties to an IIA choose to deviate from the Vienna rules, these rules 
govern the agreement’s interpretation either as treaty law or as a reflection of customary international law”; “in most 
instances, the complex interaction of various sources in the light of the principle of party autonomy will result in 
authorizing arbitral tribunals to apply the Vienna rules”; and applying them –if they form part of the applicable law 
–is not subject to a tribunal’s discretion but mandatory” so that “failure to apply or to correctly apply [them] can 
entail serious consequences and may justify an annulment decision”. Katharina Berner, Reconciling Investment 
Protection and Sustainable Development, in SHIFTING PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW - MORE BALANCED, LESS ISOLATED, INCREASINGLY DIVERSIFIED (Steffen Hindelang and 
Markus Krajewski ed. 2016) at 180-181.   
94 Ibid., at 189. 
95 This approach applies this study’s observations of horizontal integration indicators at level 1 (treaty-specific) but 
not at level 2 (non-treaty specific) explicated in Chapter 3 below.  
96 The idea for identifying observations of interpretation techniques follows from the practice that parties to a 
dispute or amicus curiae submissions may make reference to any of the sources of international law, as listed in 
Article 38(1) of the Statue of the ICJ, in their presentations to the tribunal or panel, which in turn may also make 
independent reference to any of these sources. The two different interpretation techniques applied by the tribunals 
and observed in this study are differentiated by way of what kind of references to international law the tribunal 
considers in its interpretation, taking into account VCLT Article 31 on general rules of interpretation. 
 
Sources of international law are listed in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which 
reads:  "1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the 
contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
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international law that are external to the treaty text under which the claim was brought may in turn affect 
the understanding or interpretation of specific economic treaty provisions. 
The Santa Elena v. Costa Rica case is also illustrative of the link to the study’s theoretical 
frameworks, including the third or multi-centric organizational model by Raymond C. Miller addressing 
power struggles. The tribunal in this case did not see the need to consider references made by the 
responding state to its MEA obligations (one measure of horizontal integration in this study). The tribunal 
held that “the purpose of protecting the environment for which the property was taken does not alter the 
legal character of the taking for which adequate compensation must be paid [and] [t]he international 
source of the obligation to protect the environment makes no difference”.97 The tribunal’s conclusion 
points both to the status of embedded liberalism to the extent that expropriation requires compensation 
and to existing ongoing norm contestation, such as the responding state calling on the tribunal to consider 
its environmental protection obligations under MEAs. The case illustrates power dynamics by reference 
to pre-arbitration events,98 which included: First, legal proceedings between the parties before Courts of 
Costa Rica that took place in the approximately twenty-year period from the date of Respondents 1978 
Decree until the commencement of the arbitration. Second, that the 1994 US enactment or Helms 
Amendment (which prohibits U.S. foreign aid to a country that has expropriated the property of a U.S. 
citizen or corporation where the country has not returned the property, provided adequate and effective 
compensation, offered a domestic procedure providing prompt, adequate and effective compensation or 
                                                                                                                                                                           
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, [i.e. that only the parties bound by the decision in any particular case,] 
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law”. 
 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (on general rules of interpretation) addresses the 
interpretation of treaties. Its subparagraphs read: 
“1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its 
preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of 
the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and 
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its 
provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding 
its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended”.   
 
 
97 Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena SA v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case ARB/96/1, at paragraph 71. 
98 Ibid., at paragraphs 20 and 25. 
 38 
submitted the dispute to arbitration under the ICSID rules) was invoked against Costa Rica. Consequently 
a US $175 million Inter-American Development Bank loan to Costa Rica was delayed at the behest of the 
U.S. until Costa Rica consented to refer the Santa Elena case to international arbitration.  Costa Rica 
consented to arbitration before an ICSID tribunal on 21 March 1995. 
M. Sornarajah emphasizes that “disputes like Santa Elena may be regarded as having been 
decided when the effect of neoliberal thinking was at its highest,” noting this case as “an attempt at 
insulating investment protection from other values, such as the protection of the environment” while 
tribunals and courts, “outside the context of investment treaties” have held that “interference with foreign 
investment for an environmental purpose” can be justified.99 The pre-arbitration events in this case raise 
several questions, including: whether horizontal integration of international economic and environmental 
law may be better facilitated outside the investment treaty context, including through initial local legal 
review in domestic courts;100 whether local legal reviews are necessary and/or practical;101 and to what 
extent corporate political power promoting economic interest can prevent horizontal integration.102 
                                                     
99 M. SORNARAJAH, RESISTANCE AND CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT   (Cambridge University Press. 2015) at 334 and 332. 
100 As noted elsewhere, “the existence of a dispute settlement mechanism separate from domestic judicial and 
administrative procedures is thought to contribute to a ‘friendly investment climate’ necessary to attract FDI to the 
host state” (See: Freya (ed.) Baetens, International investment dispute settlement in the twenty-first century: Does 
the preservation of the public interest require an alternative to the arbitral model? , in INVESTMENT LAW 
WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTIVES (2013) at 418). However, the 
usefulness of attracting FDI for sustainable development depends on whether the investment does indeed promote 
not only economic but also environmental and social benefits. UNCTAD recommends the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals need “a step-change in investment” and suggests: private sector commitment to sustainable 
development; transparency and accountability in honoring sustainable development practices; partnership with 
government on maximizing co-benefits of investment; and [even] private sector’s responsibility to avoid harm, even 
if it is not prohibited. (See: UNCTAD: Investing in Sustainable Development Goals –Action Plan for Private 
Investments in SDGs, Special Edition for the Third International Conference on Financing for development –July 
2015, UNCATD/OSG/2015/3, at 6, available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/osg2015d3_en.pdf). 
101 Opinions on the necessity and practicality of exhausting local remedies differ. Christoph Schreuer opines “that in 
investment arbitration there is no need to exhaust local remedies. The only accepted exception from this principle is 
a claim for denial of justice” (Christoph Schreuer, Interaction of International Tribunals and Domestic Courts in 
Investment Law., in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: 
THE FORDHAM PAPERS (Brill Arthur W. Rovine ed. 2010) at 76). Others note: “in forming national coherence 
of environmental standards and assuring rule of law in environmental decisions, legal reviews play a vital role”; “if 
national legal remedies must be exhausted first, the international tribunals will to a greater extent be required to 
address national views as stated in national judgments”; and, particular in cases of developing countries, local legal 
institutions may develop or be strengthened. (ASA  ROMSON, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY SPACE AND 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW   (Stockholm University. 2012) at 87-89). 
102 For example by: promoting insulated regimes with more specific and stronger compliance mechanism in 
international economic law vis a vis MEAs; employing regulatory chill through the threat of arbitration; or using 
other legislative avenues as in this case the enactment and invocation of the Helms Amendment.  In this context Asa 
Romson has noted: “the perception of voluntarism in concluding international treaties, and thus constraining 
national policy space, is strictly formal and makes no account of the reality of world politics. It is rather evident that 
less powerful states sometimes make agreements forced by other, more powerful states. […] The fact that many 
BITs are more or less copies of the capital-exporting-state model treaty indicates that the capital-importing state in 
many negotiations has had a subordinated role in setting the rules”. (Ibid., at 40.) 
 39 
2.5.4 Model of interactions in the context of norm contestation about sustainable development in 
international investment arbitration 
To visualize the application of my theory in the context of norm contestation about sustainable 
development in international investment arbitration consider Figure 2.3 below, in which I present a model 
of interactions identified during this research and show how its findings inform the three theoretical 
frameworks and real world interactions. 
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Figure 2.3: Model of interactions in the context of norm contestation about sustainable development in 
international investment arbitration 
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If the imagination allows one to picture a butterfly in Figure 2.3, the center of this illustration 
captures the policy problem caused by simultaneously developed but potentially conflicting international 
economic and environmental laws. This is illustrated with two separate small circles, one on each side of 
the butterfly’s wings. Following down to the tail of the butterfly we get at the origin of the potential 
conflict between these two separate areas of international public law. As shown in Figure 2.1 above 
government representative from different ministries often engage in the respective negotiations of 
international economic and environmental regimes. In Figure 2.3 here, the encircled elements describe 
that international economic and environmental laws are often referred to as international regimes, 
including for example BITs and FTAs on the left side and MEAs on the right side. Regimes also include 
several principles, standards, and soft law elements or norms captured in the center above regimes. The 
upward arrows indicate that the content of international regimes feeds into the arbitration arena captured 
in a box above. Following the illustration further down shows that these regimes can be administered by 
or “housed” in IGOs. 
The illustration also captures the three theoretical frameworks, starting from the bottom with the 
theory of norm cascade. Norm contestation takes place between state actors but is also influenced by non-
state actors, including NGOs and corporations. This interaction of norm contestation in the context of 
different regimes can take place under the administration of IGOs. For example, several MEAs are 
drafted during meetings, such as COPs with administrative help of the respective Secretariats of the 
Conventions, such as in case of the three Rio Conventions the UNFCCC, the UNCBD or the UNCCD 
Secretariats.  
The second theoretical framework, the Multicentric-Organizational Model, is already captured in 
the depiction of various actors involved directly or indirectly in norm contestation. At the center of the 
butterfly, these actors are even more clearly illustrated as: corporations or an Investor party to a dispute 
case on the left; government or the State party to a dispute to the right; and various other NGOs, 
including Environmental NGOs (ENGOs), Youth representatives (YOUNGOs), Research and 
Independent NGOs (RINGOs), Indigenous Peoples Constituencies, Woman end Gender Constituencies; 
Trade Unions NGOs (TUNGOs) or Business and Industry NGOs (BINGOs) to give a taste of the 
acronym soup used by practitioners in the field.              An important element of this theoretical 
framework is the decision-making conception based on power negotiations and the recognition of power 
inequalities among actors. The triangles illustrate with sharp angles the superior level of power of 
corporations and governments as parties to a dispute compared to other non-disputing parties such as 
NGOs captured in a curved box. Notably, the two disputing parties also have the power to restrict NGOs’ 
access to some characteristics of the transparency and public representation and participation indicators in 
this study. This restrictive power is indicated by a dotted line in the illustration. This power is 
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administrated by the tribunal, also shown in a triangle as important actor in a dispute, though not 
engaging in power negotiations. The tribunal does, however have the power to make decisions and rulings 
in a dispute case. This power is particularly great in the international investment arbitration context with 
limited possibilities for appeals to a decision. 
The third theoretical framework of embedded liberalism is captured at the top of Figure 2.3 above 
the decision taken by a tribunal concluding either with an environmental policy permissible or 
impermissible ruling. Embedded liberalism is located and can be observed here because tribunals’ 
decisions are not always based on a clear finding, for example that the challenged environmental policy 
was clearly illegitimate because the measure was gravely unjust or based on corruption. Instead, a variety 
of reasons behind a tribunal’s decision for finding a measure either illegitimate or legitimate was 
observed. By providing its reasoning, the tribunal presents the status of embedded liberalism. Broadly 
speaking, reasons provided based on applicable laws and norms established under economic regimes 
supporting the finding of illegitimacy of a measure capture the “liberalism” and reasons provided based 
on applicable laws and norms founded under environmental regimes capture its “embeddedness”. Since 
these legal arguments are juxtaposed in a dispute case one can observe the contours of a given status of 
embedded liberalism (Please see Figure 2.2 above). Tribunal’s reasoning provided in their decisions thus 
inform the status of embedded liberalism (indicated with green arrows) which also feeds back to the norm 
contestation process below in this illustration. This feedback can show the applicability and value of 
provisions, norms, standards or principles resulting from the norm contestation process and/or provide 
information regarding what further updates may be necessary to improve their applicability in the context 
of international investment arbitrations. 
International investment disputes –the focus of this study –appear in the very center box of this 
illustration. As emphasized throughout the study and confirmed by the data, tribunals base their decisions 
foremost on facts, evidence and the applicable law presented in a dispute case. Besides these important 
elements captured in the illustrated arena, the study tested my ideas, highlighted in purple, that horizontal 
integration (HI), transparency (TR) and public representation and participation (PRP) could also have an 
influence on dispute outcomes.   
In addition, an alternative explanation was taken into account and tested, namely that the 
interpretation approach taken by a tribunal could have an influence on dispute outcomes. This alternative 
explanation of interpretation approach (I), also in purple is positioned closest to the tribunal in this 
illustration and next to facts, evidence and applicable law. This is because a tribunal taking a treaty-
specific interpretation approach may be less inclined to consider legal arguments as applicable law such 
as references to sustainable development (SD), to environmental exceptions or defenses (EED) and to 
MEAs when they are only presented at the horizontal-integration level 2, (not treaty-specific) compared 
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to a tribunal taking a systemic-integration interpretation approach. For example, such references may not 
be recognized as applicable law due to: their vagueness compared to more specific objectives provisions 
in the treaty invoked in the dispute; or lack of ratification of an MEA by the parties to the treaty invoked 
in a dispute; or lack of general universal applicability of the MEA. In addition, but not specifically 
considered in the final analysis of my results, institutional bias could also be at play, for example based on 
an epistemic community of arbitrators that is foremost trained in economic law or assumes a hierarchy 
between economic versus environmental regimes. 
My first idea, that horizontal integration (HI) could have an influence on dispute outcomes is 
captured by way of a green arrow, indicating the assumption that references to sustainable development 
(SD), to environmental exceptions or defenses (EED) and to MEAs made in legal arguments could be 
accepted as applicable law by the tribunal and taken into account to arrive at its decision. This idea 
captured in the first purple box (HI) is also linked to the developments in international economic and 
environmental law, because these specific horizontal integration characteristics can occur within the 
specific treaty invoked in a dispute, such as in a BIT’s preambular or operational paragraphs. They can 
also occur outside the specific treaty invoked in a dispute, established for example under various MEAs. 
The study confirms that these specific references can be made by a disputing party, the tribunal itself or 
non-disputing parties, such as NGOs in an amici curiae submission. 
Related to this last point is my second idea, that transparency (TR) could have an influence on 
dispute outcomes. This is because the presence of specific transparency characteristics of publication of a 
notice of intent and document access during proceedings are assumed to empower non-disputing parties 
such as NGOs to engage directly or indirectly in a case. This is indicated by a red arrow in the illustration. 
However, transparency can potentially be restricted by disputing parties, illustrated by a dotted line. The 
data confirmed furthermore the interconnection between these two specific transparency characteristics, 
that is, only when the public is informed of a case taken place, can a request from the public to document 
access during proceedings be made. Document access during proceedings further enables NGOs to review 
whether horizontal integration references are being made in a case.  
Transparency is also related to my third idea, that public representation and participation (PRP) 
could have an influence on dispute outcomes. When the transparency characteristic of publication of a 
notice of intent is given and awareness of a dispute possible, non-disputing parties such as NGOs can 
submit petitions to the tribunals for amicus curiae and/or observer status. This is illustrated by a red 
arrow. The two relevant public representation and participation characteristics in this study can also be 
potentially restricted by disputing parties, again illustrated by a dotted line. When amicus curiae and/or 
observer status is granted, petitioners can submit legal arguments including with references to sustainable 
development (SD), to environmental exceptions or defenses (EED) and to MEAs. This is illustrated by 
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red arrows. Even when this public participation status is not granted in a dispute, NGOs can still enhance 
their public representation by way of advising the government acting as state party in the dispute. This is 
illustrated by black arrows. 
All of my case characteristics related to horizontal integration, transparency and public 
representation and participation can be absent in a case resulting still in an environmental policy 
permissible outcome. The dotted line also illustrates this possibility, showing that ultimately only parties 
to a dispute must present to the tribunal facts, evidence and applicable law, including their positions 
regarding the case characteristics identified in my ideas on potential influential factors for case outcome. 
With this explanation, I present Figure 2.3 as model of the interactions at play in the context of 
international investment arbitration in which environmental policies are challenged. The model 
reintegrates the three theoretical frameworks on which this study was based. 
This chapter introduced how, based on the evaluation of existing literature and selected 
theoretical frameworks, this study ventured into gaining a better understanding of the problem of existing 
conflicts between environmental and economic law at the international and domestic level. In search of 
the factors that matter in the determination of environmental policy permissibility in international 
economic law disputes, this study observed indicators of horizontal integration, transparency and public 
participation in international investment arbitration cases in which an environmental policy was 
challenged. The following chapters explain in more detail the reasons for these indicators, how they are 
measured and how they assist in finding answers to the posed question. The above provided an indication 
of how these indicators may influence the scope of consideration of various legal elements in a given 
case. It further noted that a tribunal’s reasoning and consideration of presented and possible arguments is 
related to the interpretation technique it employs. Detecting an interpretation technique is assisted in the 
presence of the indicators, because a tribunal may provide in its reasoning why it accepts or rejects 
considerations presented as relevant or applicable to the case. 
The results of this study are thus useful in providing guidance to: policy makers to ensure more 
challenge-proof environmental policy design and implementation, for example by stating direct links to 
environmental objectives, international standards or obligations; amicus curiae applicants, to make their 
calls for horizontal integration considerations most effective; and potential claimants to for example take 
into account reasonable and legitimate expectations into account before filing for arbitration. 
Observing the indicators, explicated in more detail in the next chapters, aims at answering the 
posed question and in addition, reflects in an en passant fashion, the actual status of embedded liberalism, 
its associated norm contestation process and potential power struggles therein as suggested by the 
theoretical frameworks informing this study. 
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3.0  HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION 
This chapter explicates horizontal integration as indicator as well as its measurements in this study. It 
follows from: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Horizontal integration increases the prospect of environmentally permissible dispute 
outcomes.  
 
Independent Variable 1: Horizontal Integration between international economic and environmental law 
3.1 DEFINITION AND RATIONALE FOR HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION AS 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
What do I mean by horizontal integration? M.-C. Cordonier Segger differentiates between 
“horizontal linkages” and “vertical linkages”. The former relates to different fields of law, within 
international public law; the latter refers to different levels of law, such as between internationallaw and 
law at the regional, national or sub-national level.103 Besides linkages, a diversity of terms has been used 
in the literature to describe interinstitutional influence, including interplay, interlinkage, overlap 
interconnection and interaction.104 I am of the view that the aim of horizontal integration between 
different fields of international public law is to: avoid conflicts between them; allow for mutual 
supportiveness of seemingly conflicting norms; and, where conflicts exist, point to new understandings of 
                                                     
103 MARIE-CLAIRE CORDONIER SEGGER AND JUDGE C.G. WEERAMANTRY, SUSTAINABLE JUSTICE 
–RECONCILING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW   (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 2005) 
at 94. 
104 THOMAS GEHRING AND SEBASTIAN OBERTHÜR (EDS.), INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTION IN 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: SYNERGY AND CONFLICT AMONG INTERNATIONAL 
AND EU POLICIES   (MIT Press. 2006) at 4. Oberthür and Gehring employ the term interaction, because “it 
emphasizes that interinstitutional influence is rooted in decisions taken by the members of one of the institutions 
involved. It is thus action that triggers interaction”. I explain below, in the context of jurisdictional delimitation, how 
my study differs in part from Oberthür and Gehring’s study by focusing instead on horizontal integration. 
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provisions contained in public international law as evolved up to that moment. More specifically, I adopt 
as my definition of horizontal integration Broude Tomer’s “‘principles of normative integration’ in 
international law,” which he defines as “methods deliberately aimed at the reconciliation of formally 
disparate elements of international law through normative hierarchy, inter-institutional comity, margins of 
appreciation, lex posterior, lex specialis, subsidiarity, interpretation and other such doctrines and 
conceivable tools”.105  The specific methods defining horizontal integration in this study are contained  
the research’s measurements of horizontal integration, which are explicated below and include reference 
to: the normative policy goal of sustainable development; state obligations concluded under MEAs; and 
environmental exception or defenses, such as contained in treaty provisions or doctrines articulating 
states’ regulatory powers. The data collection in the study – that is the means of observing the presence of 
these measures or whether and how horizontal integration methods are used in the cases under study – 
involved in part   a jurisprudence analysis based on case documents. The specific context of horizontal 
integration in this study is the horizontal integration between international economic and environmental 
law. Horizontal integration itself can be understood as an evolving “prescriptive norm”106 of balancing 
rights and obligations under public international economic107 law vis-à-vis rights and obligations 
embodied in MEAs.108   
These rights and obligations are the result of various international negotiations that took place 
over the last 70 years and through which international public law evolved through simultaneous 
developments in trade, investment, and environment. These developments play a crucial role for the 
realization of sustainable development, which former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon expressed as 
“the challenge of our time”. Indeed, the UN Sustainable Development Summit in September 2015 in New 
                                                     
105See: B.  Tomer, Principles of Normative Integration and the Allocation of International Authority: The WTO, the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the Rio Declaration, 6 LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW (2008-2009) at 173. 
106 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1998) at 891. 
107 Overlaps between investment treaties and trade agreements can be observed in many Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs). As seen in several NAFTA cases discussed in this study the jurisdictional question arose as to whether 
NAFTAs investment chapter also apply to state measures affecting trade in goods or services in other chapters, since 
only the former are subject to compulsory arbitration and remedy of damages against the state. (GUS VAN 
HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW   (Oxford University Press. 2007) at 
79). The complex inter-relationship between international trade and investment law is further illustrated in the 
relevant link of most-favoured nation (MFN) provisions in the relationship between a countries’ commitments made 
in an international investment agreement and its obligations under the WTO’s GATS, which applies among others to 
investments in form of establishment of service providers in the host state. (See: J. Anthony VanDuzer, Penelope 
Simons and Graham Mayeda, Integrating Sustainable Development into International Investment Agreements: A 
Guide for Developing Counties prepared for the Commonwealth Secretariat  (2012) at 40-42. 
108 In taking on international obligations in the areas of environmental protection and sustainability but also often 
interlinked human rights, labor rights, and the rights of indigenous peoples in MEAs and other international treaties, 
a state accepts the responsibility for regulating the negative effects of trade related economic activities and foreign 
investment (See: Ibid. J. Anthony VanDuzer, Penelope Simons and Graham Mayeda, at 29-30. 
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York City 2015,109 which adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, was compared by 
attending speakers “to what happened 70 years ago when leaders came together to meet the challenges of 
the post-war world and created the UN”.110 
3.2 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND LAW 
Though the International Law Association has recognized a distinct sustainable development law with a 
body of principles and practices, views on sustainable development differ. Some have noted 
developments in international public law as moving in diverging directions, others as displaying a double 
movement, as termed by Karl Polanyi.111  Anthony VanDuzer et al. notes: 
 
“In international environmental law, [sustainable development] relates to the protection 
of the natural environment in order that future generations can continue to enjoy it as present 
generations do. In development and human rights circles, its meaning is broader, encompassing 
environmental sustainability, but also equitable development to reduce poverty, improve the 
health of people throughout the world, promote peace, protect human rights and pursue gender 
equality. From an economic point of view, achieving sustainable development entails liberalizing 
trade and investment policy in order to facilitate the access of goods to foreign markets and to 
stimulate foreign investment flows”.112 
 
Though currently discussions continue on how to ensure implementation of the Post-2015 
Development Agenda and the UN Sustainable Development Goals, some scholars have looked at what 
might have prevented progress on sustainable development until now. To some of them, balancing the 
obligations contained in the different regimes, and in particular achieving the balance between private 
investors’ rights and governments’ rights to regulate economic activities in the public interest, has been a 
                                                     
109 With the adoption and universal acceptance of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in September 
2015, heads of states committed themselves “to working tirelessly for the full implementation of this Agenda by 
2030”. See: UN General Assembly resolution “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development,” paragraph 2, (A/RES/70/1). 
110 Rishikesh Bhandary, Faye Leone, Leila Mead, Delia Paul, Nathalie Risse, Lynn Wagner and Pamela Chasek 
(ed.), Summary of the UN Sustainable Development Summit,, 32 EARTH NEGOTIATION BULLETIN, (2015) at 
15. 
111 See footnote 34. 
112 J. Anthony VanDuzer, Penelope Simons and Mayeda, Graham, Integrating Sustainable Development into 
International Investment Agreements: A Guide for Developing Counties prepared for the Commonwealth Secretariat  
(2012) at  24-25. 
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theme of concern since the mid-1990.113 As some authors have noted, “conflicting commitments may lead 
to ambiguity because actors cannot sincerely implement both of them simultaneously”.114 
Studying international economic law disputes in which an environmental policy measure was 
challenged provides one entry point to assess governments’ rights to regulate economic activities in the 
public interest. My first hypothesis suggests that horizontal integration increases the possibility of 
environmentally permissible dispute outcomes. The basis for this hypothesis is threefold: First, 
determining an environmental policy, as permissible, should be more likely when environmental 
consideration that states have articulated within or external to that treaty are taking into account. Second, 
such environmental considerations articulated by the international community are captured in the 
measurements of horizontal integration and include references to sustainable development, to MEAs and 
to environmental exceptions or defenses. They can be understood as evolving norms. Third, in 
considering applicable laws, “arbitral tribunals and other international jurisdictions have wide discretion 
in determining whether and to what extent a given norm is relevant,”115 which in turn informs the 
interpretation techniques they apply in deciding a case. In practice, tribunal or dispute panel may 
recognize norms presented in the arguments made by disputing parties, or even non-disputing parties, as 
relevant or alternatively dismiss them. A Tribunal or dispute panel itself may also introduce norms it 
views as relevant to a case. Furthermore, the extent to which it uses norms in deciding a case may vary. 
3.3 MEASUREMENTS OF HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION 
A. Reference made to the concept of sustainable development 
B. Reference to an MEA is made in the case 
C. Reference made to an environmental exception or defense 
The study operationalizes horizontal integration and recognizes its presence in a given case by 
observing whether any or all of the above listed references have been made in a case. In addition the study 
observes by whom such a reference was made and whether the references have been accepted by the 
tribunal as relevant and applicable to a given case. Each of these references can occur at two levels: level 
                                                     
113 Howard Mann, Reconceptualizing International Investment Law: Its Role in Sustainable Development, 17 
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW (2013) at 533. 
114 THOMAS GEHRING AND  SEBASTIAN OBERTHÜR (EDS.), INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTION IN 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: SYNERGY AND CONFLICT AMONG INTERNATIONAL 
AND EU POLICIES   (MIT Press. 2006) at 336. 
115 E. JORGE VIÑUALES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW   
(Cambridge University Press. 2015) at 108. 
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1 horizontal integration refers to a reference in the text of economic law treaty under which the claim was 
brought; and level 2 horizontal integration refers to a reference external to the economic law treaty under 
which the claim was brought.116 These are explained below.  The goal of this scientific inquiry is to test, 
by observing any patterns in the universe of dispute cases, whether horizontal integration – as a whole, in 
a specific combination, and to what extent in relation to other factors –may correlate to dispute outcomes.  
3.3.1 Reference made to the concept of sustainable development 
The concept of sustainable development, articulated in the 1987 Brundtland Report as “development that 
meets the need of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs,” has gained general acceptance as international policy goal by governments since the 1992 UN 
Earth Summit. The implementation of sustainable development requires harmonization of “three core 
elements: economic growth, social inclusion and environmental protection”.117 “Despite the general 
agreement, there are hundreds of formulations of sustainable development, each reflecting particular 
values and priorities,” write M.-C. Cordonier Segger and A. Khalfan, noting the concept “can be 
considered part of the object and purpose of many international treaties”.118 
A reference to the concept of sustainable development submitted in an international economic 
law dispute in which an environmental policy is challenged constitutes one measure of horizontal 
integration, because it calls for normative integration, i.e. for the tribunal/panel, in determining the case, 
to take this accepted international policy goal into account. The variety of possible references appears 
along a long spectrum starting on one end with treaty specific language, including in preambular or 
operational paragraphs, in the invoked international economic treaty under which the case was brought. 
One the other end, references to sustainable development occur as contextual arguments and as more 
general formulations. In an amicus curiae brief in the Glamis v. United States case, for example, the 
Quechan Indian Nation submitted the concept implicitly stating its intent to use the land area concerned in 
this dispute “into the future with future generations” as well as that “for indigenous populations, land does 
                                                     
116 Correspondingly, a tribunal/panel following a treaty-specific interpretation technique may dismiss level 2 
horizontal integration references while a tribunal following a systemic-integration interpretation technique may take 
all of these references into account. 
117 See: United Nations Sustainable Development the Sustainable Development Goals (available at 
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/ last accessed June 2016). 
118 CORDONIER SEGGER M.C. AND A. KHALFAN, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW: PRINCIPLES, 
PRACTICE AND PROSPECTS   (Oxford University Press. 2004). 
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not represent simply a possession or means of production … it is also essential to understand the special 
and profoundly spiritual relationship of indigenous peoples with Mother Earth …”119 
 
The study refrains from attributing more relevance to one reference to sustainable development 
over another, but differentiates such as level 1 horizontal integration measures when they are textual 
references to the economic law treaty under which the claim was brought, and to agreements, instruments, 
and state practice related specifically to that economic law treaty. Level 2 horizontal integration measures 
are references external to that economic law treaty and its instruments. Why this reluctance to attribute 
level of relevance to different references to sustainable development? Because even the relevance of level 
1 horizontal integration measures, such as preambular treaty language, is debatable. And this is suitable, 
because the study observes the references made and to the extent possible whether a tribunal took the 
references to be relevant or into account.120 
 
Measure of the Horizontal 
Integration (HI) Indicator 
 
Level 1 HI 
Within economic treaty text 
Level 2 HI 
External to economic treaty text 
Reference made to  
Sustainable development 
For example:  
 
Referenced to sustainable 
development as aspirational 
goal in preamble 
For example:  
 
Reference to sustainable 
development concept as 
international policy objective 
 
Figure 3.1: Differentiation of a level 1 and level 2 horizontal integration measure related to sustainable 
development 
 
Let’s consider a level 1 horizontal integration measure of a reference to sustainable development 
in the preamble to the economic treaty text as an example. As noted elsewhere, “a preamble of an 
international agreement provides an introduction to the goals and thinking of the drafters of the 
agreement, including for those who may interpret and apply the treaty at a later date”.121 Nevertheless, the 
                                                     
119 See: Submission by the Quechan Indian Nation to Glamis v. United States, August 19, 2005, page 10, available 
at http://www.state.gov/s/l/c10986.htm last accessed December 15, 2015. 
120 A reference noted by the tribunal itself as relevant in its reasoning indicates clearly a taking into account of the 
references. Lack thereof however cannot clearly exclude the possibility that a tribunal took such references into 
account, a situation that instead is observable only when a tribunal/panel clearly dismisses such references in its 
reasoning. 
121 South African Development Community, SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template with Commentary  
(2012) at 5. 
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subject of a hierarchy in the sources of international law and rules of interpretation of treaties, as set out in 
Articles 31–33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 1961, has been subject of 
debate.  
 
Letsas notes: 
“[VCLT] Article 31 refers to the preamble to the treaty and what counts as relevant 
context for interpreting its terms (such as subsequent practice or agreement by states parties), but 
it is not at all clear how much weight these elements should be given in determining the object 
and purpose of a treaty. Nor does the VCLT make clear how far, if at all, the object and purpose 
of a treaty may diverge from the intentions and practices of states parties”.122    
 
He suggests: “the task of individuating the object and purpose of a treaty and of interpreting the 
treaty in the light of them, is – from beginning to end – a thoroughly evaluative, not empirical, exercise”. 
123  
Observing the reference being made in a case as indicator of horizontal integration is likewise 
more useful than observing merely that the concept of sustainable development is contained in the 
preamble or as an objective or purpose of the treaty, yet not mentioned in the case at all. Surely textual 
inclusion of the concept in the preamble of the treaty could also be seen as an indicator of horizontal 
integration between international economic and environmental law, namely as the outcome of normative 
processes by which the concept of sustainable development has entered not only international 
environmental but also economic law—processes which affect the horizontal relationship between the 
two areas of law. However, observing the use of or reference to the concept looks at the active notion of 
integration and thereby seeks to prevent a misappreciation of a fallow de jure norm. 
Observing that a reference to sustainable development and a call for its consideration has been 
made in a case not only goes beyond mere observance of the concept’s inclusion in the governing treaty 
but complements the observation by gaining insights as to who made the reference and, as far as possible 
whether the tribunal considered the reference in determining a case outcome. Mere inclusion of the 
concept of sustainable development in the treaty text as indicator of horizontal integration would not 
provide these useful insights. More important is that a reference to the concept was made in the case. In 
addition, even though sustainable development may be referred to in the preamble of a treaty, “the 
significance of preambles for interpreting an agreement may be affected by other provisions in the 
                                                     
122 Letsas George, Strasbourg's Interpretive Ethic- Lessons for the International Lawyer, 21 THE EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010) at 533. 
123 Ibid., at  535. 
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agreement” VanDuzer, Simons and Mayeda suggest. The authors explain that if an objectives provision 
does not “reflect the same priorities as the preamble, the objectives provision may be given priority over 
more general wording in the preamble”. 124  
The following examples from the study’s observations illustrate the insights gained from 
observing reference made to sustainable development in a case, including inquiries as to: Who? How? and 
Why? As to the ‘who’, the sustainable development concept can be referenced in a case by the 
respondent, the claimant, a non-disputing party, an amicus curiae submission, an expert opinion or the 
tribunal itself. As to the ‘how’, the reference is observed as external to the treaty text or treaty-specific, as 
in a preambular, and is observed in the context of the arguments presented. The ‘why’ inquiry looks at 
whether the referenced sustainable development concept was accepted by the judicial body as relevant 
and also applicable to the case. 
In the Ethyl Corporation v. Canada case for example, though the promotion of sustainable 
development by parties is stated in the preamble of the governing treaty NAFTA, this notion and its 
environmental perspective lacked interpretive strength vis a vis the economic perspective. First, only the 
economic perspective is specified in the NAFTA Article125 on objectives and was acknowledged by the 
tribunal even though responding Canada noted under the application of NAFTA that “the preamble to the 
NAFTA states that the parties resolved to carry out stated objectives ‘in a manner consistent with 
environmental protection and conservation’ and to ‘strengthen the development and enforcement of 
environmental laws and regulations’” [emphasis added].126 Second, the tribunal did not specifically 
address the responding state’s reference to both the environmental notions in the preamble as well as the 
Annexed Side Agreement.127 And third, no interested third party (neither state nor NGO) challenged the 
presumption of an economic focus and investor-friendly interpretation limiting government regulatory 
                                                     
124 J. Anthony VanDuzer, Penelope Simons and Graham Mayeda, Integrating Sustainable Development into 
International Investment Agreements: A Guide for Developing Counties prepared for the Commonwealth Secretariat  
(2012) at 48. 
125 On the other hand NAFTA’s chapter 1 (on objectives) includes also articles on relation to environmental and 
conservation agreements. 
126 Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, UNICTRAL, Statement of Defense, 27 November 1997, Notice of Intent to 
Submit a Claim to Arbitration, 10 September 1997, paragraph 71, available at: http://www.naftalaw.org. 
127 As stated above, the issue of a hierarchy in the sources of international law and rules of interpretation of treaties 
as set out in VCLT Articles 31–33 has been subject of debate. In the Ethyl case the tribunal focuses on guidance 
provided in VCLT Article 31(1) “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”, while Canada’s 
references included elements provided for in VCLT Article 31(2), “the context for the purpose of the interpretation 
of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to 
the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument 
which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other 
parties as an instrument related to the treaty”. 
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rights, or, supported more weight be given to the preambular language with its notion of promoting 
sustainable development and environmental view component.128  
In contrast, in the Methanex Corporation v. United States of America case, besides the U.S.,129 
two amicus curiae submissions130 also referred to the sustainable development objective in NAFTA’s 
preamble. The Canadian NGO International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), stressed inter 
alia: “that the clear absence of an [environmental] exception provision and approach for Chapter 11 
imposes upon the tribunal the need to understand differently how the right to regulate ought to be 
addressed in the context of Chapter 11; noted in this context “the clear recognition of environmental 
protection and sustainable development in the preamble to NAFTA;” referenced the reconfirmation of 
environmental goals of NAFTA in the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 
(NAAEC); and submitted these objectives as important context for the purpose of interpretation of the 
treaty as set out in the VCLT Article 31(2)(a).131 IISD explained “the protection of the environment and 
the promotion of sustainable development are two closely related aspects of state regulation that do not 
fall within the forms of regulation that a host state may not take in relation to foreign investors and 
investment”; and found this to not only to be “consistent with the preamble and objectives of NAFTA, 
“but also to have been recognized in the few international investment law arbitrations that have ruled on 
this issue”.132 
 
In addition, already in its Petition for Amicus Curiae Status133 IISD explained that: consistent 
with NAFTA's objectives as set out in the preamble, there are limits placed by NAFTA on governments’ 
authority to ensure economic and sustainable development are integrated rather than hierarchical legal 
                                                     
128 Mexico, as interested third state party to the case, exercised its right as NAFTA party in line with NAFTA Article 
1128 by making a written submission on other points of the dispute. No amicus curiae was submitted. 
129 The U.S. recites NAFTA’s preamble as relevant to environmental protection and conservation though without 
specifically using listing the term sustainable development, as well as referencing relevant provisions under the 
NAAEC “recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own levels of domestic environmental protection and 
environmental development policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its environmental laws and 
regulations . . . “. See: Amended Statement of Defense of Respondent U.S., December, 5 2003, paragraph 412. 
130 See: Methanex v. United States of America, Submission Of Non-Disputing Parties Bluewater Network, 
Communities For A Better Environment And Center For International Environmental Law, March 9, 2004, 
paragraphs 6-9; as well as Methanex v. United States of America, Amicus Curiae submission by IISD, March 9, 
2004, paragraph 23. 
131 See: Methanex v. United States of America, Amicus Curiae submission by IISD, March 9, 2004, paragraph 23, 
27-8. 
132 Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Final Award, (November 13, 2000), at para. 67: “The Tribunal 
has carefully examined these contentions, since the environmental impact assessment procedure is basic for the 
adequate protection of the environment and the application of appropriate preventive measures. This is true, not only 
under Spanish and EEC law, but also increasingly so under international law”. 
133 Methanex v. United States of America, Petition for Amicus Curiae submission by IISD, March 9, 2004, 
paragraphs 10, 14, 27. 
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policy objectives; a sustainable investment strategy requires governments’ ability to maintain an optimal 
environmental protection process; interpretation of provisions must reflect NAFTA parties’ commitments 
in the preamble to maintain their flexibility to safeguard public welfare, including environmental 
protection; and the public interest in this case regarding the ability of host states to meet their 
responsibilities towards their citizenry lies also within the context of states’ international legal 
obligations. However, the Methanex tribunal also refrained from addressing references to NAFTA’s 
preambular language. 
Finally, in S.D. Myers v. Canada, where no amicus curiae submission was made, it was the 
tribunal itself that referenced indirectly the concept of sustainable development. It did so indirectly 
because it did not mention the words ‘sustainable development,’ as neither did Canada in Ethyl 
Corporation v. Canada. There are four preambular paragraphs set out by the parties in NAFTA related to 
sustainable development: “undertake each of the preceding in a manner consistent with environmental 
protection and conservation” (Paragraph 11); “preserve their flexibility to safeguard the public welfare” 
(Paragraph 12); “promote sustainable development” (Paragraph 13); and “strengthen the development and 
enforcement of environmental laws and regulations” (Paragraph 14). The tribunal in S.D. Myers v. 
Canada referenced preambular paragraph 11, Canada in the Ethyl Corporation v. Canada referenced 
preambular paragraphs 11 and 14, neither specifically referenced preambular paragraph 13 on promoting 
sustainable development. References to sustainable development can be made literally, by using the terms 
seen in the amicus curiae submission in the Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, or more 
indirectly. 
Besides referring indirectly to the concept of sustainable development in NAFTA’s preamble, 
noted as level 1 horizontal integration, the S.D. Myers v. Canada tribunal referred to the concept in 
several other places, including at level 2 horizontal integration. It did so for example: in the context of the 
Basel Convention’s “insistence on environmentally sound management of waste;134 in the context of  “the 
international agreements affirmed in the NAAEC” which are the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the 
Human Environment and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development;135 and by 
recognizing as “indirect environmental objective” to keep domestic industry strong to ensure capability 
for continued waste disposal.136 This last reference to an ‘indirect environmental objective’ to keep 
domestic industry strong and ensure capability for the service, which the tribunal found to be a 
“legitimate goal,”137 is particular relevant to the view and understanding of sustainable development by 
                                                     
134 See: S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA (UNCITRAL), Partial Award (13 November 2000), paragraphs 211-3. 
135 See NAAEC preambular paragraph 8, referenced in S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA (UNCITRAL), Partial 
Award (13 November 2000), paragraphs 220-1. 
136 See: S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA (UNCITRAL), Partial Award (13 November 2000), paragraph 195. 
137 See: S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA (UNCITRAL), Partial Award (13 November 2000), paragraph 255. 
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developing countries, seeking to protect their, in part green, infant industries. The tribunal accepted all 
these references to sustainable development as relevant yet still rejected them as defense because Canada 
did not choose an available alternative (i.e. Canada did not stay within the scope for such legitimate 
objective as specified in the treaty text). 
The above shows that the first measure of my indicator of horizontal integration, introduced in 
Table 3.1 above, can occur in various ways, similar to different shapes of puzzle pieces.  This observation 
approach to the study’s puzzle is applied in the same manner to the other measures of horizontal 
indication aiming at gaining a deeper understanding of the indicator’s possible impact on the 
interpretation technique of the judicial body, for example either broadening the understanding of certain 
treaty provisions or interpreting treaty objectives more restrictively. To solve the puzzle, the study seeks 
to reveal in the picture at large, any patterns in the universe of dispute cases indicating whether horizontal 
integration – as a whole, in a specific combination of its measures, and to what extent in relation to my 
other indicators or appearing factors –may correlate to dispute outcomes. 
3.3.2 Reference to an MEA is made in the case 
The second measure of horizontal integration in the study is the observance of a reference to an MEA 
made in the case, which follows the same observational approach described above. Here, the level 1 
horizontal integration measure constitutes a textual reference to an MEA in the economic law treaty under 
which the claim was brought, and agreements, instruments, and state practice related specifically to that 
economic law treaty. The level 2 horizontal integration measure is an MEA references external to that 
economic law treaty and its instruments. The study observes MEA references made, by whom and to the 
extent possible whether the MEA reference was accepted by the law-applying agent as communicative 
assumptions in the interpretation of parties’ intent for prevailing environmental matters. 
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Measure of the Horizontal 
Integration (HI) Indicator 
 
Level 1 HI 
Within economic treaty text 
Level 2 HI 
External to economic treaty 
text 
Reference made to an MEA  For example:  
 
- NAFTA Article 104 on Relation to 
Environmental and Conservation 
Agreements; and its  
 
- NAFTA Annex 104.1 on Bilateral and 
Other Environmental and Conservation 
Agreements 
For example:  
 
Reference to an MEA 
obligation in existing or 
evolving MEA  
 
Figure 3.2: Differentiation of a level 1 and level 2 horizontal integration measure related to an MEA 
 
A reference to an MEA submitted in an international economic law dispute in which an 
environmental policy is challenged constitutes the second measure of horizontal integration, because it 
calls on the tribunal, in determining the case, to take developments in another international public law 
regime concerned with the environment into account. 
There is no generally accepted definition of MEAs, which broadly defined include agreements 
among sovereign states that at least partly aim to protect the environment.138 Daniel Bodansky points their 
origins back at early conservation movements with international focus. He notes as early as in 1868, “a 
German ornithological meeting proposed the development of an international treaty on bird protection” 
resulting in the 1902 “Convention to Protect Birds Useful to Agriculture,” which “is widely considered 
the first multilateral environmental treaty”.139 Today, the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) is the main UN organ responsible for the environment. It has initiated negotiations of core MEAs 
and provides them with support for their implementation.  Many MEAs have been concluded since 1972, 
the year of the Stockholm Conference and the establishment of UNEP.140 In 2017, the International 
                                                     
138 See: http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com  
139 BODANSKY, DANIEL, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW.   
(Harvard University Press. 2009) at 23. 
140 UNEP, Measuring Progress: Environmental Goals & Gaps  (2012) at ii and United Nations Information Portal on 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements at http://leo.informea.org  
 57 
Environmental Agreements Database Project observes 1290 MEAs and 2166 Bilateral Environmental 
Agreements.141   
A reference to relevant existing MEAs made in the dispute cases indicates the recognition, at least 
by the referencing party, of horizontal interrelation between different areas of international public law, 
thereby appealing for reconciliation of potentially competing economic and environmental interests “in 
the context of an integrated, holistic international legal order”.142 Observations in this study show 
variation, in that level 1 and level 2 horizontal integration measures have been made, and in the 
acceptance or rejection of references as relevant and applicable to the case. 
Using an illustration from WTO trade and environment disputes, not specifically investigated in 
this study, we find in the WTO United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (II) case, the WTO panel 
regarded MEA references external to the governing economic law treaty (level 2 measure of horizontal 
integration) and not concluded among all GATT parties as “not relevant as a primary means of 
interpretation” and not applicable. In this case, the WTO Panel, inter alia:  
 
“observed that the agreements cited by the parties to the dispute were bilateral or 
plurilateral agreements that were not concluded among the contracting parties to the General 
Agreement, and that they did not apply to the interpretation of the General Agreement or the 
application of its provisions;” “found that under the general rule contained in Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention, these treaties were not relevant as a primary means of interpretation of the 
text of the General Agreement;” and “considered that those cited treaties that were concluded 
prior to the conclusion of the General Agreement were of little assistance in interpreting the text 
of Article XX(g), since no direct references were made to these treaties in the text of the General 
Agreement, the Havana Charter, or in the preparatory work to these instruments”.143   
 
However, as Palmer, Chaytor, and Werksman144 note, the WTO Appellate Body has also taken 
into account existing international agreements and state practice when clarifying relevant provisions of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
  See: Philippe Sands, Litigating Environmental Disputes: Courts, tribunals and the progressive development of 
international environmental law  (2008). 
141 See: The International Environmental Agreements Database Project, University of Oregon, U.S., at 
https://iea.uoregon.edu/iea-project-contents  
142 Philippe Sands, Litigating Environmental Disputes: Courts, tribunals and the progressive development of 
international environmental law  (2008) at  9-10. The author concludes inter alia, that “it will take time to fully 
integrate environmental concerns into the better established norms of foreign investment protection”. 
143 See: UNITED STATES – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF TUNA, Report of the Panel, 16 June 1994, 
(DS29/R), paragraphs 5.18 - 5.20. 
144 Beatrice Chaytor Alice Palmer, and Jacob Werksman Interactions between the WTO and International 
Environmental Regimes, in INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTION IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
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the GATT. For example, in the WTO United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products case, the Appellate Body made reference to a number of MEAs when clarifying the meaning of 
“exhaustible natural resources” under one of the “environmental” exceptions in GATT Article XX.145 
Analyzing this exception, the Appellate Body looked to MEAs as one source of evidence of the 
“contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and conservation of the 
environment”.146  
Observing the reasoning behind a tribunal’s decision as to whether to consider references to 
MEAs informs the interpretation technique applied, such as either a treaty-specific or a systemic-
integration interpretation approach as illustrated in the examples above. In addition, such observations 
provide valuable insights, such as to what extent such reference may matter or not. In other words, the 
study gains understandings into what other possible factors may matter more than or in combination with 
references to MEA obligations in the determination of a case outcome, such as that states ought to choose 
available least trade-restrictive alternative measures or that cases of expropriation require compensation. 
For example, in the ICSID Santa Elena case, even though the tribunal held that “the arbitration is 
governed by international law,”147 the tribunal nevertheless concluded “the purpose of protecting the 
environment for which the property was taken does not alter the legal character of the taking for which 
adequate compensation must be paid [and] [t]he international source of the obligation to protect the 
environment makes no difference”.148 For this reason, the tribunal explained, it did “not analyse the 
detailed evidence submitted regarding what respondent refers to as its international legal obligation to 
preserve the unique ecological site that is the Santa Elena Property,”149  which included references to 
obligations to protect the environment set out in several MEAs.150  In this regard, Nicolas Hachez and Jan 
Wouters note: “host states may have to choose between abiding by one or the other of their international 
                                                                                                                                                                           
GOVERNANCE: SYNERGY AND CONFLICT AMONG INTERNATIONAL AND EU POLICIES, (Sebastian 
Oberthür and Thomas Gehring (eds.) ed. 2006) at 187. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid., and specifically United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 1998 Report of 
the Appellate Body, paragraph 129, WTO Doc WT/CTE. W/152. 
147  See: Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena SA v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case ARB/96/1, paragraph 
65. 
148 Ibid., at paragraph 71. 
149 Ibid., at paragraph 71 Footnote 32. 
150 These MEA references included: the Central American Regional Convention for the Management and 
Conservation of the Natural Forest Ecosystems; the Convention on Biodiversity; the Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat; the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage; and the Western Hemisphere Convention. See Ibid., Costa Rica’s Counter-Memorial 
of 15 June 1998, paragraphs 62-67, as also reported by C. N. Brower and J. Wong, General Valuation Principles: 
The Case of Santa Elena, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES 
FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (T. 
Weiler (ed.) ed. 2005) at 747-775. 
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obligations […] [and may not be able to] implement international agendas to which they may be deeply 
committed”.151   
The S.D. Myers v. Canada case is also illustrative. Canada made reference to its MEA obligations 
under the Basel Convention. The reference is a HI level 1 measure because it is specifically listed in 
NAFTA text as to prevail over NAFTA provisions in case of conflict. The tribunal accepted its relevance 
to this case, however rejected Canada’s defense based on the MEA obligation by: noting NAFTA Annex 
104 provides the Basel Convention would have priority if and when it was ratified by the NAFTA parties, 
and the US had not yet ratified; emphasizing that even if it was ratified by the US, the MEA obligation 
required Canada to choose among alternatives the option least inconsistent with NAFTA to meet its 
obligation; and noting that the Basel Convention did permit “the continuation of the Transboundary 
Agreement with its emphasis on including cross-border movements as a means to be considered in 
achieving the most cost-effective and environmentally sound solution to hazardous waste 
management”.152  Noting Canada’s alternative policy options, the tribunal found the measure not 
implemented within the requirements of the obligation to choose an available least-trade restrictive 
alternative. 
The above shows why and how reference to MEAs in a dispute serves as the second measure of 
horizontal integration. This measure differs from a reference to sustainable development, which calls for 
consideration for a more general internationally policy objective153 than the more specific objectives and 
obligations undertaken by states in MEAs. A reference to a MEA (i.e. to another yet specific international 
public law regime) is also distinguished in this study from references made to an environmental exception 
or defense, which can also occur at horizontal integration level 1 and 2 and which can be articulated both 
in a specific or general manner. This is explained below. 
                                                     
151 International investment dispute settlement in the twenty-first century: Does the preservation of the public 
interest require an alternative to the arbitral model?, in INVESTMENT LAW WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTIVES (Freya Baetens ed. 2013) at 432. 
152 See S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA (UNCITRAL), Partial Award (13 November 2000) Award paragraphs 
213-215. 
153 This statement is to be understood in the context of this study, and not to be misunderstood as ignoring the 
current developments under the global indicator framework, which was adopted by the General Assembly on 6 July 
2017 and is contained in the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on Work of the Statistical Commission 
pertaining to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/71/313). Furthermore, there are several 
regional MEAs and Bilateral Environmental Agreements on specific sustainable development objectives. See: 
Ronald B. Mitchell and the International Environmental Agreements IEA Database Project, 2002-2016 at the 
University of Oregon at https://iea.uoregon.edu  
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3.3.3 Reference made to an environmental exception or defense 
The final measure of the horizontal integration indicator is the observance of a reference to an 
environmental exception or defense made in the case. As the terms indicate, they can be used to defend an 
environmental policy alleged to be in violation of the governing economic treaty by pointing to 
environmental exceptions or defenses.  
An environmental exception or defense means “if there is an applicable exception, no treaty 
obligation exists with respect to a measure within the scope of the exception or reservation”.154 This 
indicates a recognition by signatory states that international economic law must provide “the necessary 
balance between domestic regulatory autonomy in the environmental field and the [economic] 
liberalization disciplines set forth by the [economic treaty]”.155 Alan Boyle explains: “Ultimately, 
governments make policy choices about how to balance competing objectives […]. These choices will be 
reflected in the agreements they sign or in the state practice that contributes to general international 
law”.156   
As was the case with the first two indicators, the study observes not the mere existence of states’ 
articulations, but whether a reference to an environmental exception or defense within or outside the 
governing treaty of the dispute was made in the case. In the end, as noted by others, “the balance or 
imbalance between [international economic law] and environmental consideration still depends, in large 
part on the interpretation of [the environmental exception or defense]”.157 And for any interpretation to 
take place the exception or defense must be made or submitted to the tribunal. 
A reference to environmental exception or defense submitted in an international economic law 
dispute in which an environmental policy is challenged constitutes the last measure of horizontal 
integration in this study, because it calls for normative integration, i.e. for the tribunal, in determining the 
case, to take the referenced environmental exception or defense into account.  
At level 1 horizontal integration, referenced environmental exceptions appear in the governing 
economic treaty under which the dispute was brought. They have been referred to as ‘general’ 
                                                     
154 A. NEWCOMBE, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 
(Wolters Kluwer Law International. 2009). 
155 NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER, DANIEL MAGRAW, MARIA JULIA OLIVA, MARCOS 
ORELLANA AND ELISABETH TUERK, ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE A GUIDE TO WTO 
JURISPRUDENCE   (Earthscan. 2006) at 77. 
156 Alan Boyle, Relationship between International environmental law and other branches of international law, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey 
Daniel Bodansky eds. at 126. 
157 NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER, DANIEL MAGRAW, MARIA JULIA OLIVA, MARCOS 
ORELLANA AND ELISABETH TUERK, ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE A GUIDE TO WTO 
JURISPRUDENCE   (Earthscan. 2006) at 77. 
 61 
exceptions,158 such as general necessity or emergency clauses, or specific environmental provisions, 
including rule specific exceptions such as under the rules on performance requirements. The notion here 
is that drafting parties integrated environmental protection concerns already in the treaty text by providing 
for environmental policy space and reserving their regulatory rights or powers. At level 2 horizontal 
integration, referenced environmental defenses are found in Tomer’s ‘principles of normative integration 
in international law,’ as noted above. These include: the police powers doctrine; the margin of 
appreciation principle; the principle of subsidiarity; and the international and or transnational public 
policy defense. 
                                                     
158 Though as Saverio Di Benedetto notes, “since ‘exception’ often relates to the idea of ‘specialty’, as stated inter 
alia, in the ILC report on fragmentation, ‘general exception’ might appear to be an oxymoron”. See: SAVERIO  DI 
BENEDETTO, EDWARD ELGAR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT   
(Edward Elgar.) at161. 
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Measure of the Horizontal 
Integration (HI) Indicator 
 
Level 1 HI 
Within economic treaty text 
Level 2 HI 
External to economic treaty 
text 
Reference made to an  
environmental exception 
or defense 
For example:  
 
- NAFTA Article 1106(6) on 
environmental exception to prohibition 
of performance requirements (specific) 
 
- NAFTA Article 1114 on 
environmental measures; and  
 
- NAFTA Article 2101 on general 
exceptions (general necessity) 
 
For example:  
 
- Police powers doctrine 
 
- Principle of margin of 
appreciation 
 
- Principle of subsidiarity 
 
- International and/or 
transnational public policy 
defense 
 
Figure 3.3: Differentiation of a level 1 and level 2 horizontal integration measure related to an environmental 
exception or defense 
 
Many different environmental exception clauses exist, varying in wording and scope, as seen in 
various international economic law treaties, such as the WTO, FTAs, BITs and the ECT.159 Andrew 
Newcombe and Lluis Paradell identify “at least five categories of exceptions and reservations in 
international investment treaty practice, ranging from wide (sometimes self-judging) exceptions applying 
to all treaty obligations, [such as essential security exceptions], to narrowly defined reservations for 
specific, non-conforming measures”. These would include, inter alia: general exceptions from treaty 
obligations for measures necessary to meet specific objectives, such as the protection of human, animal 
and plant life, often modeled after GATT 1994 Article XX; specific exceptions or reservations for 
specific sectors or types of measures; exceptions for existing non-conforming measures which act as 
‘grandfathering’ provision that allows for the continuation, renewal and amendment of an existing non-
conforming measure, provided non-conformity does not increase; and exceptions for future measures that 
may be even more restrictive.160 
                                                     
159 Ole Kristian Fauchald, International Investment Law and Environmental Protection, in YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2008) at 3-15. 
160 A. NEWCOMBE AND ANDREW AND LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT 
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT (Wolters Kluwer Law International. 2009) at 482-485. 
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Yet, just as the study refrains from attributing more relevance to one reference to sustainable 
development over another, it differentiates references to environmental exceptions also only into level 1 
or 2 horizontal integration measures. It observes the specific references made and to the extent possible 
whether the tribunal took the references to be relevant in the case. Regarding the latter observation, the 
possible reasons provided by the tribunal for accepting or dismissing the environmental exception as 
defense for the challenged environmental measure are noted. As the conclusion of this chapter shows, 
these observations provide valuable insights, such as to what extent in relation to other factors horizontal 
integration generally and its specific measures individually or in combination may correlate to dispute 
outcomes. This however is not an “attempt to categorically define the subset of situations that justify the 
non-application of the rules affected by each exception,” since, as Di Benedetto explains, “legal rules are 
characterized by an ‘open texture and their meanings therefore maintain a certain level of 
indeterminacy”.161 For example, William W. Burke-White and Andreas von Staden inter alia: explain that 
exception clauses, or non-precluded measures (NPM) clauses “require that measures taken by a state, that 
would otherwise deviate from a treaty obligation, must be sufficiently related to the permissible 
objectives specified in the clause;” term this relationship the ‘nexus requirement’; note however that 
“NPM provisions rarely provide conclusive interpretive guidance […] to their nexus term”; and observe, 
consequently, a variety of interpretations of NPM provisions.162   
The following examples of the study’s observed references to environmental exceptions illustrate 
their variety and application.   
3.3.3.1 Environmental exceptions/defenses at level 1 horizontal integration: Several references to 
environmental exceptions at level 1 horizontal integration were made in cases, for example, where 
environmental policies were challenged under NAFTA. Specific environmental exception provisions to 
NAFTA’s investment discipline include: Article 1106(2) and (6)163 on performance requirements; and 
                                                     
161 SAVERIO DI BENEDETTO, EDWARD ELGAR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT   (Edward Elgar.) at 217. 
162 See: William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The 
Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 
VIRGINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008) at 318 and 330. 
163 Note also that NAFTA Article 1108 provides an additional exception to the Article 1106 (performance 
requirements prohibition) to: “(a) any existing non-conforming measure that is maintained by (i)  a Party at the 
federal level, as set out in its Schedule to Annex I or III,  (ii)  a state or province, for two years after the date of entry 
into force of this Agreement, and thereafter as set out by a Party in its Schedule to Annex I in accordance with 
paragraph 2, or (iii)  a local government; (b) the continuation or prompt renewal of any non-conforming measure 
referred to in subparagraph (a); or (c) an amendment to any non-conforming measure referred to in subparagraph (a) 
to the extent that the amendment does not decrease the conformity of the measure, as it existed immediately before 
the amendment”. Further, NAFTA Article 1108(2) performance requirements prohibition do not apply to any 
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Article 1114 on environmental measures. There are also Article 2101 (on general exceptions, which 
incorporates Article XX of the GATT 1994) and various other exceptions related to NAFTA’s trade 
disciplines that came up in cases observed for this study. 
NAFTA Article 1106(6) limits the scope of the investment rule that prohibits the state from 
enacting performance requirements. The article requires that for “measures, including environmental 
measures,” to be permitted under the performance requirement exception, they must be: “necessary to 
secure compliance with laws and regulations that are not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement; necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; or necessary for the conservation 
of living or non-living exhaustive natural resources”.  In the Ethyl v. Canada Case, claimant contended 
Canada’s measure (MMT Act)164 did not meet all criteria for the performance requirement exception 
Article 1106(6).165 Canada rejected the notion that the Act imposed a performance requirement, noting 
“acceptance of Ethyl’s contention that an import ban is equivalent of a performance requirement would 
lead to the absurd result that every border measure is a performance requirement”.166 However, Canada 
explained the Act, if understood in such way, would lie within the exception of Article 1106(6) because it 
was necessary to prevent the negative impacts on the exhaustible natural resource clean air and on life and 
health.167  As the case was settled, the tribunal did not address the Article 1106(6) exception. However, 
some authors have commented on the application of this specific environmental exception in this case. 
Mann and von Moltke note inter alia that: “the government here relied on the text and form of the 
legislation, whereas Ethyl looked to the effect of the measure on its operations”; NAFTA Chapter 11 (on 
investment) does not apply to border measures such as an import ban, (or a quota, tariff rate quota or 
tariff), claimed here to be a performance requirement; and “the door to challenge environmental trade 
measures in the future as a performance requirement under Chapter 11 is open” since “Canada conceded 
at a jurisdictional hearing that the issue of a trade measure falling under Chapter 11 could be decided on 
                                                                                                                                                                           
measure that a Party adopts or maintains with respect to sectors, subsectors or activities, as set out in its Schedule to 
Annex II. However, note the need for specific listing of measures in the Annexes. 
164 Import and interprovincial trade restriction on additive Methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl (MMT) 
 to unleaded gasoline.  
165 The performance requirement exception Article 1106(6), which requires the measure must be: not applied in an 
arbitrary or unjustified manner; not a disguised restriction on international trade or on investment; and is necessary 
to protect human, animal or plant life or health; or for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustive natural 
resources. See: Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, UNICTRAL, Statement of Claim, 2 October 1997, Paragraph 49, 
available at: http://www.naftalaw.org. 
166 See also: Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, UNICTRAL, Statement of Defense, 27 November 1997, paragraph 91, 
available at: http://www.naftalaw.org. 
167 See also: Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, UNICTRAL, Statement of Defense, 27 November 1997, paragraph 92, 
available at: http://www.naftalaw.org. 
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the merits,” and since “the Ethyl arbitration tribunal expressed the view that trade measures could in fact 
be raised under Chapter 11”.168 
 
NAFTA Article 1114 on environmental measures provides in paragraph (1) “nothing in this 
Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure 
otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its 
territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns”.   There is some debate over the 
provision’s strength. Di Benedetto suggests while its initial part significantly corresponds to the general 
exception format of Article XX (‘Nothing in this agreement shall be construed’), the overall text 
maintains a certain ambiguity and notes that some view the provision’s relevance as negligible.169 
NAFTA Article 1114(2) further “attempts to address the race to the bottom” according to Moloo and 
Jacinto, by "recogniz[ing] that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, 
safety or environmental measures”.170 To this end it allows one party to request consultations with another 
that is seen to have derogated from such measures as an encouragement for an investment in its territory 
with a view to avoiding any such encouragement. 
 
This environmental exception clause was also referred to in the Ethyl v. Canada Case. Canada 
submitted that the MMT Act constituted a health and environment measure permitted by NAFTA Article 
1114(1).171 Canada explained this in the context of the provision on expropriation: underlining the MMT 
Act does not constitute expropriation or a measure tantamount to expropriation under NAFTA Article 
1110 (on expropriation) because it “involves the exercise of regulatory powers or police power 
recognized by international law”. Canada thus not only submitted a level 1 horizontal integration 
environmental exception but also combined in its argument a level 2 horizontal integration environmental 
defense, namely the police powers doctrine. Canada also stated the objective of, or motivation or intent 
for enacting the Act was “for the maintenance of health, for the conservation of clean air and for the 
                                                     
168 The authors recommend that the scope of Article 1106 be addressed as part of an interpretive statement. The legal 
policy objective would be to establish when a type of regulation does not constitute a performance requirement, as 
opposed to when it might qualify as an exception to these disciplines. See: Mann, Howard and von Moltke, Konrad, 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the Environment Addressing the Impacts of the Investor-State Process on the 
Environment. (1999) at 37. 
169 See: SAVERIO  DI BENEDETTO, EDWARD ELGAR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT   (Edward Elgar. 2013). In footnote 115 the author notes: The critical point seems to be the term 
‘otherwise consistent with this Chapter’. According to some authors, including Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Brown 
Weiss, the provision relevance is simply ‘negligible.’ 
170 See: Rahim Moloo Justin Jacinto, Environmental and Health Regulation: Assessing Liability under Investment 
Treaties, 29 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011) at 10. 
171 See also: Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, UNICTRAL, Statement of Defense, 27 November 1997, paragraph 97, 
available at: http://www.naftalaw.org. 
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protection of the environment”.172 Again, the tribunal did not comment on the referenced environmental 
exception contained in NAFTA Article 1114 in the Award on Jurisdiction and the case was settled. 
However, as Howard Mann identified, the consideration of the motivation or intent of the adoption of a 
measure by a tribunal is uncertain and may even be found irrelevant.173 
 
In S.D. Myers. Canada, the tribunal merely recited the listing of NAFTA Article 1114 in NAFTA 
Article 1101 (on scope and coverage) in the context of determining that the measure related to claimant 
and its investments in Canada. This environmental exception was no where else mentioned or discussed 
in the case. The tribunal found that the US investor was entitled to monetary damages as a result of a 
temporary Canadian ban on exports of Polychlorinated biphenyl (PCBs), even though the ban’s stated 
purpose was to prevent any possible significant danger to the environment or the human life or health.174 
 
The Metalclad v. Mexico tribunal did consider NAFTA Article 1114 (on environmental 
measures), but found that rather than being violated it had been observed, since Mexico was satisfied with 
the investment being “environmentally sensitive”. It further held that the measure, the Ecological Decree 
would be tantamount to expropriation requiring compensation. Specifically, the tribunal found inter alia: 
“the municipality’s insistence upon and denial of the construction permit in this instance was 
improper”;175 that “this conclusion is not affected by NAFTA Article 1114”;176 and that “the tribunal need 
not decide or consider the motivation or intent of the adoption of the Ecological Decree. Indeed, a finding 
of expropriation on the basis of the Ecological Decree is not essential to the Tribunal’s finding of a 
violation of NAFTA Article 1110”.177 The Metalclad Tribunal considered “that the implementation of the 
Ecological Decree [or measure] would, in and of itself, constitute an act tantamount to expropriation”.178 
The emphasis here seems to lie on the implementation of a measure. In the WTO 1998 Shrimp-Turtle 
case, the Appellate Body made it clear that both the substance of a measure and its implementation are 
subject to review under trade law.    
 
                                                     
172 See also: Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, UNICTRAL, Statement of Defense, 27 November 1997, paragraph 95, 
available at: http://www.naftalaw.org. 
173 Howard Mann, Assessing the Impact of NAFTA on Environmental Law and Management Processes (2002) at 
235. 
174 FRANCESCO FRANCIONI (ED.), ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS & INTERNATIONAL TRADE   
(Hart Publishing. 2001) at 326. 
175 Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(Additional Facility), 30 August 2000, Case No. Arb(AF)/97/1 Award paragraph 97. 
176 Ibid., paragraph 98. 
177 Ibid., paragraph 111. 
178 Ibid., paragraph 111. 
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NAFTA Article 2101 on general exceptions, in the context of trade in goods and technical 
barriers to trade,179 incorporates Article XX of the GATT 1994. Mann et. al explain, “trade restrictive 
measures that aim at environmental protection can be justified either under GATT Article XX(b) 
providing for the adoption or enforcement of measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life 
of health” or under Article XX(g) justifying measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources”, with NAFTA Article 2101 particularly stressing the importance of these two paragraphs.180 
Though the general exception provision in NAFTA Article 2101 does not apply to Chapter 11 (on 
investment), the study observes references to this general environmental exception in investor-state-
disputes. 
 
In the Methanex v. United States case for example, the application of the NAFTA Article 2101 
exception clause was contested by an amicus curiae submission in response to the investor Methanex’ 
approach181 to Article 2101 relying also on an expert opinion by Dr. Ehlermann,182 which the U.S. 
perceived as irrelevant.  IISD’s amicus curiae submission:  opposed the notion that environmental 
protection is an exception to international law rules; questioned Dr. Ehlermann’s “entirely speculative 
                                                     
179 SAVERIO  DI BENEDETTO, EDWARD ELGAR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT   (Edward Elgar. 2013). In footnote 116 the author notes in regards to NAFTA Article 2101(1): 
Furthermore, trade in services is likewise excluded from the incorporation of Article XX and for this matter is 
provided, by the next Paragraph, an autonomous exception which is modeled on the schema of Article XX, but 
employs a formula similar to the ambiguous one set forth in Article 1114. ‘Provided that such measures are not 
applied in a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on trade between the Parties, nothing [in Parts and 
Chapters regarding services] shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Party of measures 
necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations that are not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement’ (emphasis added). This differentiation seems to confirm the doubts on the effectiveness of Article 1114 
as an exception in favor of environmental measures. 
180 Howard Mann, Gary Horlick and Christiane Schuchhardt NAFTA Provisions and the Electricity Sector  (2002) at 
13. 
181 Noting that that there is no provision in Chapter 11 explicitly permitting environmental exceptions to the national 
treatment obligation, and referring to NAFTA Article 2101 which specifically incorporates Article XX GATT, 
Methanex claimed that GATT and WTO case law would place the burden on the U.S. regarding the validity of an 
environmental measure that denies national treatment. Methanex claimed that the U.S. must satisfy four criteria: it 
must show that the measures adopted (i) are necessary to fulfill the environmental objective, i.e. necessary to protect 
the environment of California, (ii) are proportionate, (iii) are the least restrictive of foreign investment, and (iv) do 
not constitute a disguised restriction on foreign investments. On the facts presented, it claimed that none of these 
criteria were satisfied. See: Methanex Corporation v. United States of America Final Award of the Tribunal on 
Jurisdiction and Merits, Parties IV, Chapter B, p.4 Paragraph 9. 
182 Dr. Ehlermann discusses the WTO exception clause “Article XX [with a] focus on the possible relevance of 
protectionist intent in a regulation that would perhaps otherwise be justified as an environmental regulation” 
(Paragraph 5). He draws attention to several WTO cases and highlights “the fundamental theme is to be found in the 
purpose and object of avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of the exceptions to substantive rules available in Article 
XX” (Paragraph 104), citing the WTO Appellate Body Report U.S. - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, DSR 1996:1. See: Methanex v. United States of America, Opinion of Prof Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, 
November 4, 2002, p. 21. 
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assessment of how trade law might approach the present arbitration;” and stressed, as noted above that the 
clear absence of an [environmental] exception provision and approach for Chapter 11 imposes upon the 
tribunal the need to understand differently how the right to regulate ought to be addressed in the context 
of Chapter 11.183 Specifically, the submission opposed the effort by the investor Methanex, (which noted 
Chapter 11 contains no exception provision but then carried on as if there were) to impose limitations 
surrounding exception provisions in GATT and NAFTA (trade related) to Chapter 11 (investment 
related).184   
The submission further explicated the schema of how WTO Agreements or the relevant trade-
related portions of NAFTA relate to environmental law-making;185 stressed that only states can prosecute 
cases for obligations pertaining to trade under the WTO and NAFTA dispute settlement mechanisms;186 
and contrasted this relationship to be different to “the relationship between foreign investors from within 
NAFTA countries and the NAFTA host state”. The submission stressed “no basis for reading any rules 
for regulations into Chapter 11 as obligations subject to litigation by foreign investors under Chapter 11,” 
which notably “contains no exception provision”.187  Though the tribunal did not directly elaborate on the 
                                                     
183 Methanex v. United States of America, Amicus Curiae submission by IISD, March 9, 2004, Paragraph 23 
184 Ibid., Paragraph 18-24. 
185 Ibid., Paragraph 19. IISD’s Amicus Curiae submission describes:  
a. First, an environmental measure will be tested to see if in the process of making that regulation or in its 
application one or another constraint or prohibition under the agreements is breached. 
b. In this regard, trade law sets out a variety of rules on non-discrimination between “like products”, science-based 
risk assessment, risk management and proportionality, the application of the precautionary principle, and others. 
c. Each of these different obligations is set out, in the case of the WTO, in the GATT, 1994, the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade, the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, and to a lesser extent the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services. In the NAFTA, these rules come from Chapter 3 (National Treatment and 
Market Access for Goods), Chapter 7 (Agriculture and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures), Chapter 9 (Standards-
Related Measures) and again to a lesser extent, Chapter 12 (Cross-Border Trade in Services). 
d. The complaining state has the burden of proof to show that a measure taken for whatever reason, including to 
protect the environment, breaches one of the applicable rules. It would be incorrect to characterize trade law as 
requiring the justification of measures to protect the environment by the state taking the measure before the 
complaining party has established a breach of these rules. 
e. Only when a breach of any of the relevant rules is established do the NAFTA Chapters cited above and the 
provisions of the WTO Agreements become subject to the rules of the environmental exception cited by Methanex 
and the United States. These are Article XX of the GATT, 1994 and Article 2101 of the NAFTA, both of which 
establish additional rights of states to take measures that are otherwise inconsistent with the basic rules and 
obligations. As a defense by way of additional authority to breach the generally applicable rules in certain 
circumstances, the burden of proof does shift to the state defending a measure to show that the conditions included 
in the articulation of the exceptions, designed to ensure that they are not abused, are met. ; see also, Gabrielle 
Marceau and Joel Trachtman, A Map of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods: The 
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 36 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE (2003) at 81.  
186 Methanex v. United States of America, Amicus Curiae submission by IISD, March 9, 2004, Paragraph 20. 
187 Ibid., Paragraph 21. 
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applicability of Article 2101,188 the tribunal described as “carefully reasoned” the amicus curiae 
submission, which disagreed with Methanex’s contention that “trade law approaches can simply be 
transferred to investment law”.189 Specifically and relevant with regards to the burden of proof situation in 
the case, the submission emphasized,190 that since “there is no exception in Chapter 11, […] there is no 
basis for apportioning to the host state the proof of legitimate intent unless and until claimant has made 
sufficient case of impermissible intent”.191   
3.3.3.2 Environmental exceptions/defenses at level 2 horizontal integration: The following examples 
illustrate references to environmental exceptions at a level 2 horizontal integration that were made in the 
studied cases. 
The police powers doctrine was referred to in many cases and by various participants, including 
for example by the tribunal in the S.D. Myers v. Canada case. The tribunal applied the police powers 
doctrine in the context of determining that the challenged measure was not “tantamount to expropriation” 
as claimed. Specifically, the tribunal stated192 that: the issue be interpreted in light of the whole body of 
state practice, treaties and judicial interpretations of that term in international law cases; international law 
makes it appropriate for tribunals to examine the purpose and effect of governmental measures; the 
general body of precedent usually does not treat regulatory action as amounting to expropriation; 
regulatory conduct by public authorities is unlikely to be the subject of legitimate complaint under 
NAFTA  Article 1110 on expropriation, although the tribunal does not rule out that possibility; 
expropriations tend to involve the deprivation of ownership rights - regulations a lesser interference; and 
the distinction between expropriation and regulation screens out most potential cases of complaints 
concerning economic intervention by a state and reduces the risk that governments will be subject to 
claims as they go about their business of managing public affairs.193 Moreover, the tribunal also 
                                                     
188 However, the tribunal, arguably reasoned in a similar line, that “the intent of the drafters to create distinct 
regimes for trade and investment” when it discusses differences in terminology of ‘like goods’ and ‘like 
circumstances’ used in different chapters of NAFTA. See: Methanex v. United States of America Final Award of the 
Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, Parties IV, Chapter B, p.12 Paragraph 29-38. 
189 See: Methanex v. United States of America Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, Parties IV, 
Chapter B, p.12 Paragraph 27. 
190 The submission responded here to Methanex’s argument that when a government decision is motivated by a 
variety of factors, proof of an illicit intent will invalidate the decision even if the actor also had (or might have had) 
a permissible motive for doing the same act,” See:  Methanex v. United States of America, Amicus Curiae 
submission by IISD, March 9, 2004, Paragraph 62. 
191 Ibid., Paragraph 64. 
192 S. D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA (UNCITRAL), Partial Award (13 November 2000), paras 280-282. 
193 Ibid. 
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confirmed the idea that “once applied, the police powers doctrine excludes liability”.194 Finding that the 
closure of the border was temporary, had the effect of eliminating the investors’ competitive advantage 
and delaying an opportunity, the tribunal concluded that “this may be significant in assessing the 
compensation to be awarded in relation to Canada’s breach of NAFTA Articles 1102 (on national 
treatment) and 1105 (on fair and equitable treatment), but it does not support the proposition on the facts 
of this case that the measure should be characterized as an expropriation within the terms of NAFTA 
Article 1110”.195  
The margin of appreciation principle was referenced several times in the Glamis v. United 
States of America case. The U.S. referenced this principle in several instances. In response to Glamis’ 
claim that the U.S. denied it fair and equitable treatment (FET) and thus violated NAFTA Article 1105 in 
terms of a failure to maintain a legal and business environment free from arbitrariness, the U.S. 
highlighted state’s regulatory powers and the principle of marginal appreciation. The U.S. noted, inter 
alia: “no Chapter 11 tribunal has found that decision-making that appears ‘arbitrary’ to some parties is 
sufficient to constitute an Article 1105 violation; instead these tribunals have consistently accorded a high 
level of deference to administrative decision-making; imperfect legislation or regulation, however, does 
not give rise to state responsibility under customary international law; under international law, every state 
is free to ‘change its regulatory policy,’ and every state ‘has a wide discretion with respect to how it 
carries out such policies by regulation and administrative conduct;’ the issue is not the legislature’s 
motivation, but only whether the measure is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose; and 
U.S. and Canadian courts acknowledge ‘the scope of review is narrow and a court is not to substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency.’”196 The tribunal rejected197 the principle as defense in the assessment of 
the scope of the minimum standard of treatment of aliens established by customary international law “by 
reference to which the FET standard of Article 1105(1) is to be understood”.198 
                                                     
194 E. JORGE VIÑUALES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW   
(Cambridge University Press. 2015) at 381. 
195 S. D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA (UNCITRAL), Partial Award (13 November 2000), paras 284-287. 
196 Glamis Gold Ltd. V. USA; ad hoc Tribunal; UNICTRAL; NAFTA; Award, (16 May 2009) 
paragraphs 589-97. 
197 The tribunal rejected the application of the margin of appreciation defense argument made by the U.S. in the 
context of assessing the minimum standard of treatment as the tribunal disagreed “that domestic deference in 
national court systems is necessarily applicable to international tribunals”. The tribunal explained its view by finding 
“the standard of deference to already be present in the standard [minimum standard of treatment] as stated, rather 
than being additive to that standard. The idea of deference is found in the modifiers “manifest” and “gross” that 
make this standard a stringent one; it is found in the idea that a breach requires something greater than mere 
arbitrariness, something that is surprising, shocking, or exhibits a manifest lack of reasoning”. Ibid., paragraph 617. 
198 Ibid., paragraph 619. 
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The U.S. raised the margin of appreciation principle again in the context of the process of the 
cultural review,199 by pointing to “the substantial expertise of the federal and state agencies involved on 
the question of the impact on cultural resources and argued that review of these determinations is not the 
proper role of a domestic court or an international tribunal”.200 In this context, the tribunal accepted201 the 
principle as relevant and applicable to the case and included it in its interpretation. The Friends of the 
Earth amicus curiae submission also referred indirectly to the margin of appreciation principle in this 
context.202 
 
The U.S. also raised the margin of appreciation principle by stressing that “the U.S. government 
has an obligation to consult with Native Americans,” and “claimant’s participation” in the cultural review 
process”.203 Some authors have noted similar notions in case-law of the European Court of Human Rights 
when interpreting specific treaty provisions “in light of state’s margin of appreciation in striking a balance 
among different interests,” including “state’s obligation to ensure the respect of rights by third parties, 
individuals and minorities”.204 
The amicus curiae submission by the Sierra Club and Earthworks also called for consideration of 
the margin of appreciation principle arguing, “the minimum standard of treatment required by NAFTA 
                                                     
199 The U.S. argued the process was “fully transparent and could not have upset investors legitimate expectations” 
Ibid., paragraph 665. 
200 Glamis Gold Ltd. V. USA; ad hoc Tribunal; UNICTRAL; NAFTA; Award, (16 May 2009), paragraph 664. 
201 The tribunal stated: “it is not the role of this Tribunal, or any international tribunal, to supplant its own judgment 
of underlying factual material and support for that of a qualified domestic agency. Indeed, our only task is to decide 
whether Claimant has adequately proven that the agency’s review and conclusions exhibit a gross denial of justice, 
manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process, evident discrimination, or a manifest lack 
of reasons so as to rise to the level of a breach of the customary international law standard embedded in Article 
1105”. Ibid., paragraph 779. The tribunal found that the professionals employed to provide advice to the regulatory 
agencies as “qualified for the task and they provided substantial evidentiary support for their conclusions,” and 
therefore held “that the ‘novel’ use of [the Area of Traditional Cultural Concern] ATCC does not breach 
Respondent’s obligations pursuant to the customary international law minimum standard of treatment” Ibid., 
paragraph 783. 
202 The submission reads: “In the event the Tribunal considers the application of the minimum treatment standard in 
Article 1105, the Tribunal should not engage in a de novo review of the merits of the environmental and cultural 
preservation objectives pursued by the United States and California and instead should consider whether Claimant 
has been accorded fair and equitable treatment given these environmental and cultural preservation objectives”. See 
Submission by Friends of the Earth, September 30, 2005, conclusion paragraph c, page 19. 
203 Glamis Gold Ltd. V. USA; ad hoc Tribunal; UNICTRAL; NAFTA; Award, (16 May 2009) paragraph 672-676. 
Furthermore, the U.S. explained “that there is no doubt that the Quechan would prefer a complete ban on mining in 
sensitive areas, while Claimant would have liked to mine without incurring additional reclamation expenses, and the 
legislature compromised between the two. According to Respondent, “that some resources will be damaged, 
notwithstanding compliance with the legislation does not make the legislation arbitrary. It may not be perfect, but it 
certainly was not irrational or arbitrary ...”. (See Glamis Gold Ltd. V. USA; ad hoc Tribunal; UNICTRAL; NAFTA; 
Award, (16 May 2009) paragraph 726). 
204 E. JORGE VIÑUALES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW   
(Cambridge University Press. 2015) at 243-4. 
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Article 1105, extends considerable deference to governments in matters of domestic law and policy”.205 
The submission argued that “U.S. mining law subjects all mining claimants to the government's 
substantial regulatory power”; and “has long recognized the authority of states to impose environmental 
conditions on mining claims that exceed federal standards”; as well as that “all mining claimants operate 
within this valid – if often uncertain – regulatory climate”.206 The tribunal echoed this argument.207 
The principle of subsidiarity was also referenced in the Glamis v. United States of America 
case. The amicus curiae submission by the Sierra Club and Earthworks made an indirect reference to this 
principle, arguing “if state laws or regulations conflict with [the Bureau of Land Management regulations] 
regarding operations on public lands, [the mine operator] must follow the requirements of this subpart. 
However, there is no conflict if the State law or regulation requires a higher standard of protection for 
public lands than this subpart”.208 The tribunal did not address this environmental defense.   
The international and/or transnational public policy defense was also referenced in the 
Glamis v. United States of America case. The Quechan Indian Nation submission called for applying the 
international public policy defense by identifying “norms requiring States to safeguard the rights and 
interests of indigenous peoples in their governmental conduct [as] form[ing] a part of the ordre 
publique”.209  The tribunal did not decide on the relevance or applicability of this defense. 
                                                     
205 Glamis Gold Ltd. V. USA Submission by Sierra Club and Earthworks, October 16, 2006, paragraphs 9 and 10. 
206 Ibid., paragraph 11. The submission refers to several domestic court rulings that noted in some way or other that 
“virtually all forms of ... regulation of mining claims — for instance, limiting permissible methods of mining and 
prospecting in order to reduce incidental environmental damage — will result in increased operating costs, and 
thereby will affect claim validity”. See: Ibid., paragraph 15. 
207 The Tribunal emphasized that Glamis “was operating in a climate that was becoming more and more sensitive to 
the environmental consequences of open-pit mining” and that “the federal government did not make specific 
commitments to induce Glamis to persevere with its mining claims”, thereby finding no “quasi-contractual 
inducement that the Tribunal has found is a prerequisite for consideration of a breach of Article 1105(1) based upon 
repudiated investor expectations” (Glamis Gold Ltd. V. USA; ad hoc Tribunal; UNICTRAL; NAFTA; Award, (16 
May 2009), paragraph 767). Compare this also to the AC submission by the Sierra Club and Earthworks, which 
called on the tribunal to consider: “Glamis' development of its mining interests took place in the context of a 
political economy in which it was widely known, if not notorious, that governmental environmental and health 
protection institutions at the federal and state level operating under the vigilant eyes of the media, interested 
corporations, non-governmental organizations and a politically active electorate, continuously monitored the use and 
Impact of [mining operations] and commonly prohibited or restricted [certain mining practices] for environmental 
and/or health reasons..., [T]he process of regulation [of mining practices] in the United States involved wide 
participation of industry groups. non-governmental organizations, academics and other individuals, many of these 
actors deploying lobbyists”( Glamis Gold Ltd. V. USA Submission by Sierra Club and Earthworks, October 16, 
2006, paragraph 43). 
208 Ibid., paragraph 24. 
209 The submission reads: “NAFTA Article 1136(6) provides for enforcement of a NAFTA/UNCITRAL award 
under the New York Convention or the Inter-American Convention, both of which recognize the concept of 
international public policy. As fundamental expressions of international custom, principles and conventions, norms 
requiring States to safeguard the rights and interests of indigenous peoples in their governmental conduct form a part 
of the ordre publique. Any award that requires a State to pay compensation for conduct that would be violated of 
international norms protecting indigenous peoples and their sacred lands could violate international public policy in 
so doing”. The submission further reads: “It is essential that this Tribunal take into account the ways in which the 
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The above examples illustrate the study’s observed references to environmental exceptions or 
defenses in their variety, including who made the reference and whether and how the references were 
considered by the tribunal.   
3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION INDICATOR 
The goal of this scientific inquiry is not to prove my hypothesis but rather to test, by observing any 
patterns in the universe of arbitration cases in which an environmental policy was challenged, whether 
horizontal integration – as a whole, in a specific combination, and to what extent in relation to other 
factors –may correlate to dispute outcomes. The above explained the measurements of horizontal 
integration are summarized in Figure 3.4 below. 
The discussion also foretells how the study further gains an understanding into what possible 
factors other than the applied measurements may matter in the determination of a case outcome. These 
other factors, which address reasons for rejection of the references as defense of the challenged 
environmental policy in cases, are included in the conclusion of the study aiming at providing guidance 
for various stakeholders. One apparent example of such a factor is any state action violating the norm of 
good faith. In other words: where an environmental policy was developed in gravely unjust or corrupt 
manner that environmental policy is expected to be found impermissible in a case’s ruling. 
 
Concluding this chapter, recall the threefold reason for observing horizontal integration. First, the 
expectation is that cases in which horizontal integration is observed should correlate positively with 
environmental policy permissible outcomes unless where the policy was developed in gravely unjust or 
corrupt manner. This is because determining an environmental policy alleged to have violated economic 
rights articulated in the applicable economic treaty as permissible, should be more likely when 
environmental consideration that states have articulated within or external to that treaty are taking into 
account. This is qualified when a state acts in violation of good faith, in which case the policy should be 
determined impermissible. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Respondent was indeed obliged under international law to safeguard the rights and interests of the Quechan Indian 
Nation people, both in conducting a review of Glamis' Imperial Proposal and in regulating preconditions subject to 
such approval, at both the federal and state levels”. See: Glamis Gold Ltd. V. USA Second submission by Quechan 
Indian Nation, 16 October 2006, pages 8-9. 
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Second, aiming at finding answers to what matters for dispute outcomes, the observation of 
horizontal integration probes several possibilities. These possible observations provide deeper insights 
besides confirming the above two propositions: 1) that horizontal integration matters if a positive 
correlation is observed between environmental policy permissible case outcomes and observed horizontal 
integration in these cases, however, 2) not in cases where a state’s exercise of good faith condition is not 
met.  
Additional possible observations looked for in the study include: 
• Horizontal integration matters only if specific or if all of the indicators’ measurements are 
accepted and found applicable to the case by the tribunal;  
For example, horizontal integration may matter more often in cases in which level 1 
horizontal integration is observed than in cases in which level 2 horizontal integration is 
observed or vis versa; 
• Horizontal integration matters only if a specific interpretation technique is employed by the 
tribunal; 
• Horizontal integration matters/occurs more often when transparency and public representation 
and participation indicators are observed; and/or 
• Horizontal integration matters only if other factors are given, for example, when specific policy 
implementation requirements have been met. 
 
Third, observing the horizontal integration indicator in the studied cases provides  
useful insights captured in the guidance to policy makers and amicus curiae applicants that are 
developed as a result of this study.  
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Measures of the Horizontal 
Integration (HI) Indicator 
 
Level 1 HI 
Within economic treaty text 
Level 2 HI 
External to economic treaty text 
Reference made to  
sustainable development 
For example:  
 
Referenced to sustainable development as aspirational goal 
in preamble 
For example:  
 
Reference to sustainable development concept as 
international policy objective 
Reference made to an MEA  For example:  
 
- NAFTA Article 104 on Relation to Environmental and 
Conservation Agreements; and its  
 
- NAFTA Annex 104.1 on Bilateral and Other Environmental 
and Conservation Agreements 
For example:  
 
Reference to an MEA obligation in existing or 
evolving MEA  
Reference made to  
An environmental exception or 
defense 
For example:  
 
- NAFTA Article 1106(6) on environmental exception to 
prohibition of performance requirements (specific) 
 
- NAFTA Article 1114 on environmental measures; and  
 
- NAFTA Article 2101 on general exceptions (general 
necessity) 
For example:  
 
- Police powers doctrine 
 
- Principle of margin of appreciation 
 
- Principle of subsidiarity 
- International and/or transnational public policy 
defense 
 
Figure 3.4: Overview of the Horizontal Integration (HI) Indicator 
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4.0  TRANSPARENCY 
“Adequate transparency where human rights and other state responsibilities are concerned is 
essential if publics are to be aware of proceedings that may affect public interest. Such transparency lies 
at the very foundation of what the UN and other authoritative entities have been promulgating as the 
percepts of good governance”.  
UN Special Representative to the Secretary General on Business and Human Rights, John Ruggie,  
Statement during the UNCITRAL Working Group on International Arbitration Session of February 2008.  
 
 
This chapter explicates transparency as indicator as well as its measurements in this study. It follows 
from: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Transparency increases the prospect of environmentally permissible dispute outcomes.  
 
Independent Variable 2: Transparency in international economic law disputes 
4.1 DEFINITION AND RATIONALE FOR TRANSPARENCY AS INDICATOR 
Transparency in international trade and investment law “could be defined negatively and refer to a (full or 
partial) absence of confidentiality,”210 suggest Euler, Gehring and Scherer. Reflecting on the above 
quoted intervention by John Ruggie and on confidentiality, Howard Mann reportedly stated that: “he 
understood human rights in the broader sense including political, civil, economic, social and cultural 
rights; confidentiality of treaty-based investor-state arbitration collided with human rights; and 
                                                     
210 MARKUS GEHRING AND MAXI SCHERER (EDS.) AND MEAGAN WONG AND REBECCA HADGETT 
(OTHERS) DIMITRIJ EULER, TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION -- A 
GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE 
ARBITRATION,  (Cambridge University Press. 2015) at 5. 
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confidentiality prevented civil society from scrutinizing their democratically elected government, or from 
reacting in the form of democratic debates on the issues raised in the arbitral procedures”.211   
Though these authors use the term ‘transparency’ more broadly,212 in the context of this study, I 
define transparency more narrowly as the possibility for any interested person to access information about 
an international public economic law dispute that may have implications for environmental policy, as in a 
case where an environmental policy measure is challenged. Specifically this means –and is observed as –
public access to: information that a dispute commenced; documents presented during the course of 
dispute proceedings; and final decision, including reasoning by a given tribunal. 
The nature of the “access” to information is also relevant, that is information has to be actually 
accessible, as captured with humor in this excerpt of Douglas Adams, The Hitchhiker's Guide to the 
Galaxy: 
“But the plans were on display…” 
“On display? I eventually had to go down to the cellar to find them”. 
“That’s the display department”. 
“With a flashlight”. 
“Ah, well, the lights had probably gone”. 
“So had the stairs”. 
“But look, you found the notice, didn’t you?” 
“Yes,” said Arthur, “yes I did. It was on display in the bottom of a locked filing 
cabinet stuck in a disused lavatory with a sign on the door saying ‘Beware of the 
Leopard”.213  
 
The quality of access to information is affected by the distribution channel, the language used in 
the presentation of the information and timelines of availability. In this study, presence of public notice of 
commencement of proceedings has been observed in various ways, including online media releases or 
public notification, such as on the website of the ICSID Secretariat. An observation of access required at 
least publication in English, although the study also observed documents that were only published in 
other languages, including Spanish or German. Collecting data of the dates of disclosure was not possible 
in most cases, as further explained below. 
                                                     
211 Ibid., at 20. 
212 Euler, Gehring and Scherer use the term “as an umbrella term” that includes access to the hearings, as well as 
involvement of third parties in the conduct of proceedings. In contrast, this study differentiates an indicator of 
transparency from an indicator of public representation and participation. 
213 This dialogue takes place in the first chapter scene when council workmen arrive at Arthur Dent's house with 
bulldozers about to demolish his house in order to build a bypass. DOUGLAS  ADAMS, THE HITCHHIKER'S 
GUIDE TO THE GALAXY   (Pan Books. 1979). 
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The underlying rationale for an indicator of transparency lies in the expectation that cases in 
which transparency is observed should correlate positively with environmental policy permissible 
outcomes. Transparency is expected to enable the widening of the scope of considerations taken by the 
tribunal, including public considerations of environmental protection, public health, consumer protection 
and preferences. The determination of an environmental policy as permissible even when that policy is 
alleged to have violated economic rights articulated in the applicable economic treaty, should be more 
likely when public considerations are taking into account. 
This expectation is based on the following assumptions related to each measure of transparency 
(i.e. information about the existence of a case in which an environmental policy is challenged, 
information about the arguments made by parties, and information on the reasoning for a ruling and the 
final award itself). 
First, public awareness of the existence of such a case can translate into public scrutiny or a 
“watching out” for public considerations being included in the case in general, its proceedings and 
subsequent reasoning and ruling. Second, public participation and representation, through the submission 
of amici curiae for example, could be dependent on –or could be strengthened by – access to information 
about a present case – and opinions, reasoning for and rulings of previous cases. Third, awareness that the 
tribunals’ reasoning for a ruling in a case may undergo public scrutiny and be used use in future cases, as 
well as the tribunal’s own access to publically available information of previous cases increases the 
prospect of an evolution towards horizontal integration, as perhaps initially marginal, or dissenting 
opinions can be considered, referred to and repeated. Related here to the outlook of harmonization in 
international public law, is the assumption that transparency serves the aim towards achieving greater 
coherency and consistency of interpretations and rulings. This in turn provides the benefits of addressing 
concerns of illegitimacy and increasing predictability, and in turn avoiding “regulatory chill” situations. 
Finally, and also further explicated below, is the assumption that transparency prevents 
information imbalance among actors, relevant to the dynamics of norm contestation 
These assumptions suggest interlinkages among the indicators of this study (i.e. public 
participation and representation, and horizontal integration) and are in line with the theoretical 
frameworks of this study, with particular relevance to the dynamics of norm contestation and of power 
negotiations respectively. Issues around observing these assumptions’ validity in the real world and the 
measurements themselves, are discussed below.  
An essential precondition for any use of transparency by the public is of course information about 
the existence of a dispute. This effected also this study, as its aim to investigate the universe of 
international investment law arbitrations in which environmental policies have been challenged had to be 
qualified as aspirational. For cases brought under UN Commission on International Trade Law 
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(UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules (1976),214 “it is impossible for the public [and for the author of this 
study]215 to know even that an arbitration [had been] filed, what [was] at issue in an arbitration, what 
written and oral arguments [were] being advanced in a dispute, what the arbitrators’ jurisdictional 
procedural rulings [were], and what the ultimate decision [was]”.216 These limitations are based on 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976) Articles 3 (on Access to the notice of arbitration), 15 (on Access to 
materials during the proceedings), and 32(5) (on Access to awards), (which are discussed below under the 
respective measurements of my indicator of transparency). Even though a revision of these rules, “the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration”217 and the “UN 
Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration”218 have recently been adopted, 
the new Rules will not be applied retroactively and even going forward, “for existing Investment 
Protection Agreements concluded before 1 April 2014, the [new] Rules will only apply if either the 
disputing parties (i.e. the parties to the arbitration) or the treaty parties (i.e. the parties to the investment 
treaty) agree to the application of the Rules following their coming into force”.219 Yet this study includes, 
next to UNCITRAL cases for which information is available, dispute cases in which an environmental 
policy was challenged that were brought under the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID). The ICSID, at a minimum, publishes information on the registration of 
requests for arbitration on its website.220  And ICSID, as a forum for such cases, “accounts for the largest 
share of known proceedings—roughly 60%—and also has the longest history, nearing its half- 
centennial”.221   
Regarding my first measurement of transparency or case characteristic and assumption, one 
authors notes:  
                                                     
214 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 19 (1976) (Adopted by the UN General Assembly RESOLUTION 31/98 on 
December 15, 1976), available at: https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf 
215 The author of this study made several attempts to access the UNCITRAL archives in Vienna, all of which were 
fruitless. 
216 CIEL and IISD, Revising the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to Address State Arbitrations, (February 2007), at 4, 
available at: www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/investment_revising_uncitral_arbitration.pdf 
217 UNCITRAL, 46th session (July 8-26, 2013), A/CN.9/XLVI/CRP.3 (July 9, 2013). 
218 UN Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (Adopted by the UN General 
Assembly RESOLUTION 69/116 on December 10, 2014), available at: 
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/transparency-convention/Transparency-Convention-e.pdf (last 
accessed 9/1/2016). 
219 Nadakavukaren Schefer, Article 1. Scope of Application, in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION – A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-
BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION, (Dimitrij Euler, Markus Gehring and Maxi Scherer (eds.) and 
Meagan Wong and Rebecca Hadgett (others) (2015) at 52. 
220 ICSID Convention Arbitration, Confidentiality and Transparency, Rules Applicable to the ICSID Secretariat, 
(Administrative and Financial Regulations 22(1) (on publication), available at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partC-chap04.htm#r22 
221 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and David G. Victor:, Secrecy in International Investment Arbitration: An Empirical 
Analysis, 7 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2016) at 164. 
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“The publication of information related to the proceedings allows the population of the 
defendant State, other States, NGOs and the wider public to become aware of the existence of the 
dispute. This is the necessary prerequisite for them to exercise the rights that the Rules bestow 
upon them, such as filing submissions or attending public hearings. Furthermore, this early 
publication will put the proceedings under the spotlight, so that individuals and organisations 
outside of the dispute can be watchful as to the compliance with the Rules”.222  
 
Thus, the first measure of transparency provides for the possibility of public debate and of public 
lookout and scrutiny on how a tribunal will decide – or retrospectively has decided – a case. This in turn 
may influence a tribunal so to carefully take into account public concerns as “the world” is watching, 
calling for or awaiting clarification of issues presented in a given case. Such ‘influence’ may be felt by 
members of a tribunal enjoying their ‘vocation’ who in turn may be inclined to agree with the view of one 
author emphasizing: “Judicial decisions—provided they are justified convincingly, transparently, with 
due regard to all interests affected, and in language that remains comprehensible for ordinary citizens (e.g. 
avoiding reports with more than 1000 pages of legal findings)—are essential for protecting constitutional 
rights of citizens and transnational rule of law vis-à-vis the ubiquity of abuses of power in international 
economic law”.223 
However, while this study suspects a positive relation between transparency and environmental 
policy permissible outcomes, variation is expected on how a tribunal ‘carefully’ considers such issues. A 
tribunal may likewise be reluctant to make statements on controversial issues despite or because of a high 
level of public anticipation. The tribunal in Glamis v. United States of America for example stated in its 
introductory remarks: 
“The Tribunal is aware that the decision in this proceeding has been awaited by private 
and public entities concerned with environmental regulation, the interests of indigenous peoples, 
and the tension sometimes seen between private rights in property and the need of the State to 
regulate the use of property. These issues were extensively argued in this case and considered by 
the Tribunal. However, given the Tribunal’s holdings, the Tribunal is not required to decide 
many of the most controversial issues raised in this proceeding. The Tribunal observes that a few 
awards have made statements not required by the case before it. The Tribunal does not agree 
                                                     
222 Giuseppe  Bianco, Article 2. Publication of information at the commencement of arbitral proceedings, in 
TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION – A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL 
RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION (Dimitrij Euler, 
Markus Gehring and Maxi Scherer (eds.) and Meagan Wong and Rebecca Hadgett (others) 2015) at 89. 
223 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Judicial Task of Administering Justice in Trade and Investment Law and 
Adjudication, 4 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2013) at 28. 
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with this tendency; it believes that its case- specific mandate and the respect demanded for the 
difficult task faced squarely by some future tribunal instead argues for it to confine its decision to 
the issues presented”224 
 
Second, just as it is difficult to determine the precise influence of public representation and 
participation on considerations of the tribunal, it is difficult to exactly determine such influence of the 
transparency indicator in this study. However even where tribunals do not refer specifically to amicus 
curiae submissions, or even outright state they did not address their arguments, one can recognize 
parallels in a tribunal’s reasoning and the arguments presented in the amicus curiae submissions. 
Likewise, and relevant to transparency, one can recognize reference in such submissions to memorials 
given during the case proceedings which indicates the use of transparency in informing the submissions.  
For example, one amicus curiae submission in Glamis v. United States of America includes a 
reference to the memorials by the disputing parties in the case. In addition, one can recognize parallels in 
the tribunals’ reasoning and the arguments presented in the submission, which reads: 
“The threshold inquiry in analyzing whether a government action constitutes an 
expropriation is whether the claimant has established that it holds a compensable property 
interest. Once this property interest has been established, determination of whether an 
expropriation in violation of international law occurred is made through a factual inquiry into 
the circumstances of a particular case, which involves considering: (1) the economic effect of the 
action on the claimant's property; (2) the extent to which the government action interferes with 
the claimant' s reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the 
government action. (See Glamis Memorial at 234; US. Counter Memorial at 108.)”.225 
Compare this amicus curiae statement, which leans on memorials, with the tribunal’s reasoning 
on the expropriation claim, in which the tribunal held that claimants claim under NAFTA Article 1110 
failed because the “first factor in any expropriation analysis is not met: the complained of measures did 
not cause a sufficient economic impact to the Imperial Project to effect an expropriation of Claimant’s 
investment”.226 
                                                     
224 See: Glamis Gold Ltd. v. USA; ad hoc Tribunal; UNICTRAL; NAFTA; Award, 16 May 2009, paragraph 8. 
225 See: Glamis Gold Ltd. v. USA; ad hoc Tribunal; UNICTRAL; NAFTA; Award, 16 May 2009, Submission by 
Sierra Club and Earthworks, October 16, 2006, paragraph 30. 
226 See: Glamis Gold Ltd. v. USA; ad hoc Tribunal; UNICTRAL; NAFTA; Award, 16 May 2009, paragraphs 14 and 
specifically paragraphs 534-536. 
 82 
Even though the tribunal in this case decided to confine its decision to the issues presented, 
noting that it did not reach the particular issues addressed by the amicus curiae submissions,227 this 
example illustrates the fact that presence of transparency indicator may aid arguments in amicus curiae 
submissions, either by founding arguments on or adding to submissions made by parties. In the same 
case, a different amicus curiae submission based its arguments on –and added to – what it felt parties 
ignored to address in their memorials, such as the corporate social responsibility228 concept referred to in 
the amicus curiae by the Quechan Indian Nation. 
Third transparency is a means to achieving coherency and consistency in the context of dispute 
rulings or arbitration decisions carries the benefit of reducing uncertainty for regulators, investors, and 
public interest groups. “The ECJ’s case-law on the inconsistency of EU Member States’ BITs with EU 
law, and on the lack of standing of arbitral tribunals for requesting preliminary rulings from the ECJ,” for 
example, “is influenced by this lack of transparency of investment arbitration and the fear that arbitrators 
may neglect or incorrectly apply EU law as relevant context for the settlement of commercial and 
investment disputes”.229 In this context I also assume a potential interaction between transparency and 
horizontal integration230 because transparency allows in practice for the reference to rulings of – or a 
reasoning or opinion in— previous cases, which can enhance the evolution towards greater horizontal 
integration, even though under the current dispute settlement processes, tribunals are not obliged to –and 
as some argue should not – follow precedent, often delivering awards that seem to be at odds with 
previous decisions.231 Some authors have suggested that “transparency (particularly the regular 
publication of investment awards) may indirectly help promote confidence in the system by helping to 
create a regime of quasi-precedent in which tribunals are able to turn vague but common treaty terms into 
“workable concepts” or relatively uniform meaning and application, which would make arbitration more 
predictable and hence more legitimate”.232   
                                                     
227 See: Glamis Gold Ltd. v. USA; ad hoc Tribunal; UNICTRAL; NAFTA; Award, 16 May 2009, paragraph 8. The 
Tribunal stressed its awareness that its decision has been awaited by those concerned with environmental regulation, 
the interests of indigenous peoples and the tension sometimes seen between private property rights and state 
regulation. 
228 Peter Muchlinski, Corporate Social Responsibility”, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW (Federico Ortino, Peter Muchlinski, and Christoph Schreuer eds. 2008) at 637-88. 
229 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Judicial Task of Administering Justice in Trade and Investment Law and 
Adjudication, 4 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2013) at 24. 
230 And possibly vertical integration between international and supranational or domestic law, such as suggested by 
the ECJ’s case-law on the inconsistency of EU Member States’ BITs with EU law. 
231 Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Lise Johnson, Investment Treaties & Why they matter to sustainable 
development  (International Institute for Sustainable Development  2012) at 18. 
232 Jarrod Wong and Jason Yackee, The 2006 Procedural and Transparency-related amendments to the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules: Model Intentions, Moderate Proposals, and Modest Returns, in YEARBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 2009-2010 (Karl P. Sauvant ed. 2010) at 252. 
 83 
This is important to the theoretical framework of “norm cascade”233 put forth by Finnemore and 
Sikkink (1998),234 who “argue that norms evolve in a patterned life cycle,” as “norms are shared 
assessments” deriving through an “agreement process”. The authors show “how agreement among a 
critical mass of actors on some emergent norm can create a tipping point after which agreement becomes 
widespread”. However, norm creation may well be hindered when some actors are excluded from this 
process, which includes “an extensive trail of communication” for example “prompting justification for 
action”.235 From the above one can recognize an inter-linkage between transparency and horizontal 
integration, because inconsistent decisions, while illustrating ongoing norm contestation, can also stand in 
the way of norm creation and prevent progress in international horizontal integration. 
Fourth, transparency may play a role in securing against ‘information imbalance,236 which can 
disadvantage some stakeholders.237 In line with the MCO model by Raymond C. Miller, information 
imbalances caused by a lack of transparency may translate into power imbalances among different 
stakeholders. For example, with “no requirement for an investor to publicly signal their intention to 
launch a dispute,”238 public interest groups, such as NGOs, are at a disadvantage to prepare their 
position.239 In this respect, Wong and Yackee note: “greater transparency (for example, notice of a 
pending dispute) may help domestic groups to mobilize in order to pressure state-respondents to present 
the ‘best’ arguments”.240 But as illustrated in the above cited excerpt of Douglas Adams radio comedy, 
information has to be actually accessible to domestic interest groups, in order for this to happen. 
Similarly, some authors have noted how lack of transparency may also upset the balance between the 
national and lower levels of government within a country. “As a consequence of the limited access to 
dispute proceedings, state/provincial and local authorities,” who have a strong role in regulating public 
                                                     
233 Held and McGrew talk of the emergence of global norms and behavioral standards enshrined in international 
institutions. A ‘norm cascade’ in many issue-areas of international politics, “refers to the tipping point where 
international norms become global standards of appropriate behavior”. DAVID HELD, ANTHONY G. MCGREW, 
GLOBALIZATION THEORY: APPROACHES AND CONTROVERSIES   (Polity Press. 2007) at 133-134. 
234 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1998) at 887-917. 
235 Ibid., pp. 888 and 892-3 respectively. 
236 A. Cosbey, H. Mann, et al., Investment and Sustainable Development - A Guide to the Use and Potential of 
International Investment Agreements Investment and Sustainable Development (2004) at 7. 
237 Ibid., and Kyla Tienhaara, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: Investor-State Disputes and the Protection of 
the Environment in Developing Countries, 6 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (2006) at 76. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Wong and Yackee observe: “despite the intensity of NGO calls for greater participatory rights in NAFTA 
Chapter 11 proceedings, it appears that non-parties have asked to submit amicus briefs in only five cases. We are not 
aware of any instance in which a Chapter 11 tribunal has refused to grant such a request at the merits stage of a 
NAFTA chapter 11 dispute”. Jarrod Wong and Jason Yackee, The 2006 Procedural and Transparency-related 
amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules: Model Intentions, Moderate Proposals, and Modest Returns, in 
YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 2009-2010 (Karl P. Sauvant ed. 2010) at 254. 
240 Ibid., at 250. 
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health and the environment, “are not able to fight their own battles and they may have concerns that the 
federal government is not accurately representing their interests”.241 Other authors have noted how 
“transparency, (for example, of government brief) may also help citizens ‘sanction’ governments that fail 
to adequately defend themselves”.242 
In contrast to public interest groups which may be disadvantaged by a lack of access to 
information about an investment dispute, or past disputes, “states or investors with the financial resources 
to hire major international law firms specializing in this area will enjoy greater entrée to this disparate 
body of arbitral decisions through the formal and informal links those firms maintain”.243 Their advantage 
stems from these professional networks and “the likelihood that earlier arbitral decisions will be taken 
into consideration by subsequent tribunals,” yet there are no uniform requirements that such decisions be 
publicized”.244 
In the context of international investment disputes as well as for other regimes, transparency can 
play a role in supporting legitimacy, understood as “a belief in the rightfulness of a decision or the system 
through which authority is exercised,” whereby components of legitimacy include, inter alia “formal and 
procedural criteria and social acceptance, influenced by substantive issues”.245   Transparency’s role in 
avoiding public concerns about illegitimacy of an international investment arbitration system has been 
described as providing a principle mean to hold governments accountable for their decisions and reducing 
opportunities to abuse a system by, for example powerful investors. In addition, as Gus Van Harten notes: 
                                                     
241 Kyla Tienhaara, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: Investor-State Disputes and the Protection of the 
Environment in Developing Countries, 6 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (2006) at 76; citing Sanford 
Gaines, The Masked Ball of NAFTA Chapter 11: Foreign Investors, Local Environmentalists, Government 
Officials, and Disguised Motives., in LINKING TRADE, 
ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIAL COHESION: NAFTA EXPERIENCES, GLOBAL CHALLENGES (J. and 
Virginia W. MacLaren John Kirton ed. 2002). 
242 Wong Jarrod and Jason Yackee, The 2006 Procedural and Transparency-related amendments to the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules: Model Intentions, Moderate Proposals, and Modest Returns, in YEARBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 2009-2010 (Karl P. Sauvant ed. 2010) 
at 252. 
243 A. Cosbey, H. Mann, et al., Investment and Sustainable Development - A Guide to the Use and Potential of 
International Investment Agreements Investment and Sustainable Development (2004) at 7. 
244 Ibid., at 6. 
245 Kati Kulovesi, The WTO dispute settlement system and the challenge of environment and legitimacy (2008) 
London School of Economics and Political Science) at 33 and 35. Kati Kulovesi provides an excellent review of 
legitimacy theories and analysis of legitimacy among international legal scholars. For example, in her study she 
categorizes legitimacy theories into three groups: “the first group includes [Max] Weber and other theories that 
conceive legitimacy as a process, or as ‘perceived as adhering to the authority issuing an order as opposed to the 
qualities of legitimacy that inhere in an order itself”; “the second group regards legitimacy as a mixture of process 
and substance and includes [Jürgen] Habermas. This understanding of legitimacy ‘is interested not only in how a 
ruler and rule were chosen, but also in whether the rules made, and commands given were considered in light of all 
relevant data, both objective and attitudinal’”; and “the third group focuses on outcomes and consists primarily of 
neo-Marxist theories,” with arguments that “a system seeking to validate itself must be defensible in terms of 
equality, fairness, justice and freedom” at 35. 
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“Public access to information is widely recognized as a fundamental principle of judicial decision-making 
in domestic and international courts”.246 In the context of ‘environmental citizen rights,’ the Heinrich Böll 
Foundation has called for the globalization of the Aarhus Convention, as access to information is a 
precondition of vigilance, a precondition for citizen influence and for accountability.247 Tienhaara stresses 
how the lack of transparency in arbitration and of consistency of tribunal decisions creates uncertainty for 
regulators, which, “combined with the financial risk involved in proceeding to arbitration, may create 
situations in which the threat of an investment dispute is sufficient to convince a government to reverse, 
amend, or fail to enforce an environmental regulation‚ a phenomenon referred to as regulatory chill”.248 
Legitimacy and accountability may thus be undermined, as, without access to information about cases that 
challenge an environmental policy measure, the public may not understand why a government decided to 
“reverse, amend or fail to enforce an environmental regulation”. A citizen of a democracy may not be 
aware that such a decision was prompted by either a dispute outcome or by a regulatory chill effect, as 
several case studies have illustrated.249  
                                                     
246 GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW   (Oxford University 
Press. 2007) at 159 citing the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the 
European convention on Human Rights ECHR) Art. 40 providing that hearings of the court shall take place in public 
and that documents deposited with the Registry shall be made accessible to the public. 
247 WOLFGANG SACHS, JÖRG HAAS, RITA HOPPE, ERWIN JÜNEMANN; KERSTIN KIPPENHAN AND 
ANNETTE MAENNEL, THE JO'BURG MEMO. FAIRNESS IN A FRAGILE WORLD   (Heinrich Böll 
Foundation. 2002) at 73. 
248 Kyla Tienhaara, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: Investor-State Disputes and the Protection of the 
Environment in Developing Countries, 6 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (2006). 
249 One positive example can be found in the case of Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Costa Rica. 
From its dispute documents Costa Ricans can see that their government defended its action to expand a national park 
for the protection of biodiversity, including in its argument even the fact that it “had acted in accordance with its 
obligations under multilateral environmental agreements”. Ibid., at 84-85 citing from the Final Award In the Matter 
of the Arbitration between Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. and the Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/96/1, 2000 ILM 39 (6), paragraph 72.)  
The documentation of the case also informs about the reasons for Costa Rica losing its argument, i.e. for a reduction 
of the amount claimed and instead for an appropriate compensation. (Tienhaara describes: “There is a longstanding 
international debate over compensation that generally falls on a North-South divide. Industrialized countries have 
long advocated the so-called Hull standard as a means to calculate compensation. It states (in its various 
incarnations) that compensation should be “prompt, adequate and effective”. In contrast to this, the appropriate 
compensation doctrine often favored by developing countries suggests a more complex calculation which factors in 
other considerations, such as the past practices of the investor, the depletion of natural resources or environmental 
damage that has occurred as a result of the investment, the economic situation of the country” Ibid., referring here to 
UNCTAD 2000, Taking of Property. Issues in International Investment Agreements,   UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/15. 
Geneva: United Nations, p. 14. ) (Costa Rica argued that setting the amount of compensation too high would 
discourage developing countries from adopting environmental objectives). The tribunal concluded that: 
“Expropriatory environmental measures, no matter how laudable and beneficial to society as a whole, are in this 
respect, similar to any other expropriatory measures that a state may take in order to implement its policies: where 
property is expropriated, even for environmental purposes, whether domestic or international, the state’s obligation 
to pay compensation remains”. Ibid., citing from the Final Award In the Matter of the Arbitration between 
Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. and the Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, 2000 
ILM 39 (6), paragraph 72.) 
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Transparency about cases that challenge an environmental policy measure not only may increase 
public awareness and allow NGOs to advocate for the upholding an environmental law, it can also 
provide a means to safeguard or question the legitimacy of government action. Providing examples from 
the natural resources sector, Sornarajah finds many foreign investment concession agreements throughout 
the developing world that were executed in the context of unequal bargaining power, or signed by rulers 
who did not care as they, being absolute rulers, could utilize the royalties they received for their own 
benefit.  The author notes: “It is an interesting point as to whether international lawyers who promote the 
norms of democracy would concede that concessions and other foreign investment agreements signed by 
dictators or unrepresentative governments should be considered invalid. It is possible to argue that the 
norm of self-determination, now having acquired a near ius cogens status would invalidate concession 
agreements signed by unrepresentative rulers”.250 
For all these reasons: transparency secures against “information imbalance which can 
disadvantage some stakeholders; transparency can play a role in achieving coherence and consistency in 
the context of dispute rulings or arbitration decisions, reducing thereby uncertainty for regulators, 
investors and public interest groups; and transparency can help avoid concerns about illegitimacy, 
providing a mean to hold governments accountable for their decisions and reducing opportunities to abuse 
a system – I expect that transparency in economic law and disputes factors into the possibility of dispute 
outcomes that are environmentally permissible. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Wong and Yackee note in this respect: “Greater transparency may increase the legitimacy of the legal system, by 
providing the system’s most persistent and vocal critics with an opportunity to more directly observe the workings 
of what supporters of the system view as a fair and reasonable method of dispute settlement. In other words, greater 
openness may serve an educative role, promoting understanding and acceptance of the system in its current form”. 
Wong Jarrod and Jason Yackee, The 2006 Procedural and Transparency-related amendments to the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules: Model Intentions, Moderate Proposals, and Modest Returns, in YEARBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 2009-2010 (Karl P. Sauvant ed. 2010) at 251. 
 
A different example is provided in Tienhaara’s study of an Indonesian case involving a dispute over mining 
contracts in protected forests, which the author finds to provide evidence supporting the regulatory chill hypothesis. 
In this case, even though NGOs got actively involved to advocate for environmental protection, the Indonesian 
government retreated in part from its forest law that prohibited open-cast mining in protection forests. “According to 
several observers, the government had been ‘burned’ in previous arbitrations and was not eager to try their luck 
again”. Kyla Tienhaara, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: Investor-State Disputes and the Protection of the 
Environment in Developing Countries, 6 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (2006) at 94. 
This case is instructive with respect to legitimacy, as NGOs raised among others the issue that all contracts with 
mining investors in protected areas “were signed during the period of authoritative government, and the Forestry 
Law was made under democratic rule”. Ibid., 89 referring to WALI (Friends of the Earth Indonesia) and JATAM 
(Mining Advocacy Network) released a press statement on 4 April 2002: “Mining Industry Threatens Indonesia with 
International Arbitration”. 
 
250 M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT   (Cambridge University 
Press. 2004) at 42, Footnote 22 
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Given these powerful arguments, one may wonder who is resisting transparency, and why? There 
is also a need for confidentiality.  Knahr and Reinisch note that “the confidential nature of arbitration 
proceedings may contribute to a reduction of tensions between the parties” and is assumed to be 
appreciated by many firms  “because it protects business secrets and may help to protect the public image 
of companies when even the mere fact of litigation released to the public might cause harm to its 
reputation”.251 Others have noted, “confidentiality may be precious not only for businesses: for some 
governments seeking to escape public accountability in relation to investment claims, it may also be 
convenient”.252 One study of ICSID cases found for example “that the parties to disputes favour less 
transparent outcomes where strong political pressures lead governments to violate legal norms—such as 
when disputes involve long-lived capital assets whose ongoing operation requires politically messy deals 
that neither side would like exposed to public scrutiny”.253  
In Metalclad v. Mexico, it was in fact respondent state Mexico that requested, in part resisted by 
claimant Metalclad, a confidentiality order seeking proceedings be confidential.254 The tribunal’s 
observations regarding transparency and public disclosure is relevant and insightful:  
 
“There remains nonetheless a question as to whether there exists any general principle of 
confidentiality that would operate to prohibit public discussion of the arbitration proceedings by 
either party. Neither the NAFTA nor the ICSID (Additional facility) Rules contain any expressed 
restriction on the freedom of the parties in this respect. Though it is frequently said that one of 
the reasons for recourse to arbitration is to avoid publicity, unless the agreement between the 
parties incorporates such a limitation, each of them is still free to speak publicly of the 
arbitration. It may be observed that no such limitation is written into such major arbitral texts as 
the UNCITRAL Rules or the draft Articles on Arbitration adopted by the International Law 
Commission. Indeed, as has been pointed out by the Claimant in its comments, under the US 
security laws, the Claimant, as a public company traded on a public stock exchange in the US, is 
under a positive duty to provide certain information about its activities to its shareholders, 
                                                     
251 Christina Knahr & August Reinisch, Transparency versus Confidentiality in International Investment Arbitration 
‚ The Biwater Gauff Compromise, 6 LAW & PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS & TRIBUNALS 
(2007) at 109. 
252 Nicolas and Wouters Hachez, Jan, International investment dispute settlement in the twenty-first century: does 
preservation for the public interest require an alternative to the arbitral model?, in INVESTMENT LAW WITHIN 
INTERNAITOAL LAW (Freya Baetens ed. 2013) at 435. 
253 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and David G. Victor:, Secrecy in International Investment Arbitration: An Empirical 
Analysis, 7 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2016) at 161. 
254 See: Metaclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID (Additional Facility) Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Final Award, 2 September 
2000, paragraph 13. 
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especially regarding its involvement in a process the outcome of which could perhaps 
significantly affect its share value”.255 
 
The tribunal determined: “the above being said, it still appears to the tribunal that it would be of 
advantage to the orderly unfolding of the arbitral process and conductive to the maintenance of working 
relations between the Parties if during the proceedings they were both to limit public discussions of the 
case to a minimum, subject only to any externally imposed obligation of disclosure by which either of 
them may be legally bound”.256 Rules regarding publication of documents under ICSID and ICSID 
Additional Facility Arbitration are discussed below under the relevant measure of transparency sections. 
Another example of a non-corporate interest in confidentiality is illustrated in the Glamis v. 
United States case. In this case, confidentiality mattered to the Quechan Indian Nation, who’s designated 
Native American lands and areas of special cultural concern was located near to Glamis’ mining project 
and the land area concerned in that dispute. In response to a request from the Quechan Council to remain 
confidential, the tribunal noted “the FTC [the NAFTA Free Trade Commission] stated that ‘nothing in the 
NFATA imposes a general duty of confidentiality and that in fact the FTC explained that each Party 
agreed to make available to the public all documents submitted in a Chapter 11 dispute – including 
documents by non-disputing parties – subject to redaction,’” and explained “it was not willing to grant a 
request to keep the entire report confidential” but would consider requests for sections of the report to be 
redacted.257 
4.2 MEASUREMENTS OF TRANSPARENCY 
A. Public Notice of Commencement of Proceedings 
B. Publication of Final Decision and Award 
C. Access to Documents During the Proceedings 
Observing in each case the respective measurements of transparency is generally related to: the 
level of transparency required by the rules governing the dispute; transparency-related provisions in the 
treaty under which the claim was brought; and applicable domestic statuory laws, including the statuory 
arbitration law of the seat of the arbitration and domestic statutory laws relating to freedom of information 
                                                     
255 Ibid., paragraph 13. 
256 See Glamis Gold Ltd. V. USA; ad hoc Tribunal; UNICTRAL; NAFTA; [Final] award, paragraph 13. 
257 See: Glamis Gold Ltd. V. USA; ad hoc Tribunal; UNICTRAL; NAFTA; Award, 16 May 2009, paragraph 282. 
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(FOI) requests.258  As I show below, to the extent observed in this study, these requirements differ greatly 
on general features of the key dimensions of disclosure, identified by Paul Nelson (2001, 2003)259 as: 
fullness of disclosure, accessibility of disclosure and timeliness of disclosure.260 Nelson261 further 
identified specific features of these dimensions, noting inter alia: ‘fullness of disclosure’ varies in three 
important ways; some categories of documents are not released at all; borrowers are given some 
discretion over the handling of many documents that are subject to disclosure; some documents, are 
released only in summary form; accessibility of disclosure varies by the sites at which documents can be 
obtained, the languages in which they are available and their cost; and timeliness of disclosure is a 
function of whether and for how long citizens have access to the documents in different stages of a 
procedure, (in the context of this study the different stages of a dispute).262 Though the study initially 
attempted to include these specific features, for feasibility reasons, the data collection focused instead on 
the general observations of the presence of identified transparency measures or case characteristics. The 
language of materials studied is English. For the Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and 
Vivendi Universal S.A. case, the ICSID Secretariat posted materials263 online in both, the Spanish and 
English original versions. The website provides in Spanish only the Award for Abengoa, S.A. y 
COFIDES, S.A. v. United Mexican States, which was not considered in this study. 
For the Saar Papier v. Poland (I) case the decision by the Swiss Federal Tribunal was available 
only and read in German. 
The rules on the disclosure of documents related to each of my measures differ among the fora 
under which a case is brought, including the Arbitration Rules of, inter alia: the International Chamber of 
Commerce; the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce; the International Centre 
                                                     
258 Christopher Kee, Article 3. Publication of Documents, in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-
BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION (Dimitrij Euler Markus Gehring and Maxi Scherer (eds.) and 
Meagan Wong and Rebecca Hadgett (others) 2015) at 93-6. 
259 P. J. Nelson, Transparency Mechanisms at the Multilateral Development Banks, 29 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 
(2001). And P. J. Nelson, Multilateral development banks, transparency and corporate clients: ‘public–private 
partnerships’ and public access to information, 23 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT (2003) at 
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260 Paul Nelson also includes a fourth key dimension: “the mechanisms available for recourse and influence or the 
for of redress open to citizens, which I however adopt under my third independent variable: “public participatory 
access”. Ibid. 
261 Ibid., at 252-3. 
262 Ibid. 
263 These materials in both languages (original versions) included: Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency 
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for Dispute Resolution; and the London Court of International Arbitration.264 The transparency rules of 
the three main fora relevant to the cases in this study are briefly noted below for each of my transparency 
measures. 
Transparency provisions differ also at the treaty level. Many BITs,265  FTAs and multilateral 
FTAs, such as NAFTA, do “not provide for their own arbitration rules,” instead, they offer “a choice 
between ICSID, ICSID Additional Facility and UNCITRAL Arbitration”.266 As most cases of this study 
were brought under NAFTA Chapter 11, NAFTA related practice is also briefly noted below for each of 
my transparency measures. Case summaries and discussions include references, where relevant, to other 
applicable BITs or FTAs in a given case. 
4.2.1 Public notice of commencement of proceedings 
Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976) and (2010) there is no requirement for the Secretariat 
to inform the public of the commencement of arbitration. It has been noted that, in theory and unless 
stated otherwise in provisions of the treaty under which the claim was brought, “disputing parties 
presumably could unilaterally or jointly decide to voluntarily release the notice of arbitration”.267 Article 2 
of the ‘new’ 2014 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration268 (on 
publication of information at the commencement of arbitral proceedings) requires the repository to 
“promptly make available to the public information regarding the name of the disputing parties, the 
economic sector involved and the treaty under which the claim is being made”.269  
                                                     
264 For a comparative review of these rules, including also the Optional Rules for Arbitrating a Dispute between 
Parties, of which only one is a State (1993) of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. See: Giuseppe  Bianco, Article 2. 
Publication of information at the commencement of arbitral proceedings, in TRANSPARENCY IN 
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Application, Content and Next Steps (2013) at 14. 
268 The new Rules on Transparency apply on a default basis to UNCITRAL arbitrations conducted under treaties 
concluded after the new rules came into effect on April 1, 2014. Unfortunately, however, the previous standard will 
still apply in UNCITRAL arbitrations brought under treaties concluded before that date unless States or disputing 
parties expressly “opt into” the new rules. See: Ibid., at 4. 
269 See: UN Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (Adopted by the UN General 
Assembly RESOLUTION 69/116 on December 10, 2014), available at: 
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The Secretariat of ICSID and the ICSID Additional Facility Arbitration is required, based on 
the ICSID Administrative and Financial Regulation 22(1), to publish on their website “information about 
the operation of the Centre, including the registration of all requests for conciliation or arbitration and in 
due course an indication of the date and method of the termination of each proceeding”.270 
At the treaty level, “NAFTA Chapter 11 does not contain any express rules on confidentiality, it 
does contain a number of provisions aimed at more transparency such as rules concerning the information 
of NAFTA States about pending cases, their possibility to intervene, etc”.271 Bianci observes state practice 
in this regard: “the United States makes available to the public, subject to the redaction of protected 
information, documents regarding the initiation of arbitral proceedings” and, with Canada,  “notices of 
arbitration it receives” by posting them online.272  
In this study, presence of public notice of commencement of proceedings has been observed in 
various ways, including online media releases or public notification, such as on the website of the ICSID 
Secretariat. Yet determining existence and the date of disclosure was not possible in some cases. In 
particular contacting relevant government agencies to find out whether the commencement of proceedings 
were published at the time notice of intentions were received have been fruitless during the research 
project. Some respondents referred to the websites of the institutions under which the dispute was housed, 
most explained the information is not available.273   
4.2.2 Publication of final decision and award 
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules underwent several developments. “The UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules (1976) state that awards may be made public only with the consent of both parties.274 In the 
UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules (2010),275 “this position was supplemented pursuant to a legal duty to do 
so, to protect or pursue a legal right, and in relation to legal proceedings before a court or other competent 
                                                                                                                                                                           
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/transparency-convention/Transparency-Convention-e.pdf (last 
accessed 9/1/2016). 
270 See: ICSID Administrative and Financial Regulation 22(1), available at: 
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authority”.276 Under Article 3(1) and (7)  (on publication of documents) of the new UNCITRAL 
Arbitration rules,277 the repository is mandated, subject to Article 7 (on exceptions to transparency) to 
make decisions and awards of the arbitral tribunal available in a timely manner”.278 
The ICSID Arbitration Rules state “the Centre shall not publish the award without the consent 
of the parties,”279 thus also subjecting “publication of the award to the consent of the parties”. 
Nevertheless the 2006 Arbitration Rules obliges the Centre to promptly publish excerpts of the legal 
reasoning of tribunals, which previously was a possibility, but not a mandate.280 The Secretariat of the 
ICSID Additional Facility Arbitration, also based on the Administrative and Financial Regulation 
22(2) publishes awards also only “if both parties to a proceeding consent to the publication of arbitral 
awards”. However, as noted by many, “as opposed to the Centre, the parties are in principle free to 
publish documents or awards unless they have explicitly agreed upon confidentiality,” and as shown 
below, “a number of ICSID awards have been released unilaterally by one of the disputing parties”.281 
At the treaty level, as noted above, NAFTA Chapter 11 does not contain any expressed rules on 
confidentiality. Interestingly, NAFTA Article 1137 and Annex 1137.4 (on the publication of the award) 
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Assembly RESOLUTION 69/116 on December 10, 2014), available at: 
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/transparency-convention/Transparency-Convention-e.pdf (last 
accessed 9/1/2016). The Article further “establishes three categories of documents: (1) documents that are to be 
mandatorily and automatically disclosed, (2) documents that are to be mandatorily disclosed once any person 
requests their disclosure from the tribunal and (3) documents for which the tribunal has discretion regarding whether 
or not to order disclosure”. See: Lise Johnson (principle author) and Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder (with input 
and comments from Marcos Orellana, Lisa Sachs, Daniel Magraw and Howard Mann): “New UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules on Transparency: Application, Content and Next Steps,” CIEL and IISD, August 2013, p. 15, 
available at: http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2013/uncitral_rules_on_transparency_commentary.pdf (last accessed 
9/22/2016). 
279 ICSID Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 18 
March 1965, Article 48(5) and ICSID Arbitration Rules Article 48(4) available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basic doc/CRR_English-final.pdf last accessed 9/17/2016. 
280 ICSID Arbitration Rules Article 48(4) available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basic doc/CRR_English-
final.pdf last accessed 9/17/2016. The language in this Article changed from “may” to “shall”. See also: Christina 
Knahr & August Reinisch, Transparency versus Confidentiality in International Investment Arbitration, The Biwater 
Gauff Compromise, 6 LAW & PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS & TRIBUNALS (2007) at 100. 
281 Christina Knahr & August Reinisch, Transparency versus Confidentiality in International Investment Arbitration, 
The Biwater Gauff Compromise, 6 LAW & PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS & TRIBUNALS (2007) 
at 100. 
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“treats Canada and the U.S. differently than Mexico with respect to the public disclosure of awards,” 
providing that “in any dispute involving the governments of Canada or the USA, either disputing party 
may make the award public”.282 
In this study, presence of publication of final decision and award is observed were it has been 
published in the English language on a publicly accessible website by either the institution housing the 
case, the claimant or responding party. In some cases this observation was not applicable because no 
award was issued, a case was settled by parties, withdrawn or abandoned. 
4.2.3 Access to documents during the proceedings 
The UNCITRAL Rules 1976 are silent with respect to the confidentiality of the materials produced 
during the proceedings. Article 15(3) only states: “all documents or information supplied to the arbitral 
tribunal by one party shall at the same time be communicated by that party to the other party”. This leaves 
it, in theory, to the disputing parties to decide to release documents about the case. 
Under Article 3(1) and (7)  (on publication of documents) of the new UNCITRAL Arbitration 
rules,283 the repository is mandated, subject to Article 7 (on exceptions to transparency) to make the 
following documents available in a timely manner, in the form and in the language in which it receives 
them: “the notice of arbitration, the response to the notice of arbitration, the statement of claim, the 
statement of defense and any further written statements or written submissions by any disputing party; a 
table listing all exhibits to the aforesaid documents and to expert reports and witness statements, if such 
table has been prepared for the proceedings, but not the exhibits themselves; any written submissions by 
the non-disputing Party(ies) to the treaty and by third persons, transcripts of hearings, where available; 
and orders, decisions and awards of the arbitral tribunal”.284 
                                                     
282 Joachim Delaney and Daniel Barstow Magraw, Procedural Transparency, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (Federico Ortino Peter Muchlinski, Christoph Schreuer (eds.) ed. 2008) 
at 750. 
283 The new Rules on Transparency will apply on a default basis to UNCITRAL arbitrations conducted under 
treaties concluded after the new rules come into effect on April 1, 2014. Unfortunately, however, the previous 
standard will still apply in UNCITRAL arbitrations brought under treaties concluded before that date unless States 
or disputing parties expressly “opt into” the new rules. See: Lise Johnson (principle author) and Nathalie 
Bernasconi-Osterwalder (with input and comments from Marcos Orellana, Lisa Sachs, Daniel Magraw and Howard 
Mann): “New UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules on Transparency: Application, Content and Next Steps,” CIEL and 
IISD, August 2013, at .4. 
284 See: UN Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (Adopted by the UN General 
Assembly RESOLUTION 69/116 on December 10, 2014), available at: 
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/transparency-convention/Transparency-Convention-e.pdf (last 
accessed 9/1/2016). The Article further “establishes three categories of documents: (1) documents that are to be 
mandatorily and automatically disclosed, (2) documents that are to be mandatorily disclosed once any person 
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The ICSID and ICSID Additional Facility Arbitration, based on the Administrative and 
Financial Regulation 22(2) states that “the Centre publishes other material with the parties’ consent (for 
example, decisions of the tribunal, procedural orders, parties’ submissions, transcripts and minutes of 
hearings, etc.)” and that “the Centre is committed to enhancing understanding of the ICSID process and 
international investment law and contacts parties to concluded and pending cases to seek their 
authorization to publish material from the record”.285 However, as noted above, “there are no ICSID rules 
or regulations governing the actions of the parties” and to many it is thus “not clear whether they are 
allowed to disclose any documents to the public during or after the proceedings”.286  
At the treaty level, it is important to note that the FTC, issued binding interpretative 
statements287 on this issue, making clear that “there was no separate stand-alone confidentiality obligation 
to be found in the NAFTA agreement that would, of itself, prevent the parties to the arbitration from 
publishing documents,” including sharing “arbitration documents (i.e. publishing them) to subnational 
government officials”.288  
The ICSID case between Biwater Gauff v. United Republic of Tanzania is illustrative as its 
tribunal examined all the above noted rules, including ICSID Additional Facility Rules, the UNCITRAL 
Rules and the rules governing investment arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11. In this case, the claimant 
complained about the unilateral disclosure by the respondent of minutes and a procedural order on the 
Internet without an agreement of both parties to this effect and filed a request for provisional measures on 
confidentiality.289 
With respect to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the tribunal noted that other than that “awards 
are to be made public only with the consent of both parties” and that “hearings are to be held in camera 
                                                                                                                                                                           
requests their disclosure from the tribunal and (3) documents for which the tribunal has discretion regarding whether 
or not to order disclosure”. See: Lise Johnson (principle author) and Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder (with input 
and comments from Marcos Orellana Lisa Sachs Daniel Magraw and Howard Mann), New UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules on Transparency: Application, Content and Next Steps (2013) at 15. 
285 See: Transparency Rules of the Additional Facility Arbitration applying to the Secretariat available at:  
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/process/Pages/Confidentiality-and-Transparency---AF-
Arbitration.aspx (last accessed 9/20/2016) and ICSID Administrative and Financial Regulation 22(2), available at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partC-chap04.htm#r22 (last accessed 9/20/2016). 
286 Christina Knahr and August Reinisch, Transparency Versus Confidentiality in International Investment 
Arbitration – the Biwater Gauff Compromise., 6 LAW & PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS & 
TRIBUNALS, (2007) at 100. 
287 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, NAFTA Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, 31 July 
2001. 
288 Christopher Kee, Article 3. Publication of Documents,, in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-
BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION (Dimitrij Euler, Markus Gehring and Maxi Scherer (eds.) and 
Meagan Wong and Rebecca Hadgett (others) 2015) at 95. 
289 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order 
No. 3, (29 September 2006) paragraph 13. 
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unless the parties agree otherwise, there are no provisions [expressly imposing a general duty of 
confidentiality, or prohibiting disclosure of documents prepared for or disclosed in the arbitration”.290 The 
tribunal also: observed a “lack of general rule on the issue” in both the UK- United Republic of Tanzania 
(UROT) BIT and the ICISD; “acknowledged the 2006 amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules reflect 
the trend in international investment arbitration towards transparency”; concluded “that there existed a 
sufficient risk of aggravation of the dispute that would warrant some form of control by the tribunal”; and 
“also emphasized the significance of the public interest in the case, therefore determining that “any 
restrictions must be carefully and narrowly delimited”.291   
Knahr and Reinisch provide a good discussion on how the tribunal in this case distinguished 
between documents, and between the timing of release of documents, i.e. while proceedings are pending, 
after the conclusion of the proceedings, and the publication of final awards. In distinguishing between 
documents, the tribunal found that: “restrictions on the publication of a party’s own documents would not 
be appropriate in general; the publication of minutes of hearings, pleadings or written memorials, 
correspondence between the parties and/or the tribunal, as well as any documents produced by the 
opposing party may threaten the procedural integrity of the arbitral process and should thus not be 
permitted in principle; and parties could ask the tribunal for exceptions to these restrictions on a case-by-
case basis”.292  
In distinguishing between the release of documents while proceedings are pending, after the 
conclusion of the proceedings and the publication of final awards, the tribunal: “concluded disclosure of 
documents during the proceedings was problematic and should therefore be handled restrictively” while 
“the publication of awards, other tribunal decisions, but also pleadings and written memorials after the 
conclusion of proceedings would cause less trouble”.293    
In the end, the tribunal recommended in its procedural order that “for the duration of these 
arbitration proceedings, and in the absence of any agreement between the parties” that “all parties refrain 
from disclosing to third parties: the minutes or record of any hearings; any of the documents produced in 
the arbitral proceedings by the opposing party, whether pursuant to a disclosure exercise or otherwise; any 
of the pleadings or written memorials (and any attached witness statements or expert reports); and any 
correspondence between the parties and/or the Arbitral Tribunal exchanged in respect of the arbitral 
                                                     
290 Ibid., paragraph 132 
291 Christina Knahr & August Reinisch, Transparency versus Confidentiality in International Investment Arbitration, 
The Biwater Gauff Compromise, 6 LAW & PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS & TRIBUNALS (2007) 
at 105 and 107. 
292 Ibid., at 108. 
293 Ibid. 
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proceedings”.294 Furthermore that: “ all parties are at liberty to apply to the Arbitral Tribunal in justified 
cases for the lifting or variation of these restrictions on a case-by-case basis; any disclosure to third 
parties of decisions, orders or directions of the Arbitral Tribunal (other than awards) shall be subject to 
prior permission by the Arbitral Tribunal; and for the avoidance of doubt, the parties may engage in 
general discussion about the case in public, provided that any such public discussion is restricted to what 
is necessary, and is not used as an instrument to antagonise the parties, exacerbate their differences, 
unduly pressure”.295     
In this study, the presence of official access to documents during proceedings is observed where 
case documents have been published in the English language on a publicly accessible website by either 
the institution housing the case, the claimant or responding party including: pleadings, memorials and 
briefs submitted to the panel or tribunal by a disputing party; written submissions by non-disputing parties 
to the treaty or non-parties, such as amicus curiae; and minutes or transcripts of hearings for the tribunal. 
My data collection includes tribunals’ official recommendations or orders on the matter, as well as 
unofficial online releases on media or other websites where sometimes “leaked” documents were 
reported. Yet, as in the case of my first measure, determining existence and the date of disclosure was not 
always possible. 
In conclusion, the indicator of transparency is measured by observing in any given case public 
access to: information that a dispute commenced; documents presented during the course of dispute 
proceedings; and final decision, including reasoning by a given tribunal. To test the hypothesis that 
transparency increases the prospect of environmentally permissible dispute outcomes, the study looked 
for patterns of cases in which transparency correlate positively with environmental policy permissible 
outcomes. Additional possible observations from the study include: 
• Transparency measures are dependent on each other, i.e. where no access to public notice is 
observed, no access to documents during the proceedings is observed; 
• Transparency matters only if specific or all of the indicators’ measurements are observed; 
• Transparency matters/occurs only when public representation and participation is observed; 
• Transparency matters/occurs only when public representation and participation and/or horizontal 
integration is observed;  
• Transparency matters even if horizontal integration is not observed; 
• Transparency matters even if horizontal integration measures are not accepted as relevant or 
applicable; 
                                                     
294 Biwater Gauff Procedural Order No. 3, 29 September 2006, paragraphs 140-167. 
295 Ibid. 
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• Transparency matters only if a specific interpretation technique is employed by the tribunal/panel; 
and/or 
• Transparency matters only if specific policy implementation requirements have been met.296 
 
Observing such possible patterns of case outcome in relation to the transparency indicator, 
including in combination with the indicators of horizontal integration and public representation and 
participation thus aims at finding answers to the research question. Results may provide useful insights 
into institutional reform recommendations and, given the recently adopted new UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration”297 and the “UN Convention on Transparency in 
Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration,”298 inform states in their decision to apply the new rules for 
existing Investment Protection Agreements concluded before 1 April 2014. 
Concluding this chapter with another expressed view, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann suggests: 
 
“The more intergovernmental rulemaking (e.g. in the WTO, BITs, UN environmental negotiations, EU 
violations of WTO and EMU obligations) neglects human rights and consumer welfare in international 
economic law, the more may judicial protection of cosmopolitan rights (e.g. of access to transparent 
judicial procedures, submission of amicus curiae briefs), ‘dynamic’ and ‘systemic interpretation’, judicial 
‘balancing’ of economic and non-economic interests, and other ‘judicial checks and balances’ of 
discretionary foreign policy powers be constitutionally justifiable”. 
                                                     
296 Additional observations to be discussed in future studies could include: transparency is more frequently observed 
in cases brought under specific Arbitration Rules or treaties; transparency is more frequently observed after the 
NAFTA FTC issued its binding interpretative statements in 2001; and/or transparency is cumulatively more 
frequently observed following prior cases where transparency is observed.  
 
297 See: UNCITRAL, 46th session (July 8-26, 2013), A/CN.9/XLVI/CRP.3 (July 9, 2013). 
298 See: UN Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (Adopted by the UN General 
Assembly RESOLUTION 69/116 on December 10, 2014), available at: 
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/transparency-convention/Transparency-Convention-e.pdf (last 
accessed 9/1/2016). 
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5.0  PUBLIC REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION 
This chapter explicates public representation and participation as indicator as well as its measurements in 
this study. It follows from: 
Hypothesis 3: Public representation and participation increases the prospect of environmentally 
permissible dispute outcomes. 
 
Independent Variable 3: Public representation and participation in international economic law disputes 
5.1 DEFINITION AND RATIONALE FOR PUBLIC REPRESENTATION AND 
PARTICIPATION AS INDICATOR 
This study defines public representation as indirect or direct representation of public matters, including 
environmental concerns, in an international economic law dispute case. Public participation is defined as 
active or passive participation in such dispute cases, including through the acceptance of amicus curiae 
submissions or granting of observer status in a dispute case. 
 99 
The underlying rationale for an indicator of public representation and participation lies in the 
expectation that cases in which public representation and participation is observed should correlate 
positively with environmental policy permissible outcomes. The reason is twofold. First public 
representation and participation in a case is expected to promote public considerations, including 
environmental protection, public health, consumer protection and preferences along with other public 
considerations such as economic interests. Second, public representation and participation in a case is 
expected to influence a tribunal so to take into account such public considerations as environmental 
protection, public health, consumer protection and preferences. And the determination of an 
environmental policy alleged to have violated economic rights articulated in the applicable economic 
treaty as permissible, should be more likely when public consideration are taking into account. This is 
again qualified by a state’s act in violation of good faith, in which case the policy should be determined 
impermissible.  
Whether and how a tribunal is influenced or affected by public representation and participation in 
a case is difficult to determine. Yet this does not prohibit the hypothesis that public representation and 
participation in a case can influence – or entail the capacity of causing an effect in indirect or intangible 
ways on – a tribunal in the determination of a case. Influence in this context does not mean improper 
interference nor a violation of the basic principles of independence of an international arbitration tribunal, 
including, that they, inter alia: shall still decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and 
in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats 
or interferences, direct or indirect; have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue submitted for their 
decision is within their competence as defined by law; shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted 
interference with the judicial process; and are entitled and required to ensure that judicial proceedings are 
conducted fairly and that the rights of the parties are respected.299   
Public representation and participation can increase factual information and legal understandings 
in case proceedings, for example through amicus curiae submissions. By adding a sense of accountability, 
public observance of hearings can affect the scope of presentations and testimonies given by  public 
representatives that are participating in hearings. With involved observers in the room, they may be 
inclined to include public input that was provided during the development process of a policy. Indirect 
public representation on both sides of disputing parties, such as in state-state disputes can influence 
presentations and arguments to include a wider scope of public interest on both sides of disputing parties 
than one expects in investor-state disputes where the investor as dispute party is likely to focus more 
narrowly on economic interest.  
                                                     
299 See for example: United Nations General Assembly “Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary“ UN 
GA resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985. 
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The indicator of public representation and participation in this study was measured by observing 
in any given case: submission and acceptance of an amicus curiae brief and granting of public observance 
of hearings. In the end, the study’s observations of a third measure, i.e. whether both disputing parties are 
states, showed no data variation because of the study’s ultimate focus on investment arbitrations only. 
Public representation and participation as variable is based on the premise that there exists a 
public interest in international economic law cases. Besides the fact that both economic as well as 
environmental issues are of public concern and are inherent to general international public and the 
specific UN sustainable development goals, public interest in a dispute may more specifically be based on 
several public implications that can result from a case. These include: the fact that disputes often arise in 
public service sectors; disputes may concern government regulation aimed at the protection of public 
welfare; disputes may have a “chilling” effect on government policy; arbitration is costly and has 
implications for the public purse; and case law may have implications for future public-interest cases, 
such as considering reciprocity when an environmental policy in one’s own country is challenged in the 
future.300 With disputes potentially having an implication for public interest, public representation and 
participation in a dispute may thus be relevant for the outcome of a dispute. This may be through a sense 
of accountability, for example by mere observation by the public of the disputing arguments and 
reasoning, to confirm whether public interest is responsibly taken into account –or by providing directly 
or indirectly facts, testimonials, expertise and relevant views that might otherwise be ignored by the 
disputing parties and the arbitration tribunal. 
In the Methanex v. United States case for example, the petitioners for amicus curiae: noted the 
case raised issues of constitutional importance concerning government authority to implement 
environmental regulations and  property rights; explained the interpretation of NAFTA Chapter 11 should 
reflect legal principles underlying the concept of sustainable development and offered assistance to the 
tribunal in this respect; highlighted the increased urgency for amicus participation in light of an alleged 
failure to consider environmental and sustainable development goals in the Metalclad v. Mexico 2000 
case; noted permissibility to appear as amicus in equivalent court proceedings in the jurisdictions of both 
Canada and the US; and suggested participation of an amicus would allay public disquiet as to the closed 
nature of arbitration proceedings under NAFTA Chapter 11. 301 
                                                     
300 Kyla Tienhaara, Third Party Participation in Investment-Environment Disputes: Recent Developments, 16 
REVIEW OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY & INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2007) at 230, 
referring here to H. Mann and F. Marshall, Revision of the UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules, Good Governance and 
the Rule of Law: Express Rules for Investor-State Arbitrations Required (2006). 
301Methanex v. USA Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “amici curiae” 15 
January 2001, paragraphs 5-7. 
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Yet an amicus is not equivalent to the public. Daniel Bodansky notes: “the phrase ‘public 
participation’ is a bit of a euphemism”. Since “relatively few members of the public would, in practice, be 
able to participate,” the phrase “refers to participation, not by the ‘public’ but by non-governmental 
groups”.302 And relatively few NGOs that take an interest in the matters being considered have the 
capacity to submit an amicus brief. 
Public interest encompasses a variety of issues and positions of multi-centric organizations. 
NGOs differ in their advocacy and positions with regards to: human rights, development rights as well as 
business, labor, public health, environmental, religious, security, indigenous peoples and local 
communities, and many more types of ‘public interest.’ Acknowledging these as relevant, this study 
concentrates however on environmental policy permissible outcomes in international economic law 
disputes. Therefore the idea of public interest in this study refers specifically to inclusive environmental 
views, such as advocating for the predominance of the protection of domestic or global environmental 
goods or ecosystem services in the balancing exercise of other public and private interest issues.303  
Another reason for testing whether this indicator matters to environmental policy permissible 
dispute outcomes is that public participation has been recognized as an important factor in fostering 
sustainable development in several MEAs and soft law instruments. For example, the United Nations Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development proclaims in Principle 10 that: “Environmental issues are 
best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. […]. States shall facilitate 
and encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective 
access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided”.304 
Similarly, the United Nations Agenda 21, Article 8.3, states as one of its objectives “to develop or 
improve mechanisms to facilitate the involvement of concerned individuals, groups and organizations in 
decision-making at all levels”.305 The International Law Association adopted the principle of public 
participation and access to information and justice as one of the principles of international law relating to 
sustainable development.306  
                                                     
302 Daniel Bodansky, Legitimacy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW (Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds.)  (2007) at 718. 
303 This should not be misunderstood as a green-protectionist idea or as undermining development needs. Rather the 
statement is meant in Satish Kumar’s sense of the meaning of Economics and Ecology. He reminds that Economy 
and Ecology come from the same Greek language roots. Oikos refers to home or the place we live. He underscores 
the ultimate home is planet Earth. Logos refers to knowledge, which he emphasizes must include knowledge about 
the interconnectedness of the Earth’s ecosystems. And nomos referring to management. Thus, the public interest lies 
in wisely managing the earth’s ecosystems based on an understand of human’s interconnectedness with and benefits 
from ecosystem services. 
304 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development available at http://www.un.org/documents 
305 1992 Agenda 21, Article 8.3 available at http://www.un.org/documents 
306 NICO SCHRIJVER AND FRIEDL WEISS (EDS.), INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 2004) at xii. 
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Besides the recognition in MEAs of the value of public representation and participation in support 
of the international community’s policy objective of sustainable development, some statements and 
practice of international tribunals and panels have indicated the potential permissibility and value of 
public representation and participation in disputes. For example, a note of the Iran-US Claims tribunal 
states: “The arbitral tribunal may, having satisfied itself that the statement of one of the two governments 
– or under special circumstances, any other person – who is not an arbitrating party in a particular case is 
likely to assist the arbitral tribunal in carrying out its task, permit such government or person to assist the 
arbitral tribunal by presenting written and [or] oral statements”.307 The WTO Appellate Body (AB), in 
Hot-rolled Lead and Carbon Steel, clarified, inter alia: that neither have “individuals and organisations, 
which are not members of the WTO, [a] legal ‘right’ to make submissions to or to be heard by the AB”; 
nor has “the AB [a] legal ‘duty’ to accept or consider unsolicited amicus curiae briefs submitted by 
individuals or organisations, not members of the WTO”; but that “it had the power to accept amicus 
submissions”.308 In contrast, observers have noted the International Court of Justice (ICJ): “has been 
traditionally reluctant to accept amicus curiae submissions from non-parties”; “does not admit non-
governmental organizations (which are treated as individuals)”;309 and “the only case in which the ICJ has 
ever allowed the submission of information by an NGO was in 1950, in the advisory proceedings on the 
International Status of South West Africa”.310  
For all these reasons—the potential public interest in international economic law disputes, the 
environmental policy advocacy and defense function of public representation and participation, the 
recognition in international soft law instruments of participatory access as important implementation 
feature for sustainable development and an indication by some international dispute panels and tribunals 
                                                     
307 The Methanex tribunal referred to this in its decision on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “amici 
curiae, 15 January 2001, Paragraph 32, noting: “this provision was specifically drafted for the Iran-US Claims 
tribunal as supplementary guide. Although (so it appears from published commentaries) it was invoked by Iran or 
the US as non-arbitrating parties, it was subsequently invoked by non-state third persons (albeit infrequently), such 
as the foreign banks submitting their own memorial to the tribunal. 
308 The Methanex tribunal, in its decision on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “amici curiae, 15 January 
2001, Paragraph 33, referred to this statement by the WTO AB in Hot-Rolled Lead and Carbon Steel paragraph 41. 
309 The Methanex tribunal referred to this in its decision on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as Amici 
Curiae, 15 January 2001, paragraph 34. 
310 International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Pleadings, at 324; as noted in the data base of 
The Project on International Courts and tribunals (PICT) available at: http://www.pict-
pcti.org/matrix/discussion/icj/icj_amicus.htm The data entry further notes however, that: “in that case, the chosen 
NGO was the International League for Human Rights. But 20 years later, in the 1970-1971 advisory proceedings on 
the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), the Court backed off from it previous stance because it 
refused to let the same NGO submit information. More recently, in the advisory proceedings on the Legality of the 
Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in an Armed Conflict (4), the Court refused, as a matter of discretion, a request 
to submit information made by International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War”. 
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of the potential permissibility and value of specified types of public representation and participation in 
disputes —public representation311 and participation is an explanatory variable in this study. 
5.2 CONCERNS AROUND PUBLIC REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION 
The existing complexity around the idea of public interest, including among the variety of public interest 
issues also the question of what public or civil society we are concerned with, i.e. that of the claimant 
state, of the responding state, of a non-disputing third party state or of the international public community 
at large, is revealed in concerns around public representation and participation.  
Several concerns have been raised. Direct public representation and participation in dispute cases 
may not be practical, notes Jonas Ebbesson stating “an argument sometimes made against public 
participation is that it is time-consuming, obstructing, and costly”.312 He further observes “criticisms 
against NGO’s participation are concerns about their accountability and transparency and about the 
geographical regions and societal classes whose interests they represent”.313  In addition,314 developing 
countries’ concerns around the introduction of amici curiae in disputes, include: a generally disadvantage 
for the developing countries with limited resources facing undue burden and cost on the proceeding; 
favoring of a court process of some parties over others, noting the absence of amici curiae submissions in 
the civil law legal systems in many developing countries, (an argument also made by Mexico in the 
Methanex v. United States case); potentially unduly broaden the scope of the dispute between the parties; 
                                                     
311 Some forms of participation have been shown to be relevant to possible causal claims in my research, “causation” 
[being used] here in a way that recognizes that ideas and norms are often reasons for actions”. See: Martha 
Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION (1998) at 890. For example, in certain cases open hearings have  revealed specific government 
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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Jutta Brunée and Ellen Hey (eds.) Daniel Bodansky ed. 2007) at 688. 
313 Ibid., at 688. On this point, Alexis Mourre asks: “Is it realistic to expect that an arbitral tribunal will assess the 
representability of an NGO? Probably not”. Alexis Mourre, Are Amici Curiae the Proper Response to the Public's 
Concerns on Transparency in Investment Arbitration?, 5 LAW & PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS & 
TRIBUNALS (2006) at 267. 
314 With regards to additional burden and delay of the whole proceeding, developing countries have pointed to the 
Aguas Del Tunari v. Bolivia case (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3) that involved a dispute regarding the privatization of 
water services demonstrates this well. Over 300 interested parties petitioned the tribunal to be allowed to intervene 
in and attend the hearing, as well as to be allowed to receive full public disclosure of all evidence and pleadings. 
See: South Center. "Developments on Discussions for the Improvement of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration and 
the Participation of Developing Countries”. In South Center Analytical Note. Geneva: South Center, 2005. 
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and raising concerns about undue prejudice and influence of the arbitral tribunal to their disadvantage 
because civil society in the developed countries are more experienced, better organized and equipped as 
well as better funded. 315 
With regards to public hearings, some316  have noted that the evidence and the strategy of 
litigation will thereby be exposed for examination and criticism that may trigger public pressure on the 
arbitral proceeding, noting the defense of developing countries during arbitral proceedings may also affect 
the promotion of investment.317 Investors have opposed public representation and participation based on 
concerns around confidentiality318 and fairness.319   
However, these concerns can be addressed in a tribunal’s decision on amici curiae petitions. In 
Methanex v. United States for example, the tribunal concluded it had the power to accept amici curiae 
submissions and explained “in coming to this conclusion, [it] has not relied on the fact that amici curiae 
submissions feature in the domestic procedures of the courts in two, but not three, NAFTA Parties”.320 As 
an important factor for the exercise of its discretion, it noted the public interest in the arbitration arising 
from its subject matter.321 The tribunal carefully addressed the issue of safeguarding equal treatment with 
regard to any burden which could be added with an acceptance of amici curiae submissions and found 
that the burden would be shared by both disputing parties; and would not be inevitably excessive nor 
cause any immediate risk of unfair or unequal treatment of any disputing party or party.322 On the risk of 
                                                     
315 Ibid. 
316 Some developing countries fear that ‘well intended’ environmental NGOs from developed countries may 
undermine developing countries’ ability to attract foreign investment for economic development, and, as noted, are 
concerned that public representation and participation in disputes may expose strategies of litigation for public 
criticism. These complex concerns around sustainable development reflect power struggles in the current 
negotiations, involving norm contestation in the process of a paradigm shift. The issue of lowering environmental 
standards (also referred to as race to the bottom) to attract FDI has already been addressed in treaty provisions of 
some FTAs among parties committing from refraining from such strategies. The problem of green protectionism, i.e. 
exports from presumably predominantly developing countries facing trade restrictions based on environmental 
standards in presumably predominantly developed countries, could be equally addressed in treaty provisions that, for 
example promote active technology transfer through open access to information and a limiting of IPRs, all which 
would however require a transformative paradigm shift in the international political economy and its legal structure. 
317 South Center. "Developments on Discussions for the Improvement of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration and 
the Participation of Developing Countries”. In South Center Analytical Note. Geneva: South Center, 2005. 
318 Mistelis notes “it is questionable whether they are bound by any duty of confidentiality,” and “although one 
would expect them to do so […] it would be difficult to enforce such a duty”. Loukas A.  Mistelis, Confidentiality 
and third party participation: UPS v. Canada and Methanex Corporation v. United States, 21 ARBITRATION 
INTERNATIONAL p211(2005) (concluding remarks). In the Methanex case, the tribunal observed that 
confidentiality is determined by disputing parties. 
319 Methanex v. USA, Decision of the tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “amici curiae” 15 
January 2001, paragraphs 12-15, arguing for example as to unfairness, that if petitioners were to appear as amici 
curiae, disputing parties would not have the opportunity to test by cross-examination the factual basis of their 
contention. 
320 Ibid., Paragraph 47. 
321 Ibid., Paragraph 49. 
322 Ibid., Paragraphs 35-37. 
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imposing an extra burden on one of the disputing parties, the tribunal noted that such disputing party 
should receive whatever procedural protection might be necessary.323 In addition, some guidance and 
recommendations on non-disputing party participation, including the scope of submissions, has been 
developed by the NAFTA’s Free Trade Commission and the WTO Appellate Body.324  
Given these concerns around public representation and participation in dispute cases, the study 
found presence of acceptance of amicus curiae and granting of observer status varied among cases.  
5.3 MEASUREMENTS OF PUBLIC REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION 
A. Acceptance of amicus curiae  
B. Public observation of panel or arbitration hearings  
C. Both parties to the dispute are states versus investor state dispute 
The study operationalizes public representation and participation and recognizes its presence in a 
given case by observing: the acceptance of an amicus curiae brief and practices allowing public 
                                                     
323 Ibid., Paragraph 50. 
324 In the context of NAFTA, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission on non-disputing party participation 
recommended, inter alia that any non-disputing party with significant presence in the territory of a Party, [..] will 
apply for leave from the tribunal to file such a submission to be attached to the application. The application to, 
among others: disclose any affiliation, direct or indirect, with any disputing party; identify any assistance that was 
provided in preparing the submission; specify the nature of the interest in the arbitration; identify the specific issues 
of fact or law in the arbitration that the applicant addressed in its written submission; and explain, why the tribunal 
should accept the submission. 
The submission filed by a non-disputing party to, inter alia: set out a precise statement supporting the applicant’s 
position on the issues; and only address matters within the scope of the dispute. In determining whether to grant 
leave to file a non-disputing party submission, the tribunal will consider, inter alia, the extent to which: the non-
disputing party submission would assist the tribunal in the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the 
arbitration by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the disputing 
parties; the non-disputing party submission would address matters within the scope of the dispute; the non-disputing 
party has a significant interest in the arbitration; and there is a public interest in the subject-matter of the arbitration. 
The tribunal will ensure that any non-disputing party submission avoids disrupting the proceedings; and neither 
disputing party is unduly burdened or unfairly prejudiced by such submissions. The granting of leave to file a non-
disputing party submission does not require the tribunal to address that submission at any point in the arbitration. 
The granting of leave to file a non- disputing party submission does not entitle the non-disputing party that filed the 
submission to make further submissions in the arbitration.  
 
In the context of the WTO, the WTO Appellate Body adopted additional procedure in the hearing of the appeal in 
European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products. See WT/DS135/9. In this 
appeal, the Appellate Body adopted an additional procedure “for the purposes of this appeal only” to deal with 
amicus curiae submissions. The Appellate Body received, and refused, 17 applications to file such a submission. 
The Appellate Body also refused to accept 14 unsolicited submissions from non-governmental organizations that 
were not submitted under the additional procedure. See: WTO case summary, available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm 
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observation of hearings.  These are explained below. In addition, a third case characteristic was observed, 
the categorization of a state-state disputes as distinguished from investor-state disputes, however no 
variation was found due to the study’s ultimate focus on international investment arbitration. 
5.3.1 Acceptance of amicus curiae 
Acceptance of amicus curiae in a dispute serves as the first measure or case characteristic of public 
representation and participation in my study. As noted by Tienhaara they generally contain 
“supplementary information on the case, particularly the occurrence of events or technicalities relating to 
the subject at hand”.325   
In some cases, an indirect representation observed in form of a state party to the dispute does not 
seem to suffice. For example, such representation can be viewed as insufficient or as not applicable to 
indigenous peoples. In the Glamis v. United States case for example, the Quechan Indian Nation, in its 
amicus curiae application and two submission, stressed, inter alia: the fact that neither claimant nor 
respondent can represent the tribe as sovereign nation nor has expertise on the cultural, religious and 
spiritual values at stake; the interest of indigenous peoples worldwide in how their interest in the 
protection of sacred areas will be treated in this case; and that a decision in favor of Glamis could put 
political pressure on California with adverse impacts on the tribunals interests.326 In its second submission 
to this case, the Quechan Indian Nation highlighted that the tribunal should be guided by the 
considerations that “the preservation and protection of indigenous rights in ancestral land is an obligation 
of customary international law which must be observed, by both the NAFTA parties and any treaty 
interpreter […]; and that an investor seeking compensation for an alleged taking of property cannot rely 
upon a claim to acquired rights in which no legitimate expectation to enjoy such rights existed”.327   
The problem is that there is “no tradition of involving non-disputant third [persons] in arbitration, 
as Tienhaara notes, and “the most common means of non-party third person participation in international 
tribunals is through the submission of amicus curiae briefs”.328 Non-party third persons are neither parties 
nor third state parties to the dispute, nor are they parties to the treaty claimed to have been violated and 
they have not engaged in negotiations of the rules governing the dispute. Neither are non-party third 
                                                     
325 Kyla Tienhaara, Third Party Participation in Investment-Environment Disputes: Recent Developments, 16 
REVIEW OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY & INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2007) at 230-231. 
326 Submissions by the Quechan Indian Nation to the Glamis case are available at: 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c10986.htm last accessed December 15, 2015. 
327 Ibid. 
328 Kyla Tienhaara, Third Party Participation in Investment-Environment Disputes: Recent Developments, 16 
REVIEW OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY & INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2007) at 230. 
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persons necessarily neutral, such as, theoretically, the dispute panel or appellate body (in WTO disputes) 
or the arbitration tribunal (in investment arbitration). The tribunal in Methanex v. United States, which 
uses the term ‘non-party third persons’, noted furthermore: “Amici are not experts; such third persons are 
advocates (in the non-pejorative sense) and not "independent" in that they advance a particular case to a 
tribunal”.329  
Next to civil society organizations, a non-party third person could be a for-profit business. Clearly 
some corporate organizations have special attributes of, such as: “being state-chartered, having an 
indefinite lifetime, sharing ownership with limited liability, and enjoying unlimited fundraising capacity 
and operational size”.330 Entities with such characteristics differ from an individual in the ordinary 
meaning. One could argue the view of a corporation as individual or person is in itself situated in the 
context of a specific liberal-market paradigm or worldview.331 On the other hand there exist also an 
increasing number of international corporations that include environmental considerations in their 
business model. Especially those taking a front-runner approach value environmental policies as 
validating this approach vis-à-vis competing companies that have ignored environmental considerations. 
The study adopts the definition of a non-party third person as provided in the Statement by the 
NAFTA FTC of 7 October 2003, namely: “any non-disputing party that is a person of a Party, or that has 
a significant presence in the territory of a Party”.332 Description of any given amicus curiae applicant, 
however vary. They can be found in the respective application for amicus curiae submission. Following 
from the NAFTA FTC Statement, such description should including: “membership and legal status (e.g., 
company, trade association or other non-governmental organization), its general objectives, the nature of 
its activities, and any parent organization (including any organization that directly or indirectly controls 
the applicant); whether or not the applicant has any affiliation, direct or indirect, with any disputing party; 
whether any government, person or organization has provided any financial or other assistance in 
                                                     
329 See: Methanex v. USA Decision of the tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “amici curiae” 15 
January 2001, paragraph 38. 
330 RAYMOND C. MILLER, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: CONTRASTING WORLD VIEWS   
(Routledge. 2008) at 240. 
331 One can look back to Adam Smith, who “believed that though the market was driven by individuals seeking the 
highest material gain (a morally suspect motivation), the positive outcomes of the competitive market for the whole 
society justified the self-interested motivations of the individual participants,” notes Raymond C. Miller. He 
explains, inter alia: “by a strange historical twist, U.S. corporations are considered under the law as ‘artificial 
persons’ with all the legal rights and obligations of individuals. This interesting fiction was not passed by any 
legislature; it is usually attributed to a Supreme Court decision in 1886 (Southern Pacific Railroads v.. Santa Clara 
County); however, [though] it turns out that the Court made no such decision, [but] it has subsequently been 
referenced in later Supreme Court decisions and has become part of the received legal doctrine”; and “the statement 
that corporations were ‘persons and therefore subject to the protections provide by the Fourteenth Amendment was 
put into the head notes on the 1886 case by a government official who had connections to the railroad. The reference 
was to testimony given in an earlier case by former Senatro Roscoe Conklin. Conklin claimed that the Senate had 
intended the concept of persons in the Fourteenth Amendment to include corporations”. Ibid., 9 and 95-96. 
332 See Statement by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission on non-disputing party participation of October 7, 2003. 
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preparing the submission; the nature of the interest that the applicant has in the arbitration; and the 
specific issues of fact or law in the arbitration that the applicant has addressed in its written 
submission”.333  
Variation in observations of this procedural case characteristic is expected because tribunals have 
discretion over granting leave to file a non-disputing party submission. Taking such a decision in the 
context of NAFTA, the tribunal will likely consider, whether, inter alia: “the non-disputing party 
submission would assist the tribunal in the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the 
arbitration by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the 
disputing parties; the non-disputing party submission would address matters within the scope of the 
dispute; the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the arbitration; and there is a public interest in 
the subject-matter of the arbitration”.334 
For example, already in the Methanex v. United States case, the tribunal noted in its decision on 
petitions from third persons to intervene as amici curiae: “there is an undoubtedly public interest in this 
arbitration; [t]he substantive issues extend far beyond those raised by the usual transnational arbitration 
between commercial parties. This is not merely because one of the disputing parties is a State: there are of 
course disputes involving States which are of no greater general public importance than a dispute between 
private persons. The public interest in this arbitration arises from its subject-matter, as powerfully 
suggested in the petitions”.335   
 
Variation in the observations of acceptance of amicus curiae is also expected because there is no 
uniform practice established in this regard. The practice of accepting amicus curiae “has become frequent 
in the WTO context” as observed by Mourre.336 In the investment law context, van Harten tells us “the 
practice of courts to appoint amicus curiae to assist in the consideration of outside interests that are 
affected by a dispute, and that would not otherwise be represented by the disputing parties, is largely an 
innovation of US law that has spread to other jurisdictions”.337 
This issue of differing domestic practices with regard to amicus curiae was brought up in the 
Methanex v. United States case, with the non-disputing third party Mexico, opposing the amici arguing 
that “the existence of a specific procedure in one Party’s domestic state court procedure [to receive 
                                                     
333 See Footnote 321. 
334 Ibid. 
335 See: Methanex v. USA, Decision of the tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “amici curiae” 15 
January 2001, paragraph 49. 
336 Alexis Mourre, Are Amici Curiae the Proper Response to the Public's Concerns on Transparency in Investment 
Arbitration?, 5 LAW & PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS & TRIBUNALS (2006) at 257 and 258. 
337 GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW   (Oxford University 
Press. 2007) at 159. 
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amicus briefs] did not mean that it could be transported to a transnational NAFTA arbitration”.338 
Methanex supported Mexico’s statement and added “it had been unable to find any precedent where a 
tribunal had granted amicus curiae status to non-parties in an arbitration under the UNICTRAL 
Arbitration rules” and opposed the amici as “an undesirable precedent [that] would be set and [concerned 
that] other groups might be encouraged to seek to appear as amici in arbitrations under [NAFTA Chapter 
11]”.339  The tribunal decided that it had the power to and would accept amicus submissions. The tribunal 
also noted that, in its decision, it did “not rel[y] on the fact that amicus submissions feature in the 
domestic procedure of the courts in two, but not three, NAFTA parties”. 340 And in its final award, the 
tribunal noted reference to its decision in a FTC joint statement of 16 July 2004: “We are pleased that the 
transparency initiatives we took during our October 2003 meeting have already begun to improve the 
operation of the investment chapter investor-state dispute-settlement mechanism. Earlier this year, for the 
first time a tribunal accepted written submissions from a non-disputing party and adopted the procedures 
that we recommended […] October 7, 2003 for the handling of such submissions”.341 
5.3.2 Public observation of panel or arbitration hearings 
Granting the public the right to observe hearings is the second measure of public representation and 
participation in my study. Howard Mann speaks of “the right of the public to witness the process,” and 
argues that—in matters central to public policy decision making, where the conflict is not just about 
private sector money, but about the balance between the public welfare and private interests –the 
opportunity to be present and witness the hearings, and to hold parties to account for their positions, is 
crucial.342 Public hearings can expose the evidence and strategy of litigation for examination and may 
trigger public pressure on the arbitral proceeding.343 For example, public pressure could demand the 
defense of an environmental policy that emerged with public participation so to prevent undermining their 
respective rights, where applicable, possibly including domestic democratic rights, or international public 
                                                     
338 See: Methanex v. USA, Decision of the tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “amici curiae” 15 
January 2001, paragraph 9. 
339 Ibid., paragraphs 14-15. 
340 Ibid., paragraph 47. 
341 See: Methanex v. USA, Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits, 3rd August 2005, Ad Hoc tribunal 
(UNCITRAL), Parties II, Chapter C, page 16, footnote 8. 
342 Howard Mann et al. “Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration” in APPEALS 
MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES (Karl P. Sauvant ed. 2008) at 366. 
343 See: South Center. "Developments on Discussions for the Improvement of the Framework for Icsid Arbitration 
and the Participation of Developing Countries”. In South Center Analytical Note. Geneva: South Center, 2005. 
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rights such as public participation in environmental decision-making under the Aarhus Convention.344 If 
public pressure is triggered, public discourse can call into question legal concepts, such as ‘scientific 
evidence’ or ‘necessity tests’ and juxtapose these with evolving alternative principles and norms, such as 
‘scientific plausibility’ or the ‘precautionary principle’.  
Lack of observing rights may also limit the effectiveness of non-disputing third person 
participation. This is because observing the initial substantive meetings of the tribunal with the parties, (in 
which parties make opening and closing statements, and they as well as the tribunal may make comments 
or pose questions) is useful for the development of amicus curiae. Mann et al highlight the benefits of 
open hearings, as in the case of the Methanex v. United States case arbitration, where “the US. position on 
a specific issue was revealed in a way that would have been impossible without open hearings”.345 
Concerns around open hearings echo those against third party participation in general, in 
particular costs involved for facility and technology in case of broadcasting settings and security staff. 
Mann et al note however “there is no need to fear an open hearing. Observers will generally act with 
proper decorum and where problems arise […] the exclusion of observers [is] the ultimate sanction”.346 
Traditionally dispute and arbitration hearings have been closed to the public, however, a practice 
of open hearings has not always been ruled out.  
For example, in the Methanex v. United States case the tribunal found, referencing the travaux 
prepartoires, the UNCITRAL drafting committee deleted a provision in an earlier draft which could have 
allowed the arbitration tribunal to admit into an oral hearing persons other than the parties. In this case, 
the tribunal decided it has no power to accept petitioners request to attend oral hearings of the 
arbitrations.347 Yet, the main hearing in this case, which “addressed all issues of jurisdiction and merits 
arising from Methanex’s amended claim (excepting only quantum), was held in public, by agreement of 
the disputing parties, excepting one procedural issue heard in camera at Methanex’s request”.348  
In the context of WTO disputes, former Chair of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body Ambassador 
Shahid Bashir also recalls “on several occasions the Appellate Body and arbitrators have opened for 
                                                     
344 See: The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. The Convention has 47 
parties from Europe and Central Asia. 
345 Howard Mann et al., “Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration” in APPEALS 
MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES (Karl P. Sauvant ed. 2008) at 367. 
346 Ibid., at 366. 
347 See: Methanex v. USA, Decision of the tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “amici curiae” 15 
January 2001, Paragraph 47. 
348 See: Methanex v. USA, Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits, 3rd August 2005, Ad Hoc tribunal 
(UNCITRAL), Paragraph 8. 
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public viewing their hearings (called “meetings” in WTO dispute settlement) and oral hearings349 with 
disputing parties, where for example the public is permitted to view the panel meeting via closed circuit 
television in a WTO meeting room”.350  
The study found variation in the presence of this procedural case characteristic of granting 
observer status.  
In conclusion, the indicator of public representation and participation is measured by observing in 
any given case: acceptance of amicus curiae and granting public observance of hearings. To test the 
hypothesis that public representation and participation increases the prospect of environmentally 
permissible dispute outcomes, the study looked for patterns of cases in which public representation and 
participation correlate positively with environmental policy permissible outcomes.  
 
Additional observations include: 
• Public representation and participation matters only if specific or all of the indicators’ 
measurements are observed; 
• Public representation and participation matters even if horizontal integration is not observed; 
• Public representation and participation matters even if horizontal integration measures are not 
accepted as relevant or applicable; 
• Public representation and participation matters only if a specific interpretation technique is 
employed by the tribunal; 
• Public representation and participation matters/occurs only when transparency and/or horizontal 
integration is observed; and/or 
• Public representation and participation matters only if specific policy implementation 
requirements have been met. 
 
Observing such possible patterns of case outcome in relation to the public representation and 
participation indicator, including in combination with the indicators of transparency and horizontal 
integration thus aimed at gaining further insights  and finding answers to the research question. Results 
may provide useful insights into institutional reform recommendations adding evidence to a principle-
based debate. 
                                                     
349 See for example US — COOL (WT/DS384, 386) and specified procedure 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/384_386r_f_e.pdf 
350 See for example Canada — Renewable Energy (WT/DS412) and Canada — Feed-in Tariff Program 
(WT/DS426). 
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5.3.3 State-State versus Investor-State-Dispute 
Because of the study’s ultimate focus on investment arbitrations only, no data variation was found for the 
specific case characteristic of public representation and participation observed as a case involving a state-
state dispute. The decision to focus on investment arbitrations was based on a cost-benefit analysis, and 
enabled a richer analysis of norm contestation because many of the international trade law principles or 
norms in addition to more specific investment related norms could be addressed. Acknowledging that a 
choice had to be made illustrates also the humbling experience a researchers undergoes, starting with 
much ambition going into a project to later realize the limits of one person attempting an in-depth 
qualitative study involving multiple distinct international regimes. What follows in this section is thus 
useful for consideration in future studies, but not addressed in the final analysis of this project. 
Institutional settings, such as investor-state case arbitrations that allow investors to directly 
represent themselves and bring a claim against foreign government, may matter to dispute outcomes. 
Such institutional settings are expected to more frequently lead to outcomes favorable to corporate and 
less favorable to public interest, such as environmental protection, including in the home country of the 
investor. In contrast, in state-state arbitration cases (where both states presumably represent the public 
interest at large) the outcome is expected to be more favorable to public interest such as environmental 
protection policies.351 A state is more likely to be held accountable and subject to public scrutiny for 
misrepresenting public interest whereas an investor is ‘at best’352 primarily accountable to its shareholders 
rather than the general public. 
In state-state disputes, public representation and participation can be assumed to take place 
indirectly through the state. This is because nation states353 are political organizations of a society, 
invested with its governance and thus theoretically represent in a dispute case the public interest of a 
society at large. Naturally, the public interest has several dimensions, including next to environmental 
protection interest also labor rights or effects on consumer prices. In contrast, public participation and 
representation is limited in investor-state arbitrations. This is because in such cases, one party to the 
dispute, the investor, does not propose to represent the interest of the larger society. In international 
                                                     
351 Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder (et al): Investment treaties & why they patter to sustainable development –
Questions & answers, IISD, Winnipeg, Canada, 2012, at 51. 
352 See: Raymond C. Miller’s discussion of John Kenneth Galbraith idea of a ‘techno structure’ in mature 
corporation and Thorstein Veblen’s distinction between similar engineer mentality versus entrepreneur mentality 
among corporate managers along with the more critical view presented in Robert B. Reich’s “Supercapitalism”. See: 
RAYMOND C. MILLER, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: CONTRASTING WORLD VIEWS   
(Routledge. 2008) at 95; and ROBERT REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
BUSINESS, DEMOCRACY, AND EVERYDAY LIFE   (Vintage Books. 2008) at 27 and 71. 
353 This study uses the term state to refer to nation state. 
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investment arbitrations under study in this research, an investor is granted the right for direct 
representation of its interest rather than having to rely on an indirect representation through the state.354  
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) settings are highly controversial among the public (and 
as result a number of countries are currently reassessing their positions in treaty negotiations as to 
whether to include such a provision) precisely because it provides investors with the ability to bypass a 
national court and offers them more choices among legal processes.355 ISDS is not contained in the WTO 
agreement but found in some BITs and FTAs such as NAFTA. Even then, the mechanism in NAFTA for 
example is limited to disputes under the investment provisions in chapter 11. In disputes involving trade 
matters, the state-state dispute settlement in NAFTA chapter 20 prevails.  
However, as the Ethyl v. Canada case illustrates, in practice an investor can succeed in using 
ISDS even in cases involving trade in goods, despite the fact that enforcements of rights of NAFTA under 
Chapter 3 (on trade in goods, national treatment and market access) accrue not to the investor but the 
home state through which the investor may seek representation.356 Ethyl challenged an import and 
interprovincial trade restrictions on additive to unleaded gasoline in four different legal processes. In 
addition to the NAFTA Chapter 11 challenge, Ethyl: unsuccessfully sought to convince the U.S. 
government to take up its claim under a NAFTA Chapter 20 (state-state dispute settlement); attempted a 
Canadian constitutional challenge, which did not proceed to trial; and persuaded the provisional 
government of Alberta, backed by the governments of Quebec, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan, who 
brought and subsequently won a dispute under Canada's Agreement on Internal Trade.357  
Finally, the idea of a state representing public interest in international economic law disputes 
could also apply to non-disputing third ‘state’ parties, which are parties to the treaty claimed to have been 
violated by one disputing party, but which are not one of the disputing parties. Non-disputing third 
parties’ participation in dispute settlement proceedings is specified in the respective treaty text on which a 
dispute is based. For example, NAFTA Article 1128 provides that “on written notice to the disputing 
parties, a [NAFTA] Party may make submissions to a tribunal on a question of interpretation of this 
Agreement”. In WTO disputes, third parties’ participation opportunities at various stages of a dispute are 
                                                     
354 For example, the position represented by US based company Bechtel and its claims against Bolivia did not 
represent the views of US citizens at large, as the public awareness campaign and public outcry that influenced the 
final settlement illustrated. 
355 For example, Germany and France also opposed ISDS and pursued in the negotiations to remove it from the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). 
356 Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, UNICTRAL, Award on Jurisdiction, 24 June 1998, paragraphs 63-64 
357 The challenge with regard to Canada's Agreement on Internal Trade was based, inter alia on: lack of federal-
provincial consultation; not employing alternative less-trade restrictive measures and/or “the issue of indirect v. 
direct legislation: the federal government could not justify what it wanted to do (ban a substance) under 
environmental legislation, so turned to trade legislation to accomplish the same end indirectly”. For a summary of all 
four challenges see: Julie A.  Soloway, Environmental Trade Barriers Under NAFTA: The MMT Fuel Additives 
Controversy, 8 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL TRADE (1999) at 75-91. 
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specified in relevant provisions,358 and include, inter alia: to present their views orally to the panel during 
the first substantive meeting; and in practice to make written submissions.  
However, as noted above in the discussion on the complexity of public interest and concerns with 
its representation and participation, a non-disputing third party may or may not be supportive of the 
public interest of environmental protection that the responding state party to the dispute seeks to defend. 
The study also observed in the raw data collection whether a non-disputing third party, in its submission 
to the tribunal pointed to: the objective of sustainable development, which also embraces the development 
rights focus of potential non-disputing third parties from developing countries; an environmental 
exception; and/or relevant MEAs. 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 presented the basis for my hypothesized three case features that could matter 
to the outcome of international economic law disputes. In the following chapters I discuss my 
methodological research approach, I analyze my research findings and present some recommendations 
that government and non-government actors may take with caution from these findings. 
                                                     
358 In WTO disputes, third parties’ participation opportunities at various stages of a dispute are explicated on the 
WTO website as follows: First, during the consultation stage, third parties can join only when consultations are held 
pursuant to Article XXII of GATT 1994, Article XXII:1 of GATS, or the corresponding provisions in the other 
covered agreements (Article 4.11 of the DSU). If the complainant invokes Article XXII:1, the admission of 
interested third parties based on their substantial ‘trade’ interest in dispute matter depends on the respondent, who 
may or may not accept them. However, launching a dispute with a request for consultations by choosing Article 
XXIII:1, the complainant can prevent the involvement in the consultations of third parties.  
Second, if the consultations have failed to settle the dispute, and the complainant requests the establishment of a 
panel to adjudicate the dispute, third parties will be informed of the basis of the complaint and have an opportunity 
to be heard by panels and to make written submissions, even if they have not participated in the consultations. To 
participate in the panel procedure, third parties must notify in writing their substantial ‘systemic’ interest in the 
matter before the panel to the DSB (Article 10.2 of the DSU) within ten days from the establishment of the panel. In 
practice, any third party who invokes a systemic interest is admitted to a panel procedure without any scrutiny 
whether the interest truly is “substantial”. Third parties receive the parties’ first written submissions to the panel and 
present their views orally to the panel during the first substantive meeting (Article 10.3 of the DSU). Third parties 
have no rights beyond these although a panel can, and often does, extend the rights of participation of third parties in 
individual cases.  
And third, DSU Article 16.4 makes clear that third parties can not appeal the panel report. 
See: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s2p1_e.htm; 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s3p1_e.htm; and  
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s5p1_e.htm  
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6.0  METHODOLOGY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study applies a unique approach to analyse environmental-policy related cases brought under 
international investment arbitration. It does so by observing specific characteristics of horizontal 
integration, public participation and representation, and transparency in such cases. The research provides 
an initial database which can complement existing databases to inform a variety of analysis and the 
approach taken here could be also applied for analysis of broader public policy related international 
investment arbitration cases. For example, the data collected can be mined in various ways, depending on 
research questions posed. And this initial database can also be expanded to include economic law disputes 
more generally, including not only investment law focused but also trade law specific cases. 
The previous chapters introduced: the policy problem that sparked my interest in investigating 
economic law disputes in which environmental policies have been challenged (chapter 1); the theoretical 
frameworks underlying my conceptual approach to understand motivations of various actors interacting in 
the arena of international law generally and international economic law disputes more specifically 
(chapter 2); and the basis for my hypotheses of three features that could matter in international economic 
law disputes (chapters 3, 4 and 5). These hypotheses included an initial identification of three broad 
indicators, namely horizontal integration, transparency and public representation and participation. The 
ideas developed towards a subsequent further specification of characteristics for each of these indicators. 
This chapter 6 describes my method of data collection and my methods used for the analysis in chapter 7.  
The data collection resulted in comprehensive but targeted case summaries, a cumulative case 
summary table and a data table in which observations are presented in binary form, captured as either 
presence or absence of the identified characteristics for each of the three indicators.  
The analysis in chapter 7 examines whether the three hypothesized features were observed in the 
real world of international investment disputes. Though the analysis refrains from concluding causality 
and from making predictions, it does inspect specifically whether any contradictions were observed for 
my given hypotheses about the co-occurrence of a case characteristic with a case outcome. To illustrate 
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this, please consider the three ideal type Tables and related Figures 6.1-3 below. Illustrative Table 6.1 
displays an ideal type scenario in which my hypothesis about a specific case characteristic would be most 
strongly supported, namely that reference to the concept of sustainable development in a case could have 
a positive influence on the case outcome that is environmental policy permissible. 
 
Table 6.1: Hypothetical ideal type scenario with strongest support of hypothesis with observations of co-
occurrence no contradictions 
Y  
or 
Environmental 
Policy 
Permissible 
Outcome 
 X or  
Concept of sustainable development referenced in case  
1   0 
1 10   0 
0  0                                 10 
Total 10 10 
∆1   = 1 (The measure ∆1 is explicated further below in this chapter). 
 
 
In this scenario, the strongest support for my hypothesis would be based on the following 
observations of co-occurrences and contradictions. My hypothesized case characteristic X, a reference to 
the concept of sustainable development, is observed as present (1) in a total of ten cases and in all ten of 
these cases a co-occurrence with my expected case outcome Y, an environmental policy permissible 
outcome was also observed as present (1). Moreover, in the additional equal number of ten cases in which 
my X was not present (0), all ten cases observed a co-occurrence with environmentally impermissible 
case outcomes or Y (0). No contradictions are observed in this scenario, since no case was observed in 
which my X was observed as present (1) and an environmental impermissible case outcome, or Y of (0) 
was observed. Neither is a contradiction observed in the ten cases in which my X was observed as not 
present (0) because in none of these cases had an environmental permissible case outcome, or Y (1). 
Table 6.1 represents an illustrative hypothetical ideal type table only, since in the real world the number 
of cases for each possible observation is expected to differ. Another way to illustrate this ideal type 
scenario of co-occurrence with no contradictions is shown in Figure 6.1, which illustrates this scenario 
with the positive delineation that presence of the hypothesized case characteristic should co-occur with 
the expected case outcome. (The measure ∆1 is explicated further below in this chapter).
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Figure 6.1: Support for hypothesis when ∆1 > 0 and here strongest support with ∆1 = 1 
 
The line illustrates co-occurrences whereby in this ideal scenario: 
• 10/10 on the lower left represents 10 co-occurrences in the 10 cases in which X is not present (0), 
namely co-occurring with 10 observations of Y not present (0);  
• 10/10 on the upper right represents 10 co-occurrences in the 10 cases in which X is present (1), 
namely co-occurring with 10 observations of Y present (1).  
 
The area outside of the line illustrates contradictions, whereby in this ideal scenario: 
• 0/10 on the lower right represents 0 contradictions in 10 cases in which X present (1) because no 
or 0 observations of Y present were made. 
• 0/10 on the upper left represents 0 contradictions in 10 cases in which X is not present (0) 
because also no or 0 observations of Y not present were made. 
 
A finding of no contradictions would provide the strongest support for my hypothesis compared 
to a finding of a balance between co-occurrences and contradictions (shown in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2 
below). The weakest support for my hypothesis would be a finding of co-occurrence in exactly the 
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opposite direction of what I expected and without any contradictions (shown in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.3 
below). 
 
Table 6.2: Balance between co-occurrence and contradictions 
Y  
or 
Environmental 
Policy 
Permissible 
Outcome 
 X or  
Concept of sustainable development referenced in case 
1 0 
1 5 5 
0 5                                  5 
Total 10 10 
∆1   = 0 (The measure ∆1 is explicated further below in this chapter). 
 
In this scenario, no clear support for my hypothesis would be based on the following observations 
of co-occurrences and contradictions. My hypothesized case characteristic X, a reference to the concept of 
sustainable development, is observed as present (1) in a total of ten cases and but only in five of these 
cases was a co-occurrence with my expected case outcome Y, an environmental policy permissible 
outcome also observed as present (1). Moreover, in the additional equal number of ten cases in which my 
X was not present (0), again only five cases observed a co-occurrence with environmentally 
impermissible case outcomes or Y (0). A balance of contradictions is also observed in this scenario, since 
again five case were observed in which my X was observed as present (1) yet an environmental 
impermissible case outcome, or Y of (0) was observed. And a balance of contradictions is also observed 
in the ten cases in which my X was observed as not present (0) because five of these cases had an 
environmental permissible case outcome, or Y (1). Figure 6.2 below displays an ideal type of perfect 
balance between co-occurrence and contradictions. 
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Figure 6.2: No clear support for hypothesis when ∆1 = 0 or balance between  
co-occurrence and contradictions 
 
No support for my hypothesis is illustrated in the following scenario where co-occurrences are 
observed in exactly the opposite way of what I expected and without any contradictions. 
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Table 6.3: No contradictions but in opposite direction no support for hypothesis when ∆1=-1 or balance 
between co-occurrence and contradictions 
Y  
or 
Environmental 
Policy 
Permissible 
Outcome 
 X or  
Concept of sustainable development referenced in case 
1 0 
1 0 10 
0 10                                 0 
Total 10 10 
∆1   = -1 (The measure ∆1 is explicated further below in this chapter). 
In this scenario, least support for my hypothesis would be based on the following observations of 
co-occurrences and contradictions. My hypothesized case characteristic X, a reference to the concept of 
sustainable development, is observed as present (1) in a total of ten cases and but in none of these cases 
was a co-occurrence with my expected case outcome Y, an environmental policy permissible outcome 
observed as present (1). Moreover, in the additional equal number of ten cases in which my X was not 
present (0), again no cases observed a co-occurrence with environmentally impermissible case outcomes 
or Y (0). Furthermore, no contradictions are observed in this scenario of findings that is however opposite 
to what I expected, since all or ten cases were observed in which my X was present (1) yet an 
environmental impermissible case outcome, or Y of (0) was observed. And no contradictions were 
observed in this scenario of findings opposite to what I expected, because in the ten cases in which my X 
was observed as not present (0) all ten of these cases had an environmental permissible case outcome, or 
Y (1). 
Figure 6.3 below displays an ideal type of this scenario of co-occurrence in the opposite direction 
than expected and with contradictions. 
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Figure 6.3: Least support for hypothesis when ∆1 = -1 or co-occurrence opposite to what expected with no 
contradictions 
 
The above Tables and Figures 6.1-6.3 describe my approach to inspecting whether any 
contradictions were observed for my given ideas about the co-occurrence of a case characteristic with a 
case outcome. They apply the concept of ideal type scenarios to explain that in my study a finding of no 
contradictions would provide the strongest support for my ideas compared to a finding of a balance 
between co-occurrences and contradictions. The weakest support, on the other hand, would be a finding 
of co-occurrence without any contradictions however that the co-occurrence is exactly the opposite of 
what I expected.  
Table 6.4 below concludes this explanation with an actual observation in this study with regards 
to my hypothesis that reference to an environmental exception or defense in a case accepted by the 
tribunal. The corresponding Figure 6.4 serves to further illustrate visually my conceptualization of co-
occurrence and contradictions. 
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Table 6.4: Observations of the hypothesized influence of a reference to an environmental exception or defense 
in a case accepted by the tribunal on an environment policy permissible case outcome 
 
 
Y  
or 
Environmental 
Policy 
Permissible 
Outcome 
 X or  
Environmental Exception or Defense referenced and accepted by tribunal 
1 0 
1 10 4 
0 2                                  6 
Total 12 10 
∆1   = 0.433333 (The measure ∆1 is explicated further below in this chapter). 
 
In this real-world observation, the co-occurrence of the specific hypothesized case characteristics 
with case outcomes, the contradictions and the total number of observed cases do not neatly equal up 
evenly as in the ideal type scenarios above. Yet support for the hypothesis is observed as Figure 6.4 
illustrates this positive delineation, though not as strong as in the ideal type of Table and Figure 6.1 yet 
not as weak as an ideal type balance between co-occurrence and contradictions seen in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.4: Some support based on observations of the hypothesized influence of a reference to an 
environmental exception or defense in a case accepted by the tribunal on an environment policy permissible 
case outcome with ∆1 = 0.43333 
The measure delta for the occurrence of contradictions is explicated below. Provided per request 
can be the delta calculations for the individual indicator characteristics, as only the results are discussed in 
the analysis chapter. Rather than stopping at the methodological level, the analysis chapter 7 further 
aimed at gaining practical insights from an additional deeper inspection of specific cases highlighting 
contradictions to my hypotheses. This resulted in recommendations for governments and NGOs and 
pointed to the status of norm contestation within the economic-environment nexus of international law.  
The methodological approach used to analyse the research data followed three main steps: First, a 
data description was provided focusing on observed occurrences of specified indicators with identified 
characteristics, including explanations of specific case observations based on an  examination of the raw 
data. Second, a test of these individual characteristic observations was conducted using the measure for 
the occurrence of contradictions. Third, a Boolean truth table approach for qualitative comparative 
analysis was applied to consider specific combinations of indicator characteristics to assess support for 
my hypotheses. The Boolean truth table approach for qualitative comparative analysis is explicated 
below. The respective Boolean tables and equations can be provided per request as only the results are 
discussed in the analysis chapter.  
What follows is a summary of the approaches and methods used for the data collection and 
analysis in this research. 
6.2 DATA COLLECTION 
This dissertation study began with my dissertation proposal, outlining the path to accumulating the 
required knowledge to answer my research question. “What explains variation in environmental policy 
permissibility in international trade and investment law? What matters for the dispute outcome in such 
cases?” However, my initial data collection proved to be too simplistic, leading me to revise my data 
collection several times as I gained deeper insights to the complexity of issues relevant for my research 
question itself. “Do institutional factors matter in the outcome of my cases” seemed unanswerable, even if 
I correctly identified what institutional factors are relevant, without understanding why and how they 
would matter. To answer the why and the how questions, I had to revise my data collection to capture 
explanatory factors. Aspects of the methodology underwent revision in the course of exploration and 
early collection of the data.  The complexity of the cases, the large number of variables and the 
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importance of interaction among several factors all encouraged the changes that are described in the 
following sections. 
Initially my hypothesis was centered around the presence of concepts, such as sustainable 
development, and certain provisions, such as an environmental exception provision, present in the legal 
text of the treaty invoked under an economic law dispute in which an environmental policy was 
challenged. The focus was whether the concept of sustainable development was mentioned in the 
preamble, an environmental exception clause was incorporated in the treaty, and a specific reference to an 
MEA was spelled out in the treaty invoked under such a dispute. Reading through the many disputes, I 
recognized that much more detailed legal language in the treaty was contested. Guided by Asa Romson’s 
questionnaire,359 I added on to my initial approach to collect data of only a few treaty text provisions 
many more specific legal text issues. For example, I added to my data collection whether the invoked 
treaty contained a wide definition of investment, as well as the scope of provisions on ‘fair and equitable 
treatment’, the most favored nations and the national treatment principles. While this exercise was helpful 
in gaining a better understanding of the legal concepts, the data collection itself turned out to be too 
comprehensive, with never ending data sheets reporting as many as 178 variables. These included besides 
specifics about many legal text provisions also institutional and procedural notes, such as administrating 
institutions, applicable rules, treaty involved, document numbers, year, economic development status of 
state parties involved.  Yet, after several revisions, I finally narrowed down the question of how 
institutional factors might or might not matter to a manageable data size. Realizing that many investment 
treaties invoked in the cases studied contain similar if not identical core legal provisions, I reallocated too 
specific issues from my data sheet to my case summary and discussion and retained in the data set the 
crucial elements that I originally hypothesized. This relocation of too specific legal definitions and 
arguments from my data set to the individual case summaries proofed beneficial for the analysis. With 
fewer and more focused binary variables I could gain a better overview of my observations, and because 
much of the rich raw data was maintained in the case summaries, I could further inspect specific cases for 
which the data presented surprising observations or otherwise deviations from the general trends 
observed.  
I also narrowed the focus in my methodology on disputes involving international public 
investment law which is a subset of international economic law regime. This choice to focus on 
international investment arbitrations or disputes, enabled a richer analysis of norm contestation because 
many of the international trade law principles or norms, such as most-favoured nations, national treatment 
or the concept of “like circumstances” still applied, while also in addition more specific investment 
                                                     
359 ASA  ROMSON, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY SPACE AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW   
(Stockholm University. 2012). 
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related norms such as “fair and equitable treatment” or “legitimate and reasonable expectations” were also 
addressed.  The benefits of this choice outweigh the loss of variety in one of my case characteristics, 
namely all cases under investigation where investor-state disputes and none a state-state dispute. 
The most important change made in the evolution of my study was first, moving from observing 
whether treaty text contained my horizontal integration measurements to differentiating the measurements 
at two levels of horizontal integration. Second my research evolved from merely observing whether the 
concept of sustainable development, was mentioned, an environmental exception clauses was contained 
and an MEA referenced in the treaty invoked towards whether these hypothesized case elements 
indicating horizontal integration were mentioned or referred to in the dispute case. And if so, whether 
these references were recognized by the tribunal as relevant and accepted as applicable to the case. This 
change was based on a deeper understanding of the case interpretation process, which further allowed me 
to recognize why and how observation of these measurements could explain interpretation of provisions, 
inter-linkage to the measurements of transparency and public participation and ultimately case outcomes.  
This decision was reinforced by the feedback I received from trade, investment and environmental law 
experts such as Aaron Cosby, Senior Associate at the International Institute for Sustainable Development 
and Professor Kati Kulovesi at the University of Eastern Finland. Having found the path after several 
detours has brought me closer to the destination, where I can analyze my findings to answer my question. 
By amending my data collection from quantitative to more and more qualitative research, my 
method of data collection tested also several approaches before advancing in an acceptable manner. I 
began with reading all available primary documents of a case in chronological order, considering this to 
allow for the most thorough and comprehensive research of contested norms in my identified population 
of cases. Because of the voluminous submissions and documents, this proved to be time consuming, and 
based on the suggestion from the Chair of my Committee, I agreed to begin my data collection on each 
case with simply reading its final award. This may be justified not only because of the time saved and the 
need to speed up data collection, but also, the fact that many cases deal with a series of procedural 
applications, orders, decisions and directions, which seemed not to have an impact on the award and in 
any case was assumed to be otherwise reflected in the final award. As the ICSID Tribunal noted in the 
Santa Elena v. Costa Rica case, “since none of these procedural orders or other decisions of the Tribunal 
have any impact on the present Award, it is not necessary to review and summarize them here”.360   
However, in some cases it became clear that merely looking at the final award would be 
insufficient to understand the underlying issues of the case. For example, in the S.D. Meyers v. Canada 
case, the final award concerns the costs of the dispute. In this case, only by looking at the Partial and 
                                                     
360 Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, ICSID, In the Matter of the Arbitration between Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa 
Elena, S.A. and the Republic of Costa Rica, Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award 2000, paragraph 32, footnote 19. 
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Second Partial Award as well as the dissenting opinions can the normative contestation be extracted for 
my data. 
In amending my methodology in data collection, to start with the final award, I ensured that 
wherever the tribunal did make reference to a point in other documents that may be relevant to this study, 
I also read the referred documents. Yet, I could not abandon reading all memorials of disputing parties 
and non-disputing party’s or person’s submissions. This reflects by no means a compulsive impulse or joy 
in reading mounts of documents, but rather points to the fact that interpretation influence of presentation 
is hard to detect.  
In the Glamis v. United States case, for example, were I to merely note the tribunals decision to 
confine its decision to the issues presented, noting that it did not reach the particular issues addressed by 
the amicus submissions,361 and stressing its reluctance or opposition to broaden its interpretation and 
consider “controversial issues raised,” I would not have been able to collect the data on various horizontal 
integration measures presented in these submissions, including the environmental exception or defense 
argument of international public policy as well as the MEA references seeking a human rights-based 
approach that is evolving in international environmental law jurisprudence. My data collection would thus 
only have served a partial picture, rather than the full picture I sought, namely to observe horizontal 
integration, including: in relation to transparency and public participation indicators; patterns related to 
specific horizontal integration measures in relation to relevance and interpretation; and patterns related to 
case outcomes. Only such full picture can lead to comprehensive observations despite the fact that the 
degree of influence presentations have on interpretation are difficult to show. Otherwise I entrusted that 
all relevant aspects found in the final award included those captured in submissions and those that 
informed the reasoning for the decision taken have been accounted for in this study. For that reason, in the 
end, the data collection for most cases did go beyond final awards. 
In addition, I considered the use of software programs for data collection. Such programs allow a 
large volume of documents to be screened for specific language, for example words such as sustainable 
development or contained in MEAs or exception clauses. However, while such technology appears 
attractive for timesaving purposes, it is prone to miss important details that cannot yet be recognized by 
artificial intelligence. In the end, the learning process and deeper understanding gained through the 
process of human reading and analysis, albeit time consuming, would be required to be undergone first 
before even attempting to code an artificial intelligence to deliver the desired outcome.  
                                                     
361 Glamis Gold Ltd. v. USA; ad hoc Tribunal; UNICTRAL; NAFTA; Award, 16 May 2009, paragraph 8. The 
Tribunal stressed its awareness that its decision has been awaited by those concerned with environmental regulation, 
the interests of indigenous peoples and the tension sometimes seen between private property rights and state 
regulation. 
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To illustrate this point, let’s consider the case reading of S.D. Myers v. Canada: First, a word 
search for the word “sustainable” to detect the measure “reference to sustainable development” may lead 
to the use of the word in the wrong context, i.e. the tribunal stating “the contention also is not sustainable 
on a proper interpretation of the NAFTA”. Only with her experience and knowledge in international 
negotiations, the author was able to detect a reference, though not specific, by the tribunal to the 
sustainable development in the preamble of NAFTA, because of the complexity around the concept of 
sustainable development, including different views among countries at different levels of development.362  
The same applies to environmental exceptions. For example, “although the exceptions envisaged 
in Article XX of the GATT do not mention ‘environment,’ there is little difficulty in interpreting 
‘conservation of exhaustible natural resources’ or protection of ‘human, animal or plant life or health’ 
broadly enough to cover any of the exiting environmentally related treaty restrictions to trade”.363 
Second, the level of horizontal integration (HI) measurements, at the treaty interpretation level 1 
or the more general international law level 2, are not obvious and require similar deeper understanding of 
the issues involved. In this case, a computer program may have found a level 1 interpretation of HI 
because the Tribunal initially excluded in its reference to relevant context of VCLT 31(3)(c), yet later in 
the interpretation applies a level 2 HI, which was detected by the author due to her knowledge of the 
indirectly referenced MEAs, including the principles contained in their text, in the referenced NAAEC.364 
                                                     
362 There are four preambular paragraphs in NAFTA related to sustainable development: undertake each of the 
preceding in a manner consistent with environmental protection and conservation (Paragraph 11); preserve their 
flexibility to safeguard the public welfare (Paragraph 12); promote sustainable development (Paragraph 13); and 
strengthen the development and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations (Paragraph 14). The Tribunal 
referred to the concept of sustainable development in several places: in the preamble to the NAFTA (level 1) to 
preambular paragraph 11, but did not specifically refer to sustainable development as in preambular paragraph 13; in 
the text of the transboundary agreement between the US and Canada, “recognizing that the most effective and 
efficient means of achieving environmentally sound management procedures for hazardous waste crossing the 
United States - Canada border is through cooperative efforts and controlled regulatory schemes”; in the context of 
the Basel Convention “insistence on environmentally sound management of waste (See Partial Award Paragraph 
211-3); in the context of the NAAEC; “and the international agreements affirmed in the NAAEC” which are the 
1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment and the 1992 Rio declaration on Environment and 
Development (see NAAEC preambular paragraph 8) (Partial Award Paragraph 220-1).; and by recognizing “indirect 
environmental objective to keep domestic industry strong to ensure capability for continued waste disposal (Partial 
Award Paragraph 195). They were rejected because the Canada did not choose an available alternative (did not stay 
within the scope for such legitimate objective as specified in the text). This last reference to “indirect environmental 
objective” to keep domestic industry strong and ensure capability for the service is in particular relevant to the view 
and understanding of sustainable development by developing countries, seeking to protect their, in part green, infant 
industries. 
363 Alan Boyle, Relationship between International environmental law and other branches of international law,, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Daniel Bodansky, Jutta 
Brunnée and Ellen Hey eds.) at 138. 
364 Albeit the Tribunal does set out referencing only VCLT Article 31(1) and (2) (indicating HI level 1), VCLT 
Article 27 (indicating potential restrictive interpretation of police powers), the Tribunal did not reference VCLT 
Article 31(3)(c) (on taking into account together with context, “any relevant rules of international law applicable in 
the relations between the parties” which indicates HI level 2). However, the Tribunal later does consider HI level 2 
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The same applies to references to MEAs, that may be hidden in the text, or exceptions, such as the police 
powers doctrine, which may be used in a case but not literally stated. Finally, in terms of observing 
whether a tribunal accepted a HI reference as relevant context, or rejected it and on what grounds, as well 
as subsequent interpretation technique, such as restrictive or broad of specific provisions and legal 
concepts, gets at a level of complexity that requires careful reading comprehension beyond what a legal 
word search program could master. 
The relative lack of transparency in international investment arbitrations made capturing my 
transparency indicator difficult. The procedural history summarized in a final award did not always help 
with data collection either.  Next, to checking whether notice of intent was published, I:  did a google 
search within specific timeframes around the notice; I searched publications, such as ICSID news on 
whether registration of the case was published, I contacted respondent government party and asked 
whether the notice was made public, for example through a press release. I also interviewed relevant 
experts in trade and investment disputes from government, civil society and business organizations, such 
as US Trade Representative office, Respondent party ministry of economics and environment, Ralph 
Nader, Public Citizens and IISD, and various Chambers of Commerce of relevant countries. Few attempts 
were fruitful, especially with regards to my question whether access to documents during the case 
proceedings was provided. 
The data collection for this transparency measurement was aided by my data collection for my 
public participation indicator. I could detect my transparency indicator of access to documents during 
case proceedings by reading through the adjudicatory body’s decision on the petition of non-state third 
parties, which often requested to be not only considered as amici curiae; allowed to make written 
submissions; granted access to the hearings; but also to redacted versions of documents of the case file. 
The data entry is based on the results of this research. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
MEAs and customary [case] law. First, the Tribunal explains: “The Preamble to the NAFTA, the NAAEC and the 
international agreements affirmed in the NAAEC [which are the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Environment 
and 1992 Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development in NAAEC preambular paragraph 8] suggest that 
specific provisions of the NAFTA should be interpreted in light of the following general principles: Parties have the 
right to establish high levels of environmental protection. They are not obliged to compromise their standards 
merely to satisfy the political or economic interests of other states; Parties should avoid creating distortions to trade; 
environmental protection and economic” (See Partial Award Paragraphs 220). The Tribunal explained its view, that 
“these principles are consistent with the express provisions of the Transboundary Agreement and the Basel 
Convention”. The Tribunal rejected, however, the determining relevance to this case because the measure was not 
implemented within the given scope of such norms, by adopting in its interpretation the principle of mutual 
supportiveness and supporting it with relevant WTO case law: “A logical corollary of them is that 
where a state can achieve its chosen level of environmental protection through a variety of equally effective and 
reasonable means, it is obliged to adopt the alternative that is most consistent with open trade. This corollary also is 
consistent with the language and the case law arising out of the WTO family of agreements. (See Partial Award 
Paragraphs 221). 
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6.3 MEASURE FOR THE OCCURRENCE OF CONTRADICTIONS 
To analyse my collected data and inspect specifically whether any contradictions were observed in the 
real world for my given hypotheses about the co-occurrence of a case characteristic with a case outcome, 
I used the measure delta for the occurrence of contradictions. Specifically, for any of my given 
hypotheses about the co-occurrence of a case characteristic with a case outcome, ∆1 tells us about the 
existence of contradictions in regard to this hypothesis. To illustrate the application and my use of this 
measure, I use an example from the research. 
Table 6.5 below relates to my hypothesis that transparency, and specifically Document Access 
During Proceedings as one characteristic of transparency, could have an influence on dispute outcomes. 
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Table 6.5:  Measure for the occurrence of contradictions 
  x=1  x=0  y=1  a  b  
y=0  c  d  
 
Definitions: In Table 6.5, 
x represents Document Access During Proceedings  
y represents Environmental Policy Permissible Outcome  
x=1 represents the presence of the characteristic x 
x=0 represents the absence of the characteristic x 
y=1 represents the presence of an Environmental Policy Permissible Outcome  
y=0 represents the absence of an Environmental Policy Permissible Outcome 
 
a represents the number of observed cases in which the presence of characteristic x co-occurred with an 
Environmental Policy Permissible Outcome 
 
b represents the number of observed cases in which the absence of characteristic x co-occurred with the 
presence of an Environmental Policy Permissible Outcome 
 
c represents the number of observed cases in which the presence of characteristic x co-occurred with the 
absence of an Environmental Policy Permissible Outcome 
 
d represents the number of observed cases in which the absence of characteristic x co-occurred with the 
absence of an Environmental Policy Permissible Outcome 
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With respect to Table 6.5 and the definitions:  
 
 
 
The term antithesis is only used to describe the probability of contradictions in this context. 
One can write down the equations 1 to 5:   
∆1 = p1 − k1       (equation 1) 
∆2 = k2 − p2     (equation 2) 
∆1 + ∆2 = 0      (equation 3) 
 p1 + k2 = 1     (equation 4) 
 k1 + p2 = 1    (equation 5) 
 
The combination of equation 1 and equation 4 leads to equation 6:  
∆1 =1−k1 −k2 (equation 6) 
 
Equation 6 makes clear that ∆1 depends only on “the antithesis” k1 and k2. So ∆1 is a measure that 
expresses the occurrence of contradictions related to the frequency of cases with x = 0 and  
x = 1.  
 
∆1 spans from -1 to 1 and allows me to test my data:  
 
a finding of ∆1 = 1 means no contradictions;  
a finding of ∆1 = 0 means a balance between co-occurrences and contradictions; and   
a finding of ∆1 = -1 means that co-occurrence is given without any contradictions however that the co-
occurrence is exactly the opposite of what I expected.  
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The following illustrates and explains why ∆1 allows for an evaluation of the existence of 
contradictions, and why I refer to ∆1 only. Using an example from the study’s data on the transparency 
indicator, the following Table 6.6 presents the case outcome y on the left as either presence of an 
environmental policy permissible outcome (1) or absence thereof (0). The rows to the right present the 
individual transparency characteristic of Document Access During Proceedings, as either present (1) or 
absent (0).  
 
Table 6.6 : Evaluation of the existence of contradictions 
∆1 = 0.0827 x=1 x=0 y=1 a=5 p1 = 0.714285 b = 12 k1 = 0.6315789 y=0 c=2 k2 = 0.285714 d=7 p2 = 0.368421 
 
The specifically calculated ∆1 (please see Table 6.6) based on the numbers from the data for this 
transparency characteristic presented in this table, resulted in ∆1 = 0.0827. For this characteristic, the ∆1 
calculation of 0.08 indicates a balance between co-occurrence and contradictions, however with a slight 
tendency of stronger observations of co-occurrences. My hypothesis that Document Access During 
Proceedings could have an influence on dispute outcome is thus not strongly, if at all, supported.  
Compared to this weak result, my hypothesis that the public representation and participation 
characteristic of Observer Status Granted could have an influence on the case outcome seems more 
supported based on the ∆1 calculations of the study’s data. For that specific characteristic, the calculated 
∆1 of almost 0.22 indicates still nearly a balance between co-occurrences and contradictions however 
with a good visible tendency of stronger observations of co-occurrences.  
An even stronger support was found for the hypothesis that the public representation and 
participation characteristic of ‘amicus curiae accepted’ could have an influence on the case outcome. For 
that specific characteristic, the calculated ∆1 of nearly 0.27 indicates no longer a balance between co-
occurrences and contradictions but a strong visible tendency of observations of co-occurrences.  
The strongest support was found for my hypothesis that a reference to an environmental 
exception of defense made and accepted by the tribunal could have an influence on the case outcome. For 
that specific characteristic, the calculated ∆1 of 0.43 indicates a strong visible tendency of observations of 
co-occurrences.  
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6.4 BOOLEAN TRUTH TABLE APPROACH FOR QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
Charles Ragin used Boolean algebra to develop a technique that allows for systematic case comparisons 
and enables researchers to make causal inferences on the basis of only a small number of cases. The 
technique is based on the binary logic of Boolean algebra, and attempts to maximize the number of 
comparisons that can be made across the cases under investigation, in terms of the presence or absence of 
characteristics (variables) of analytical interest.365  
The analysis in this study refrains from concluding causality and from making predictions but 
aims instead at testing my hypotheses about specified characteristics that could have an influence on a 
case outcome. In addition to the application of the measure for the occurrence of contradictions that was 
applied in this study to the hypotheses of individual characteristics, applying Ragin’s approach allows me 
to test for the effects of combinations of characteristics. The focuses here is: what combination of 
characteristics are observed to influence dispute outcomes. A precise influence of the characteristics of 
the theorized indicators on the case outcome was not determined in this study. However, the study sought 
to confirm support of my hypotheses, including that such theoretical influence is best understood in an 
interactive way. The study sought to illustrate this based on observations made, whereby assessing 
observations of co-occurrences of case outcomes with combination of characteristics was also seen as 
useful. 
                                                     
365 A Dictionary of Sociology  (Oxford University Press 1998). 
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The basic features of the Boolean approach include:366  
 
• the use of binary data;  
 
• the use of a truth table to represent the data;  
 
• Boolean addition which is represented with the logical operator OR with uppercase letters 
indicating presence and lowercase letters indicating absence;  
 
• Boolean multiplication is represented with AND, whereby a product is a specific combination of 
causal conditions; 
 
• combinatorial logic, whereby causes are never viewed in isolation but in the context of presence 
and absence of other causally relevant conditions;  
 
• Boolean minimization, following from the rule that if two Boolean expressions differ in only one 
causal condition yet produce the same outcome, then the causal condition that distinguishes the 
two expressions can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a simpler, combined 
expression; and 
 
• the theoretical factoring of Boolean expressions to identify conditions that are causally equivalent 
and to show which context is required for a condition to be present for the outcome of interest to 
occur. 
 
Provided per request can be the documentation of the results of the constructed truth tables, 
simplified truth tables based on a minimization process and resulting Boolean expressions for: specific 
characteristics of the horizontal integration indicator; relevant characteristics of the transparency and 
public representation and participation indicators; and for the total data set.  
                                                     
366   Charles Ragin explicates these features, and emphasizes that “in all these procedures there is an element of 
investigator input that is crucial and the use of theory is used to evaluate the results of Boolean analysis. See: 
CHARLES RAGIN, COMPARATIVE METHOD   (University of California Press. 1987), Chapters 6-8 and quoted 
here at 98. 
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Due to the Boolean technique, the research acronyms for the individual characteristics had to be 
changed for this test. The letters assigned for the individual characteristics in the constructed truth table of 
the complete data set below are: 
 
A = Reference to Sustainable Development (SD) made 
B = reference to Sustainable Development (SD) accepted 
C = Reference to Environmental Exception or Defense (EED) made 
D = Reference to Environmental Exception or Defense (EED) accepted 
E = Reference to a Multilateral Environmental Agreement (MEA) made 
F = Reference to a Multilateral Environmental Agreement (MEA) accepted 
G = Public Notice of Intent 
H = Document Access During Proceedings 
I = Published Final Award (since all data entries are present because in the end the research only included 
cases where a published award with information about the case outcome, the Boolean truth table analyses 
did not consider this characteristic) 
 
J = Amicus Curiae Accepted 
K = Observer Status Granted 
L = State-State Dispute (since all data entries are absent because in the end the research only included 
investor-state disputes, the Boolean truth table analyses did not consider this characteristic) 
 
M = Systemic-Integration Interpretation Approach (Interpretation Approach represents an alternative 
explanation, and was juxtaposed with a Treaty-Specific Interpretation Approach)  
 
Y = Environmental Policy Permissible Dispute Outcome 
 
In the truth tables: 
 
0 indicates the absence of a specific characteristic; 
1 indicates presence of a specific characteristic; and 
-- dash means the specific characteristic could be either present or absent for the outcome to occur in the 
specified combination. 
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For the Boolean equation: 
 
a small letter such as “a” means that the characteristic is absent 
a capital letter such as “A” means that the characteristic is present 
* represents the logical operator of AND  
+ represents the logical operator of OR 
With regards to horizontal integration, as noted in the relevant chapter, the study evolved from an 
early idea of what factors could matter, including for example whether the governing economic law treaty 
included a reference to sustainable development or included an environmental exception provision. As the 
conceptual hypotheses advanced, the interest grew as to why such factors could matter, including whether 
such reference was made, or whether such reference was accepted. In the final Boolean truth table 
approach to test initial analysis results, the focus progressed to whether references to specific 
characteristics of the horizontal integration indicator was accepted in a case, represented by the 
characteristics B, D and F. This is because by definition, only where a reference was made could it be also 
accepted. However, this does not mean that the possible invisible influences of a reference being made 
but not accepted were disregarded.  
In addition and related, the Boolean truth table also includes the alternative explanation or 
specific characteristics of interpretation approach taken by the tribunal in a case, represented by the 
characteristics M. Where (1) represents a systemic-integration interpretation approach juxtaposed to a (0) 
representing a treaty-specific interpretation approach. 
Displayed in the tables are the existing combinations observed, where observed cases with 
environmental permissible outcome show Y = 1 and observed cases with impermissible outcome show Y 
= 0.   
To illustrate the application of this approach I am using the example of the theme horizontal 
integration. In this example, I assess my hypothesis that specific horizontal integration characteristics 
could have an influence on dispute outcome, by looking at what combination of horizontal integration 
characteristics co-occurred with an environmental policy permissible dispute outcome. This approach 
involves the four steps. First, a truth table (please see Figure 6.5 below) with Boolean equation was 
constructed based on the data. Here the first column presents the assigned case numbers assigned to a case 
in this research. Second, a simplified truth table (please see Figure 6.6 below) was established showing a 
condensed set of combinations of case characteristics resulting in the outcome. Here, the first column no 
longer represents a case number but instead an assigned combination number for a particular combination 
of characteristics that co-occurred with the outcome of interest observed in the research. It does not 
represent the number of observed occurrences of that combination.  Third based on the Boolean 
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minimization process simpler, combined equations were establish; and fourth, the findings were described 
in a meaningful and ‘real world relevant’ way. 
 
Figure 6.5: Constructed truth table for the characteristics of horizontal integration with  interpretation 
approach taken 
 138 
The long Boolean equation for the table in FIGURE 6.5 is: 
 
Y = A*b*C*D*E*f*M + A*b*C*D*E*f*M + A*b*C*D*E*f*M + A*B*C*d*E*f*M + 
A*b*C*d*e*f*m + a*b*c*d*e*f*m + a*b*C*D*E*F*M + A*B*c*d*E*F*M + a*b*c*d*E*F*M + 
a*b*C*D*e*f*M + a*b*C*D*E*F*M + a*b*C*D*E*f*M + a*b*C*D*E*f*M + A*B*C*D*e*f*m + 
A*B*C*D*E*f*M + a*b*c*d*e*f*m + a*b*c*d*E*F*M + a*b*c*d*E*F*m 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Simplified truth table for the Horizontal Integration Theme showing a condensed set of 
combinations of case characteristics resulting in the outcome of interest 
 The minimization process resulted in the following Boolean equation for the table in Figure 6.6:  Y = b*C*D*E*f*M + A*B*C*D*e*f*m + A*B*c*d*E*F*M + a*b*c*d*e*f*m + a*b*c*d*E*F + A*b*C*d*e*f*m + A*B*C*E*f*M + a*b*C*D*f*M + a*b*C*D*E*M 
 This equation shows the combinations of horizontal integration case characteristics that co-occurred with environmental policy permissible outcomes in this study. From this equation result I can infer, based on my strong familiarity with the data and understanding of real world scenarios, the following. Cases with an environmental policy permissible outcome co-occurred with specific horizontal integration characteristic combinations of:  
• b*C*D*E*f*M that is with a combination of reference to an environmental exception or defense 
made and accepted as defense AND reference to an MEA was made but still not accepted AND 
the tribunal taking an interpretation approach of systemic integration; OR 
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• A*B*C*D*e*f*m that is with a combination of reference to sustainable development AND to an 
environmental exception or defense made and accepted AND the tribunal still taking a treaty-
specific interpretation approach; OR 
 
• A*B*c*d*E*F*M that is with a combination of reference to sustainable development AND to an 
MEA made and accepted AND the tribunal taking an interpretation approach of systemic 
integration; OR 
 
• a*b*c*d*E*F that is with a combination of a reference to an MEA was made and accepted no 
matter what interpretation approach was taken by the tribunal; OR 
 
• A*b*C*d*e*f*m that is with a combination of reference to sustainable development AND to an 
environmental exception or defense made but neither was still accepted AND showing a treaty-
specific interpretation approach taken by the tribunal; OR 
 
• A*B*C*E*f*M that is with a combination of references to sustainable development, an 
environmental exception or defense and an MEA made with still only the sustainable 
development reference accepted AND the tribunal taking an interpretation approach of systemic 
integration; OR 
• a*b*C*D*f*M that is with a combination of reference to an environmental exception or defense 
made and accepted even if reference to an MEA was not accepted AND the tribunal taking an 
interpretation approach of systemic integration; OR 
 
• a*b*C*D*E*M that is with a combination of references to an environmental exception or 
defense and an MEA made with still only the environmental exception or defense reference 
accepted AND the tribunal taking an interpretation approach of systemic integration; OR 
 
• a*b*c*d*e*f*m showing that cases in which none of the horizontal integration characteristics 
were present AND the tribunal was taking a treaty-specific interpretation approach also co-
occurred with an environmental policy permissible outcome.  
All constructed tables and equations can be provided per request. The analysis chapter refers to 
these results, compares them with findings based on my other analysis approaches and further elaborates 
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on the equations. For example, the equations above conform with my finding of strong support for my 
hypothesis that a reference to an environmental exception of defense made and accepted by the tribunal 
could have an influence on the case outcome. For that specific characteristic, the calculated ∆1 of 0.43 
indicates a strong visible tendency of observations of co-occurrences. Moreover, the equations provide 
further insights into the relevant combination of this characteristic with other characteristics, including 
when the reference was made but not accepted. The value of assessing these combinations relates to the 
recommendations made for governments and NGOs based on my data analysis. This is further addressed 
in the conclusions chapter 9. 
Furthermore, in the example above, the last equation is also important and requires further 
elaboration. Looking at the raw data of the two specific cases in which this surprising scenario was 
observed reveals, as elaborated in the analysis chapter, what other features of the cases mattered, namely 
the facts of the contractual nature of the dispute. This important Boolean equation also underlines that 
elements of facts, evidence and applicable law are overriding features influencing the outcome of a case. 
These elements are also captured in the illustration provided in the conclusion chapter.  That illustration 
shows why a precise influence of the characteristics of the theorized indicators on the case outcome was 
not intended in this study. Rather, the study aimed at showing that such theoretical influences may exist 
but are best understood in an interactive way, and sought to illustrate this based on observations made. 
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7.0  ANALYSIS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a summary analysis of my research observations. I analyse the data collected and 
resulting from qualitative case analysis with the aim to examine whether my hypotheses postulated in 
chapters 3, 4 and 5 were observed in real world international investment arbitration cases in which an 
investor challenged the legitimacy of a state’s environment-related policy. Though the analysis refrains 
from concluding causality and from making predictions,367 it does inspect specifically whether any 
contradictions can be observed for my given hypotheses about the co-occurrence of a case characteristic 
with a case outcome, as explicated in chapter 6.  
A three-pronged approach was used to analyse the research data beginning first with a description 
of observed occurrences of hypothesized case characteristics in relation to the expected case outcome. 
Where relevant, explanations of specific case observations in this analysis are explored by examination of 
the raw data.  A substantial amount of raw data, which was captured in individual case summaries, is 
investigated to further inspect observations related to horizontal integration features. Because of that, this 
chapter is divided into several sections, with a comparative longer section on the horizontal integration 
hypotheses followed by a section on the transparency and public participation and representation 
hypotheses. The overall length of the chapter is due to its 27 tables included to illustrate the data 
description while accommodating a reading without having to skip back-and-forth to some reference 
Annex. Since the tables are uniform in format, the reader may find that after initially familiarizing with a 
table, later tables are self-explanatory and require less reading time. The table contains binary data entries, 
where observed case characteristics are coded as present (1) or absent (0). The outcome of interest this 
study is an environmental policy permissible ruling. Therefore, an entry (0) means the tribunal concluded 
with an environmental policy impermissible ruling. Likewise, regarding the alternative explanation, that a 
                                                     
367 DISCLAIMER: In this regard, where ever I state in this analysis that the data on a case characteristic “does not 
confirm a clear influence on case outcomes” I do not wish to imply that it would be possible to determine a clear 
influence, which could never be conclusively verified. I discuss the limitations of this research in the following 
chapters 8 and 9. 
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systemic-integration interpretation approach taken by a tribunal could have a positive influence on an 
environmental policy permissible outcome, an entry (0) means the tribunal took a treaty-specific 
interpretation approach.  
A test of individual case characteristic observations is conducted using the measure for the 
occurrence of contradictions, explicated in chapter 6. I also consider specific case characteristics in 
combination to assess whether support for my hypotheses can be found. For this, I applied a Boolean truth 
table approach for qualitative comparative analysis, also explicated in chapter 6. This assessment of 
characteristic combinations is conducted by themes: beginning with horizontal integration; then a 
combined theme of transparency and public representation and participation; and finally, all 
characteristics considered in the research combined.  
7.2 HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION 
Does horizontal integration co-occur with environmental policy permissible case outcomes, as 
hypothesized? Looking first at the three individual characteristics constructed as ‘measures’ of horizontal 
integration, the data does not strongly confirm the hypotheses that references to sustainable development, 
an environmental exception and defense or an MEA have an influence on the case outcome.  However, 
the hypotheses that such influence could exist when an environmental exception and defense or an MEA 
reference is not only made but also accepted by the tribunal as relevant is more strongly supported by the 
findings of the data.368 
The analysis approach starts with a description of observed individual characteristics in relation 
to case outcomes; next with the individual characteristic and its observed acceptance by the tribunal in 
relation to the outcome; followed by the individual characteristic, an observed acceptance by the tribunal 
and the observed interpretation technique applied by the tribunal in relation to the outcome. Additional 
expected interactions between these sub-characteristics, such as acceptance of a horizontal integration 
characteristic by a tribunal with the interpretation technique applied are observed and explained where 
applicable.  
Conversely, a subsequent examination of cases in which an absence of an individual horizontal 
characteristic is observed in relation to the expected environmental policy impermissible outcome is 
                                                     
368 The Delta measure calculations for the occurrence of contradictions indicates this, with the result of  
Delta 1 = 0.22 for an MEA accepted by a tribunal, and even more strongly with the result of Delta 1 = 0.43 for an 
environmental exception or defense accepted by a tribunal. See also Chapter 6 on methods. 
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performed. Here, some of the sub-characteristic interaction analysis is groundless. For example, where no 
reference to sustainable development was made (an observation which includes references made by the 
tribunals themselves), the relation or observation as to whether a tribunal accepted such reference is clear, 
namely not observed since such would be by definition not possible.  
7.2.1 Reference to the concept of sustainable development 
Reference to the concept of sustainable development: The data does not confirm the hypothesis that 
reference to the concept of sustainable development could individually have a clear influence on case 
outcomes. 
The study observed 15 cases in which a reference to the concept of sustainable development was 
observed as shown in Table 7.1 below. Eight of these cases had an environmental policy permissible 
outcome, and seven of these cases had an environmental policy impermissible outcome. 
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Table 7.1: Observed case outcomes of cases with observed reference to the concept of sustainable 
development as individual characteristic of horizontal integration 
 
Study 
Case 
Number 
 
Sustainable 
Development 
Reference 
 
Environmental 
Policy Permissible 
Outcome 
 
7 1 1 
14 1 1 
25 1 1 
26 1 1 
2 1 1 
3 1 1 
6 1 1 
8 1 1 
5 1 0 
24 1 0 
27 1 0 
1 1 0 
4 1 0 
10 1 0 
23 1 0 
TOTAL 15 8 
 
Acceptance of the sustainable development reference: Looking further at whether a tribunal’s 
acceptance of a sustainable development reference made in the dispute could illuminate a potential 
influence on the outcome, the data also does not offer strong support for this hypothesis, illustrated in 
Table 7.2 below. In the eight cases in which both a sustainable development reference and an 
environmental policy permissible outcome was observed an equal number of four cases each showed 
presence and absence of an acceptance by the tribunal of the reference to sustainable development made 
in a case. In the seven cases with an environmental policy impermissible outcome and in which a 
sustainable development reference was observed, three cases showed presence of an acceptance of the 
reference made, and four showed an absence of such acceptance. 
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Table 7.2: Observed case outcomes of cases with observed reference to the concept of sustainable 
development and observation regarding tribunal’s acceptance of such references 
 
Study 
Case 
Number 
 
SD 
Reference 
 
 
SD 
accepted 
 
 
Environmental 
policy permissible 
Outcome 
 
7 1 1 1 
14 1 1 1 
25 1 1 1 
26 1 1 1 
2 1 0 1 
3 1 0 1 
6 1 0 1 
8 1 0 1 
5 1 1 0 
24 1 1 0 
27 1 1 0 
1 1 0 0 
4 1 0 0 
10 1 0 0 
23 1 0 0 
TOTAL 15 7 8 
 
 
The color-coded illustration of the data triggers further investigation as to what could explain: the 
observation of four cases in which the sustainable development reference was not accepted but the 
outcome was nevertheless environmental policy permissible; and conversely, the three cases in which the 
sustainable development reference was accepted but nevertheless the outcome was environmental policy 
impermissible. 
We find in the first scenario group, a three out of four majority of tribunals took a systemic- 
integration interpretation approach. In the latter scenario, a two out of three majority of tribunals took a 
systemic-integration interpretation approach. Thus, though no clear answer can be derived from looking 
at the interpretation approach taken, recognition that tribunals often perform a balancing act may be at 
play here. Below I investigate more specifically the cases in which a systemic-integration approach was 
taken but a sustainable development reference not accepted.  
The raw data reveals some common characteristics, namely that specific and at best treaty-
specific sustainable development references are more likely to be accepted by tribunals, no matter what 
their interpretation approach. In the three out of four cases with policy permissible outcomes in which 
sustainable development reference was not accepted, despite the tribunal applying a systemic-integration 
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interpretation approach, these references were in part only indirect and vague and included non-treaty 
specific references (Methanex v. USA, Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, and Glamis Gold Ltd. v. USA).  
The fourth case, Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, in which the tribunal rejected the 
sustainable development reference while taking a treaty-specific interpretation approach, the reference 
was also only vaguely and indirectly implied by the amici. The tribunal in that case noted and recited the 
economic development and investment-stimulation emphasis in the preamble to the 1992 Bolivia-
Netherlands BIT.369 In this case, a treaty-specific sustainable development reference was indeed not 
possible because the relevant BIT Preamble does not contain references to: “sustainable development; 
right to regulate (e.g. regulatory autonomy, policy space, flexibility to introduce new regulations); nor text 
on environmental aspects (e.g. plant or animal life, biodiversity, climate change)”.370  
Sustainable development references made at the treaty-specific level also explain in part the 
scenario of the Claytons and Bilcon of Delaware Inc. v. Canada case371 (with policy impermissible 
outcome) in which a treaty-specific interpretation approach was taken and the sustainable development 
reference was accepted.  
Relevant common features can also be observed in the two out of three cases (S.D. Myers v. 
Canada and Copper Mesa v. Ecuador) with policy impermissible outcomes in which the tribunal did 
accept the sustainable development reference while applying a systemic-integration interpretation 
approach. In these cases, the tribunals themselves made a sustainable development reference, yet rejected 
its use as defense because the measure was not implemented within the given requirements of being least 
inconsistent with NAFTA, as in S.D. Myers v. Canada,372 or because, as in Copper Mesa v. Ecuador,373  
                                                     
369 Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3 (Petition for amici) (August 29, 2002), 
paragraph 145 and footnote 120. 
370 UNCTAD Investment policy hub, available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mappedContent/treaty/587 (accessed 10/1/2016). 
371 The Claytons and Bilcon of Delaware Inc. v. Canada tribunal accepted as relevant and applicable the concept of 
sustainable development, noting: “The concepts of promoting both economic development and environmental 
integrity are integrated into the Preamble’s endorsement of the principle of sustainable development”.  See: William 
Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware Inc. v. 
Government of Canada, 1976 UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-04 (2015); NAFTA, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Liability, March 17, 2015, paragraph 596, but also paragraphs 595 and 597 on mutual supportiveness between 
economic and environmental norms. 
372 The tribunal referenced the concept of sustainable development indirectly in various instances: by reference to 
NAFTA preamble; by reference to the 1972 Stockholm and 1992 Rio Declarations; by reference to the mutual 
supportiveness of economic and environmental policies; and by noting the indirect environmental motive in 
Canada’s attempt to ensure future viability of its domestic waste management industry, a notion that is particular 
relevant to developing countries view on sustainable development. However, the tribunal did not view the concept 
as relevant enough to directly recall it as stated in NAFTA, and in anyway rejected its use as defense in this case 
because the measure was not implemented within the given requirements of being least inconsistent with NAFTA. 
See: S.D. Myers v. Canada, ad hoc tribunal under UNCITRAL; UNCITRAL (1976); NAFTA Partial Award 
November 13, paragraphs 196, 217, 220-1 and 247. 
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the concept did not help defend against breaches of fair and equitable treatment (FET) since the tribunal 
found the termination resolutions were made in an arbitrary manner and without due process. 
Interpretation Approach: Looking further at the interpretation approach taken by a tribunal in a 
case, as an alternative explanation for a possible influence of a reference to sustainable development and 
acceptance thereof on a case outcome, the data also does not clearly confirm the expectation that a 
sustainable development reference could have an influence on the case outcome. Table 7.3 below 
illustrates that in the eight cases in which both a sustainable development reference and an environmental 
policy permissible outcome was observed, six cases observed the tribunal took an interpretation approach 
of systemic integration and only two cases were observed in which the tribunal applied a treaty-specific 
interpretation approach. In the seven cases in which a sustainable development reference was made but an 
environmental policy impermissible outcome was observed, four cases observed the tribunal applied a 
treaty-specific interpretation approach and three cases in which the tribunal took an interpretation 
approach of systemic integration. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
373 For example, the tribunal recites, as submitted by respondent, Ecuador’s 1998 Constitution, granting “more 
extensive powers to local government; in particular, Article 86 provides (inter alia) that the State shall protect the 
right of its people to live in a healthy and ecologically balanced environment to ensure sustainable development, 
ensure that this right is not affected and guarantee the preservation of nature; and Article 88 obliges the State to 
consult in relation to decisions that may affect the environment”. 
The tribunal also cited at length the 2005 Resolution by the Cantonal Unity Assembly of Cotacachi and the 
Development and Action Council, entitled ‘With a single voice: NO TO MINING’ and signed by Mayor Tituaña 
and representatives of the Council.  One excerpt of the resolution the tribunal recites, reads: “Organized civil society 
and the Intag and Cotacachi authorities have chosen sustainable development, framed in solidarity, reciprocity, 
democratic principles and involvement, respecting human rights, both individual and collective and the right of the 
communities to create and enjoy their own forms of development and to say NO to projects that may endanger their 
natural and socio-cultural wellbeing”. See: Copper Mesa Mining Corporation (Canada) v. Republic of Ecuador; 
UNCITRAL; PCA Case No. 2012-2; Award, 15 March 2016, paragraphs 4.39 and 4.115.  
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Table 7.3: Observed case outcomes of cases with observed reference to the concept of sustainable 
development and observations regarding the interpretation approach taken by the tribunal 
 
Study 
Case 
Number 
 
SD 
Reference 
 
 
Systemic-integration 
Interpretation 
Approach 
 
Environmental 
policy permissible 
Outcome 
 
7 1 1 1 
14 1 1 1 
26 1 1 1 
2 1 1 1 
3 1 1 1 
6 1 1 1 
25 1 0 1 
8 1 0 1 
5 1 1 0 
27 1 1 0 
23 1 1 0 
24 1 0 0 
1 1 0 0 
4 1 0 0 
10 1 0 0 
TOTAL 15 9 8 
 
The above examination on acceptance of a sustainable development reference warrants further 
inspection related to the reasonable expectation that acceptance of a sustainable development reference 
should more likely concur with an interpretation approach of systemic integration. This is also not clearly 
confirmed by the data. 
Among the cases in which a reference to sustainable development was observed, the study 
observed both, cases in which such reference was accepted by a tribunal generally taking a systemic-
integration approach, as well as by a tribunal taken a treaty-specific approach.  
Specifically, of the eight cases (displayed in Table 7.3) in which a reference to sustainable 
development and an environmental policy permissible outcome was observed, a majority of six cases is 
observed in which the tribunal applied a systemic-integration interpretation approach. In these cases, an 
equal number of three cases each showed the tribunal accepting or as not specifically accepting the 
sustainable development reference, as shown in Table 7.4 below. 
In two of the eight cases (displayed in Table 7.3) in which a reference to sustainable development 
and an environmental policy permissible outcome was observed, the tribunal applied a treaty-specific 
interpretation approach. Again, an equal division of cases showed the tribunal either as accepting the 
sustainable development reference, or, not specifically indicating any acceptance of the sustainable 
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development reference, as shown in Table 7.4 below. Thus, no obvious relationship between 
interpretation approach and acceptance or application of a sustainable development reference by the 
tribunal can thus be clearly confirmed from the observations. 
 
Table 7.4: Observed cases with environmental policy permissible outcomes and reference to sustainable 
development and observations regarding both tribunal’s acceptance of the sustainable development reference 
and the tribunal’s interpretation approach 
 
Study 
Case 
Number 
 
SD  
Reference 
 
 
SD 
accepted 
 
 
Systemic- integration 
Interpretation 
Approach 
 
Environmental policy 
permissible 
Outcome 
 
7 1 1 1 1 
14 1 1 1 1 
26 1 1 1 1 
2 1 0 1 1 
3 1 0 1 1 
6 1 0 1 1 
25 1 1 0 1 
8 1 0 0 1 
TOTAL 8 4 6 8 
 
Looking at the seven cases (displayed in Table 7.3) in which a reference to sustainable 
development was made but an environmental policy impermissible outcome was observed, only three 
cases are observed in which the tribunal applied a systemic-integration interpretation approach. In these 
three cases, two cases showed the tribunal accepted the sustainable development reference and in one case 
it did not as shown in Table 7.5 below. In four of the seven cases, in which a reference to sustainable 
development was made but an environmental policy impermissible outcome was observed, the tribunal 
took a treaty-specific interpretation approach. In only one of these four cases did the tribunal accept the 
reference to sustainable development. 
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Table 7.5: Observed cases with environmental policy impermissible outcomes and reference to sustainable 
development as individual characteristic of horizontal integration as well as with observations regarding both 
tribunal’s acceptance of the sustainable development reference and the tribunal’s interpretation approach 
Study 
Case 
Number 
 
SD  
Reference 
 
 
SD 
accepted 
 
 
Systemic- integration 
Interpretation 
Approach 
 
Environmental 
policy permissible 
Outcome 
 
5 1 1 1 0 
27 1 1 1 0 
23 1 0 1 0 
24 1 1 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 
4 1 0 0 0 
10 1 0 0 0 
TOTAL 
 
7 
 
3 
 
3 
 
7 
IMPERMISSIBLE 
 
 
A closer look at the raw data provides an explanation for the study’s observation of cases where 
the tribunal took a treaty-specific interpretation approach while also accepting the sustainable 
development reference. It also confirms the initial conceptual thoughts that went into the structuring the 
research. One explanation for this observation lies in the differentiated levels of horizontal indicator 
characteristics. In this context, a sustainable development reference can be treaty-specific (level 1) or non-
treaty specific (level 2). 
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Table 7.6: Case outcomes of cases with observed reference to the concept of sustainable development and with 
highlighted differing observations regarding tribunal’s acceptance of such reference and tribunal’s 
interpretation approach 
 
Study 
Case 
Number 
 
SD 
Reference 
 
 
SD 
accepted 
 
 
Systemic-integration 
Interpretation 
Approach 
 
Environmental 
policy permissible 
Outcome 
 
7 1 1 1 1 
14 1 1 1 1 
26 1 1 1 1 
2 1 0 1 1 
3 1 0 1 1 
6 1 0 1 1 
8 1 0 0 1 
25 1 1 0 1 
24 1 1 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 
4 1 0 0 0 
10 1 0 0 0 
5 1 1 1 0 
27 1 1 1 0 
23 1 0 1 0 
TOTAL 15 7 9 8 
 
 
Table 7.6 above highlights two cases (with different case outcomes) where the tribunal took a 
treaty-specific interpretation approach while also accepting the sustainable development reference. In 
both cases, the sustainable development reference occurred at the treaty-specific level. In the first case 
with an environmental policy permissible outcome, Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi v. Sultanate of Oman, the 
tribunal assessed the FTA parties’ intent. 
 
The tribunal explained that:  
“the Preamble to the US–Oman FTA, which includes as one of the Treaty’s objectives the 
desire to ‘strengthen the development and enforcement of environmental laws and policies, 
promote sustainable development, and implement this Agreement in a manner consistent with the 
objectives of environmental protection and conservation’ [provided] a further clear indication by 
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the State parties that the Treaty is to be interpreted to give effect to the objectives of 
environmental protection and conservation”.374 
 
In the second case with an environmental impermissible outcome, Claytons and Bilcon of 
Delaware Inc. v. Canada, the tribunal mentioned “the Laws of Canada and Nova Scotia, as well as the 
NAFTA itself, expressly acknowledge that economic development and environmental integrity can not 
only be reconciled, but can be mutually reinforcing”.375 The tribunal accepted as relevant and applicable 
the concept of sustainable development, noting: “the concepts of promoting both economic development 
and environmental integrity are integrated into the preamble’s endorsement of the principle of sustainable 
development”.376  
Next to the treaty-specific sustainable development reference and a mutual supportive 
interpretation approach taken by the tribunal, another feature in both cases is that the tribunals themselves 
made the sustainable development reference.  
Unsurprisingly, sustainable development references were not made by the tribunals themselves in 
the four cases in which such references were not accepted, but where the tribunal nevertheless applied a 
systemic-integration interpretation approach. Explanations for these observed cases are less clear.  
Looking at the raw data the sustainable development references in these cases were: not made by 
the tribunal but by the responding state and / or by amici curiae; 377 made at both horizontal integration 
levels 1 and 2 but predominantly at level 2 as well as made implicitly, vaguely or indirectly;378  and either 
                                                     
374 Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi v. Sultanate of Oman; ICSID; ICSID Case No. ARB/11/3; FTA Oman – United States 
of America 2006; Award November 3, 2015, paragraph 389, footnote 777. 
375 William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware Inc. 
v. Government of Canada, 1976 UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-04 (2015); NAFTA, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Liability, March 17, 2015, paragraphs 595 and 597. 
376 William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware Inc. 
v. Government of Canada, 1976 UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-04 (2015); NAFTA, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Liability, March 17, 2015, paragraph 596. 
377 In Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, sustainable development references were made also by 
amicus curiae, including by IISD in its Petition for amicus curiae status. In it, IISD explained: that consistent with 
NAFTA's objectives as set out in the preamble, there are limits placed by NAFTA on governments’ authority to 
ensure economic and sustainable development are integrated, rather than hierarchical legal, and policy objectives; 
that a sustainable investment strategy requires governments ability to maintain optimal environmental protection 
process; that interpretation of provisions must reflect NAFTA parties’ commitments in the preamble to maintain 
their flexibility to safeguard public welfare, including environmental protection; and that the public interest in this 
case regarding the ability of host states to meet their responsibilities towards their citizenry lies also within the 
context of their international legal obligations. However, the tribunal in the Methanex case refrained from 
addressing references to NAFTA’s preambular language. See: Methanex v. United States of America, Petition for 
Amicus Curiae submission by IISD, March 9, 2004, paragraphs 10, 14, 27. 
378 In Glamis Gold Ltd. v. USA for example, the Quechan submission referenced sustainable development only 
implicitly, stating its intent to use the land area concerned in this dispute “into the future with future generations” as 
well as that “for indigenous populations, land does not represent simply a possession or means of production … it is 
also essential to understand the special and profoundly spiritual relationship of indigenous peoples with Mother 
 153 
not referred to at all by the tribunal or rejected because the tribunal found other illegitimate political 
priorities than sustainable development as the motivation behind a challenged measure.379 
Taking the above inspection into account, the expectation that acceptance of a sustainable 
development reference should concur with an interpretation approach of systemic integration may still be 
reasonable, though no clear influence of a possible relationship between interpretation approach and 
acceptance of a sustainable development reference on a specific case outcome can be confirmed.   
Table 7.7 below illustrates this by looking at this relationship and influence separately from cases 
in which differing observations in the sub-characteristics of “sustainable development reference accepted” 
and “interpretation approach” were made as highlighted in Table 7.6. Underlying this partial observation 
as separate from the above comments, we find some support of the reasonable expectation, because four 
cases in which a systemic-integration interpretation approach was taken concurred with an acceptance of 
a sustainable development reference and three cases in which a treaty-specific interpretation approach 
concurred with the absence of an acceptance of sustainable development reference. However, no clear 
influence on the case outcome was found, because only in three out of the five cases in which a systemic-
integration interpretation approach concurred with an acceptance of a sustainable development reference 
was an environmental policy permissible outcome observed. In the other two cases an environmental 
policy impermissible outcome was observed. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Earth as basic to their existence and to all their beliefs, customs, traditions and culture”.  Specifically, see: Glamis 
Gold Ltd. v. USA; ad hoc Tribunal; UNCITRAL (1976); NAFTA; (Award, June 8, 2009), First amici submission by 
the Quechan Indian Nation to Glamis vs. United States page 10, August 19, 2005. The notion of “means of 
production” refers to the economic, while reference to Mother Earth refers to the environmental aspect of the 
sustainable development concept.  As noted by some, “references to their spiritual relationship with lands, natural 
resources and Mother Earth are central to indigenous peoples’ demands for the recognition of their human rights”; 
see for example MAURO BARELLI, SEEKING JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW –THE SIGNIFICANCE 
AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES  
(Routledge. 2016) at 133. 
379 Gold Reserve Inc. v. Venezuela; ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1; Award, September 22, 2014, paragraphs 580-1. 
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Table 7.7: Case outcomes of cases with observed reference to the concept of sustainable development and with 
converging observations only regarding tribunal’s acceptance of such reference and tribunal’s interpretation 
approach 
 
Study 
Case 
Number 
 
SD  
Reference 
 
 
SD 
accepted 
 
 
Systemic- integration 
Interpretation 
Approach  
 
Environmental 
policy permissible 
Outcome 
 
7 1 1 1 1 
14 1 1 1 1 
26 1 1 1 1 
5 1 1 1 0 
27 1 1 1 0 
1 1 0 0 0 
4 1 0 0 0 
10 1 0 0 0 
TOTAL 8 5 5 3 
 
 
The following section looks conversely at cases where no reference to the concept of sustainable 
development was made. This check examines whether an absence of this individual horizontal integration 
feature could indicate an influence on case a outcome, conversely expected to be environmental policy 
impermissible. 
Three preliminary observations must be made. First, in all of the study’s observed cases in which 
no sustainable development reference was made, no such reference could have been accepted. Hence 
needless to say no acceptance of a sustainable development reference could be observed in these cases. 
Anything to the contrary would have indicated a data transfer mistake. Second, an assessment of the 
relationship between acceptance of a sustainable development reference and interpretation technique in 
such cases is therefore unfounded in this examination.  
Third, note that the specific case of Piero Foresti and others v. South Africa is not further 
included in the analysis because claimants withdrew their claims. Thus, the case was discontinued and 
therefore lacks data on interpretation technique and clear outcome. For example, although initially 
viewing the outcome in favor of the state, the tribunal stressed in its award on discontinuance and costs 
that: “it wishes to state in the plainest possible terms that the resolution of this dispute cannot be 
understood in terms of success or failure for either side, but only in terms of the ultimate success of all 
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parties in their struggle to find a fair, viable structure for the future of this particular part of the South 
African economy”.380  
Examining the data substantiates the above finding in that also the absence of a reference to the 
concept of sustainable development as specific horizontal integration characteristic does not individually 
confirm a clear influence on case outcomes. Table 7.8 below shows that the study observed 14 cases381  
without a reference to the concept of sustainable development. Ten of these cases had an environmental 
policy permissible outcome, and four of these cases had an environmental policy impermissible outcome. 
 
                                                     
380 Piero Foresti and others v. South Africa; ICSID Additional Facility Arbitration Rules; ICSID Case No 
ARB(AF)/07/1; Award, August 4, 2010, paragraph 113. 
381 The number of 14 cases is based on the exclusion of the Piero Foresti and others v. South Africa Case. 
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Table 7.8: Case outcomes of cases with no observed reference to the concept of sustainable development and 
tribunal’s interpretation approach and preconditioned observations regarding tribunal’s acceptance of such 
reference 
 
Study 
Case 
Number 
 
SD  
Reference 
 
 
SD 
accepted 
 
 
Interpretation 
Approach 
 
 
Environmental policy 
permissible 
Outcome 
 
13 0 0 1 1 
17 0 0 1 1 
18 0 0 1 1 
19 0 0 1 1 
21 0 0 1 1 
22 0 0 1 1 
29 0 0 1 1 
12 0 0 0 1 
28 0 0 0 1 
30 0 0 0 1 
9 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 
16 0 0 0 0 
[20] [0] [0] [X] [1*] 
TOTAL 
 
15-1=14 
no 
reference 
      14 
not 
accepted 
7 
treaty-specific 
approach 
10 
environmental policy 
permissible 
 
 
The above illuminates that based on the study’s data, an expectation that a presence of a reference 
to sustainable development as individual characteristic of horizontal integration could individually have a 
meaningful influence on a case outcome is not confirmed. Neither does the initial data review suggest that 
it mattered whether such reference was accepted by the tribunal nor what interpretation approach the 
tribunal applied. Additional observations point to a tendency that supports a reasonable expectation that a 
systemic-integration interpretation approach concurs with an acceptance of a sustainable development 
reference, however without any clear influence on a case outcome. Vice versa a treaty-specific 
interpretation approach taken by a tribunal tends to concur with an absence of acceptance of a sustainable 
development reference made. A closer inspection of a deviation from this trend showed that in all cases 
(with different case outcomes) where the tribunal took a treaty-specific interpretation approach while also 
accepting the sustainable development reference, the sustainable development reference was made by the 
tribunals themselves and occurred at the treaty-specific level.  
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Cases in which a systemic-integration interpretation approach was taken but nevertheless an 
existing sustainable development reference was not accepted by the tribunal had the following traits. The 
sustainable development references in these cases were: not made by the tribunal but by the responding 
state and / or by amici curiae; made at both horizontal integration levels 1 and 2 but predominantly at 
level 2 as well as vaguely or indirectly; and either not referred to at all by the tribunal or rejected because 
the tribunal found other illegitimate political priorities than sustainable development as the motivation 
behind a challenged measure. In conclusion, from the above we can summarize the following findings for 
further review and evaluation. 
The specific sustainable development reference as characteristic of the horizontal integration 
indicator: 
• should be referenced, if possible, treaty-specifically that is at HI level 1 to increase the likelihood 
of acceptance; 
 
• however, no clear indication was found as to whether it mattered by whom it was mentioned, with 
the obvious observations that a) if not mentioned at all no acceptance or application was possible 
and b) when mentioned by the tribunal the reference was always accepted, even if not as ultimate 
defense of an otherwise illegitimately implemented measure;  
 
• a sustainable development reference may also be accepted when made at HI level 2 (non-treaty 
specific), especially when the tribunal employs an understanding of mutual supportiveness, i.e. 
that the goals of environmental protection and economic development should and can be mutually 
supportive; and  
 
• a sustainable development reference made at either HI level may still not be accepted as defense 
of a challenged measure when the reference, including in treaty-specific objective is 
o too vague vis a vis the investment goal in the treaty objective; or 
o the measure is not implemented within the legitimate scope. This scope requires the 
measure to be 
 least-NAFTA inconsistent,  
 least-trade or least-investment restrictive,  
 following the norms of due process (in a timely, transparent and participatory 
manner) and  
 not in a gravely unilateral, protectionist or corrupt manner. 
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7.2.2 Reference to an environmental exception or defense 
Reference to an environmental exception or defense: The data does not confirm that reference to an 
environmental exception or defense as specific horizontal integration characteristic has individually a 
clear influence on case outcomes. 
 
Table 7.9 below illustrates this study found 22 cases in which a reference to an environmental 
exception or defense was observed.382 No meaningful influence on the outcome is shown with an almost 
equal divide, namely 12 of these cases with such a reference had an environmental policy permissible 
outcome, and ten of these cases had an environmental policy impermissible outcome. Conversely, the 
expectation that cases with no reference to an environmental exception or defense should show an 
environmental policy impermissible outcome is also not confirmed. The study observed seven cases with 
no reference to an environmental exception or defense. Only one of these cases had an environmental 
policy impermissible outcome, and six of these cases had an environmental policy permissible outcome. 
                                                     
382 The number of 22 cases is based on the exclusion of the Piero Foresti and others v. South Africa Case as 
explained above. 
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Table 7.9: Observed presence and absence of reference to an environmental exception or defense with case 
outcomes 
 
Study 
Case 
Number 
 
Environmental 
Exception  
or Defense 
 
Environmental Policy 
Permissible 
Outcome 
 
26 1 1 
6 1 1 
2 1 1 
19 1 1 
3 1 1 
13 1 1 
18 1 1 
21 1 1 
22 1 1 
25 1 1 
8 1 1 
7 1 1 
30 0 1 
12 0 1 
28 0 1 
14 0 1 
17 0 1 
29 0 1 
5 1 0 
27 1 0 
4 1 0 
15 1 0 
23 1 0 
24 1 0 
1 1 0 
10 1 0 
9 1 0 
11 1 0 
16 0 0 
TOTAL 22 18 
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Acceptance of the environmental exception or defense reference: The data, however, does 
appear to support the hypothesis that a tribunal’s acceptance of the reference to an environmental 
exception or defense is associated with environmentally permissive outcomes. 
In the 12 cases in which both an environmental exception or defense referenced and an 
environmental policy permissible outcome were observed only two cases show that the tribunal did not 
accept the reference an environmental exception or defense, as illustrated in Table 7.10 below. Table 7.10 
also shows that in the ten cases in which an environmental exception or defense referenced and an 
environmental policy impermissible outcome was observed most tribunals, i.e. in six cases, did not accept 
the reference to an environmental exception or defense. 
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Table 7.10: Observed case outcomes of cases with observed reference to an environmental exception or 
defense and with observation regarding tribunal’s acceptance of such references 
 
Study 
Case 
No 
 
Environmental 
Exception or 
Defense 
 
EE/D 
accepted 
 
 
Environmental Policy 
Permissible 
Outcome 
 
2 1 1 1 
3 1 1 1 
6 1 1 1 
13 1 1 1 
18 1 1 1 
19 1 1 1 
21 1 1 1 
22 1 1 1 
25 1 1 1 
26 1 1 1 
7 1 0 1 
8 1 0 1 
4 1 1 0 
5 1 1 0 
15 1 1 0 
27 1 1 0 
1 1 0 0 
9 1 0 0 
10 1 0 0 
11 1 0 0 
23 1 0 0 
24 1 0 0 
TOTAL 22 14 12 
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The color-coded illustration of the data triggers further investigation as to what could explain: the 
observation of four cases in which an environmental exception or defense reference was accepted but the 
outcome was nevertheless environmental policy impermissible; and conversely, the two cases in which an 
environmental exception or defense reference was not accepted but nevertheless the outcome was 
environmental policy permissible? 
An inspection of the raw data found that several features stand out. First, in the two cases 
(Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. Tanzania and Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Bolivia) in which the environmental 
exception or defense was not accepted yet the outcome was nevertheless environmental policy 
permissible, we find a lesser number of references overall and those made being indirect or vague 
references and references at horizontal integration (HI) level 2. In contrast the group of cases in which the 
environmental exception or defense was accepted yet the outcome was nevertheless environmental policy 
impermissible, we find multiple environmental exception or defense references made and at both HI level 
1 and 2. One explanation for the observed phenomena contrariwise to expectation could be the need to 
critically review the data collection and data entry design. The data entry in the first group may simply 
and naturally not have clearly captured the possibility of an acceptance of additional environmental 
exception or defense, if such would have been made, whereas the data entry in the second group may 
have captured an acceptance of some but not all environmental exception or defense references. In the 
future, the data entry design could be refined by including the number of defenses made as well as 
decisiveness of a particular environmental exception or defense reference. The analysis approach taken 
here however addresses precisely such issues by referencing back to the raw data where needed.383 
Second, one common feature in both groups is the finding of expropriatory acts. In the Biwater 
Gauff Ltd. v. Tanzania the tribunal did neither mention the necessity defense referenced by the amici in 
this case,384 nor the margin of appreciation defense argued by Tanzania.385 The tribunal found instead 
                                                     
383 For example, by taking substantive observations into account in the coding process I tried to reduce the risk of 
coding errors stemming from simplification and accomplished a richer data set. Still even then, reasonable critics 
may disagree with my coding as environmental policy permissible or as an outcome in which the responding state 
prevailed, a ruling in which an environmental measure was determined as legitimate expropriation yet still requiring 
compensation. The Biwater case offers critics similar opportunities to disagree with my coding. In my decision 
between binary data entries, I opted in this case for determining a permissible ruling in which the responding state 
prevailed. This is because the claims for damage were dismissed although state actions were found in part 
unreasonable and politically motivated. And lacking causation, no injury was observed and instead losses were 
found to have been caused by claimant himself. This provides a good example of the benefits of a thorough 
qualitative research that was required for my data collection and the fruits of keeping some of the data’s richness for 
deeper inspections. In this case, the surprising finding in the analysis may seem less surprising once one mine’s the 
data set. Though my data collection did include the number of references made and tried to capture decisiveness (by 
differentiating between treaty-specific and non-treaty specific references), this data is not revealed in the binary 
coding but in the richer data set. 
384 See: Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. (U.K.) v. United Republic of Tanzania ICSID (W. Bank) ICSID, ARB/05/22, 
Award 24 July 2008, paragraph 387. 
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several acts as expropriatory, emphasizing the occupation of city water’s facilities and usurpation of 
management control were unjustified by any public purpose, there being no emergency at the time. 
Specifically, the tribunal observed that “in all the circumstances, therefore, there was no necessity or 
impending public purpose to justify the Government’s intervention in the way that took place”.386 
However, the tribunal also noted that “at least in theory, and viewed at that time, this crisis could have 
threatened a vital public service and the situation therefore had to be resolved one way or the other in the 
near future”.387 The case highlights that an emergency situation with severe impacts on the public can 
justify state actions. An environmental or public policy exception in the economic treaty text with specific 
language on what would qualify as such an emergency situation could help responding states defend their 
action. However, the investor Biwater Gauff in this case successfully stressed the abnormal, unilateral, 
arbitrary and unjustified acts by Tanzania, (puissance publique or abuse of government power) including 
procuring "its police force to apprehend City Water’s managers and its Immigration Authority to arrange 
their hasty deportation out of Tanzania in most irregular circumstances,” which was argued to have 
constituted, cumulatively, “the effective expropriation of Biwater Gauff’s investment“.388   
Expropriatory acts were also found in the second group of cases in which the environmental 
exception or defense was accepted yet the outcome was nevertheless environmental policy impermissible. 
The tribunal in Metaclad v. Mexico found that whatever the motivation or intent, the implementation of 
the Ecological Decree issued by a local government would, in and of itself, constitute an act tantamount 
to expropriation requiring compensation.389 The tribunal in Tecmed v. Mexico recognized the relevance of 
the police powers doctrine referenced by Mexico,390 but explained that a determination that the exercise 
of such power is legitimate “includes that of the limits which, if infringed, would give rise to the 
obligation to compensate an owner for the violation of its property rights.”391 The Tecmed tribunal further 
established, based on the Spain - Mexico BIT and by reciting392 the Santa Elena v. Costa Rica tribunal, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
385 Ibid., paragraphs 436, 424, 434 and 428. 
386 Ibid., paragraphs 497-503. 
387 Ibid., paragraph 654. 
388 Ibid., paragraphs 393-413. 
389Metaclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID (Additional Facility) Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, [Final] Award August 30, 2000, 
paragraph 111. 
390 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2); Award of 
the Tribunal (May 29, 2003) English (Translated) paragraph 97. 
391 Ibid., paragraph 119. 
392 In addition to the above suggested data refinements for future studies, the role of references to prior decisions 
could be more explored. However, “the principle of stare decisis does not apply to investor-state disputes,” yet as 
Katherina Berner notes, “arbitral tribunals nevertheless tend to acknowledge, analyse and rely on previous awards”. 
She argues that “tribunals must not rely on previous arbitral awards to interpret international investment agreements 
before they have applied the general rule of interpretation”. Katharina Berner, Reconciling Investment Protection 
and Sustainable Development, in SHIFTING PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW - MORE 
 164 
that: “expropriatory environmental measures – no matter how laudable and beneficial to society as a 
whole – are, in this respect, similar to any other expropriatory measures that a state may take in order to 
implement its policies: where property is expropriated, even for environmental purposes, whether 
domestic or international, the state’s obligation to pay compensation remains.”393 
Other informative features among the second group of cases (in which the environmental 
exception or defense was accepted yet the outcome was nevertheless environmental policy impermissible) 
include the following. Although the tribunals found the environmental exception or defense references 
made were relevant and applicable, they could not serve as decisive defense because:  
 
• the challenged measures were not implemented within the required scope, i.e. not implemented in 
accordance with due process, not reasonably proportional to the aim of the policy or the least 
trade-effecting alternative measure; 
 
• the referenced environmental exception did not require the measure to avoid infringement of 
state’s rights provided in that exception; and 
 
• evidence showed that political circumstances or motivations were decisive in a case however not 
justifying the challenged measure. 
 
On the implementation of a measure within the required scope, the specific additional 
observations are particular informative with regards to the status of norm contestation. In line with the 
examination of sustainable development references, we find also here tribunals endorsing as legitimate 
scope a policy implementation that: is the least trade-effecting alternative among available measures; 
follows the norms of due process (in a timely, transparent and participatory manner); and is not gravely 
unilateral, protectionist or based on corruption.  
For example, the tribunal in S.D. Myers v. Canada recognized the relevance of several 
environmental exception and defense references but ultimately found that the environmental measure was 
not implemented in the least-trade effecting way and, by reference to relevant treaty text, did not meet the 
requirement to employ the most cost-effective and environmentally sound solution. In addition, in finding 
Canada’s breach of national treatment, the tribunal took into account whether the practical effect of the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
BALANCED, LESS ISOLATED, INCREASINGLY DIVERSIFIED (Steffen Hindelang and Markus Krajewski eds. 
2016) at 200-1. 
393 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2); Award of 
the Tribunal (May 29, 2003) English (Translated) paragraph 121. 
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measure is to create a disproportionate benefit for nationals over non-nationals, thereby considering 
proportionality. Thus, even if the reason behind a policy choice would benefit the future viability of 
domestic capacity, which the tribunal in this case noted as a potentially valid indirect environmental 
purpose, the importance to be in line relevant treaty text remains, i.e. in this case to employ the most cost-
effective and environmentally sound solution.  
Given that “the S.D. Myers case was the first NAFTA Chapter 11 case to reach a decision on a 
new environmental measure adopted by a government,”394 it is important to keep in mind that the required 
scope on this particular issue may be further refined in the process of norm contestation. Here, the 
evolving System of Environmental-Economic Accounts (SEEA) developed under the UN could be 
helpful in the future, as its new Measurement Framework in Support of Sustainable Development and 
Green Economy Policy aims to “inform integrated policies, evaluate trade-offs between different policies 
and evaluate their impacts across domains of the economy, the environment and society.”395 
Also on the implementation of a measure within the required scope, the tribunal in Copper Mesa 
Mining v. Ecuador accepted the police powers defense argued by Ecuador as relevant, but found that 
although claimant could not establish legitimate expectations such as based on prior commitments made 
by the respondent, the respondent nevertheless implemented the termination resolution in an arbitrary 
manner and without due process. It thus did not accept the doctrine as critical defense in this case.396 For 
the same reason, the tribunal decided that though relevant, the general exception clause referred to by 
Ecuador was not able to successfully defend the action.397 In finding the measure was an unlawful 
expropriation as well as a breach of the FET standard of the treaty,  the tribunal underlined that “it is no 
answer for the respondent to assert that no such compensation, legal remedy or administrative review 
                                                     
394 Howard Mann, Private rights, public problems - A guide to NAFTA’s controversial chapter on investor rights  
(IISD and WWF  2001) at 89. 
395 UN Statistics, System of Environmental-Economic Accounts (SEEA) - Measurement Framework in Support of 
Sustainable Development and Green Economy Policy (n/a) at 4, available at:   
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/envaccounting/Brochure.pdf last accessed November 2017. 
396 Copper Mesa Mining Corporation (Canada) v. Republic of Ecuador; UNCITRAL; PCA Case No. 2012-2; 
Award, 15 March 2016, paragraph 6.66. 
397 The general exception clause in Article 8(3) of the BIT provided that such measures are not applied in an 
arbitrary or unjustifiable manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction on international trade or investment, 
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Contracting Party from adopting or maintaining measures, 
including environmental measures: 
(a) necessary to ensure compliance with laws and regulations that are not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; or 
(c) relating to the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources.” 
Respondent explained: “the Mining Mandate was adopted for the legitimate public policy purposes of protecting 
public health and the environment where the requirement to consult the local population on the basis of an EIS was 
specifically intended to protect the residents and local communities and to reduce the environmental impacts of 
mining activities. Ibid., paragraphs 6.15-16. 4.2. 
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were permitted, in theory, under the Mining Mandate or otherwise under its national laws: the Treaty, to 
which the Respondent had voluntarily agreed, imposed higher standards as a matter of international law; 
and it does not require an investor to pursue ineffective legal remedies when its goose is well and truly 
cooked.”398  
Thus, the tribunal underlined the important requirement of effective due process. In addition, this 
statement of the Copper Mesa Mining tribunal also echoes the S.D. Myers tribunal providing another 
reason for a tribunal to accept a reference to an environmental exception or defense as relevant but yet 
determine it as insufficient defense. Specifically, in the S.D. Myers case, with regards to Canada’s claim 
that the measure was in accordance with its domestic law and necessary to protect health and the 
environment,399 the tribunal recited the general principle contained in VCLT Article 27 that “a party may 
not invoke the provisions of its own internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty;” 400  and 
stated that “it did not suggest that national law is irrelevant, as it may be relevant in various ways but 
[that] the general principle of interpretation is clear.” 401  The tribunal in Metaclad Corp. v. Mexico also 
noted VCLT Articles 27 on internal laws not justifying compliance failure with a binding international 
treaty. That tribunal found, inter alia, that the municipality acted improper and outside its authority in 
denying Metalclad the local operation permit and that Metalclad relied on federal government authorities 
representation, which failed to ensure transparency (required under NAFTA Article 102(1)) by not clearly 
and promptly determining legal requirements for the full operation of investments.402  
The second feature among cases with environmental policy impermissible outcomes in which the 
tribunal accepted and considered environmental exception or defense references as relevant yet not as 
decisive defense concerns the issue of applicability of the exception or defense under the specific 
circumstances. In these cases, the rights granted to states in the referenced environmental exceptions were 
not infringed and alternative means were available to meet the policy objective. 
For example, in Metaclad Corp. v. Mexico, the tribunal considered Mexico’s reference403 to the 
environmental defense contained in NAFTA Article 1114 on environmental measures, which permits a 
Party to ensure that an investment activity is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns. 
However, the tribunal decided that its conclusion (that the municipality’s insistence upon and denial of 
the construction permit was improper) is not affected by NAFTA Article 1114, emphasizing that “the 
                                                     
398 Ibid., paragraph 6.69. 
399 S. D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA (UNCITRAL), Partial Award (13 November 2000), page 48, footnote 35 
(under paragraph 208). 
400 Ibid., paragraph 203. 
401 Ibid., page 46, footnote 34. 
402 Metaclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID (Additional Facility) [Final] Award, Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, paragraphs 76 
and 88. 
403 Metaclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID (Additional Facility) Respondent’s Counter Memorial,22 May 1998,  
paragraph 838. 
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issuance of the federal permits show clearly that Mexico was satisfied that this project was consistent 
with, and sensitive to, its environmental concerns.”404 A lesson to be learned from this case is the need to 
harmonize rules and requirements among different levels of governments and to ensure any application of 
the principle of subsidiary is coordinated with –and confirmed by– federal government.   
In in the S.D. Myers case, Canada argued even if the measure would have violated Article 1106 
(on performance requirements), the Articles’ specific environmental exceptions under NAFTA Articles 
1106(6)(b) and (c) would apply because the measure was necessary to protect human, animal or plant life 
or health or was necessary for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources. 
Although accepting the exception as relevant, the tribunal did not further consider it because it found no 
requirement was imposed on the investor that would constitute a breach of Article 1106 (on performance 
requirements).  
With regards to Canada’s claim that the measure was necessary to protect health and the 
environment,405 the S.D. Myers tribunal rejected Canada’s use of the customary necessity defense by 
observing that the requirements for necessity were not met, as alternative means to achieve the policy 
objective were available and encouraged.406 In the Tecmed v. Mexico case, the tribunal reached its 
conclusion based on the evidence that the measure taken, specifically “the resolution, [did] not specify 
any reasons of public interest, public use or public emergency that may justify it.”407 
The third feature among cases with environmental policy impermissible outcomes in which the 
tribunal accepted and considered environmental exception or defense references as relevant yet not as 
decisive defense concerns the issue of political circumstances and motivations. 
The Tecmed v. Mexico tribunal found that political circumstances rather than compliance or non-
compliance with the required permit’s conditions or the Mexican environmental protection laws had a 
decisive effect in the decision to deny the permit’s renewal.408 Considering “whether community pressure 
was so great as to lead to a serious emergency situation, social crisis or public unrest” the tribunal 
concluded the police powers doctrine did not apply as defense in this case as “the absence of any evidence 
that the operation of the landfill was a real or potential threat to the environment or to the public health, 
coupled with the absence of massive opposition, limits ‘community pressure’ to a series of events, which, 
although they amount to significant pressure on the Mexican authorities, do not constitute a real crisis or 
                                                     
404 Metaclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID (Additional Facility) [Final] Award, Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, paragraph 98. 
405 S.D. Myers Inc. vs. Canada, NAFTA (UNCITRAL), Partial Award (13 November 2000) page 48, footnote 35 
(under para 208). 
406 Ibid., paragraphs 212-213. 
407 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2); Award of 
the Tribunal (May 29, 2003) English (Translated) paragraphs 123-125. 
 
408 Ibid., paragraph 127. 
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disaster of great proportions, triggered by acts or omissions committed by the foreign investor or its 
affiliates.” 409   
The S.D. Myers tribunal applied an interpretation approach allowing for regulatory flexibility 
when it emphasized “the assessment of like circumstances must also take into account circumstances that 
would justify governmental regulations that treat them differently in order to protect the public 
interest.”410 However, the tribunal recognized that it was because they were in like circumstances, “the 
investor SDMI’s Canadian competitors lobbied the Minister of the Environment to ban exports when the 
US authorities opened the border.”411 In its examination of the export ban,412 the tribunal took note of 
lobbying activities by Canadian industry targeting the lead minister and subsequent statements by the lead 
minister,413 and reviewed documented evidence of exchanges that took place prior to the interim and final 
orders, including policy advise against the ban from Canadian federal and provincial politicians and 
government departments, (Environment, Foreign affairs and international trade, and a request for a note 
from the Department of Justice).  
Thus, the raw data inspection, just as performed for sustainable development references, provides 
valuable insights pointing to the status of norm contestation. 
Interpretation Approach: To recapitulate, the discussion above examined the raw data to find 
further insights regarding the two cases in which an environmental exception or defense reference was not 
accepted but nevertheless the outcome was environmental policy permissible; and conversely four cases 
in which an environmental exception or defense reference was accepted but the outcome was nevertheless 
environmental policy impermissible. These are highlighted in Table 7.11 below. 
                                                     
409 Ibid., paragraph 144. 
410 S.D. Myers Inc. vs. Canada, NAFTA (UNCITRAL), Partial Award (13 November 2000) paragraph 250. 
411 Ibid., paragraphs 251 and 296. 
412 Ibid., Chapter V. 
413 Ibid., paragraphs 161-192. 
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Table 7.11: Observed case outcomes of cases with observed reference to an environmental exception or 
defense as individual characteristic of horizontal integration as well as with observation regarding tribunal’s 
acceptance of such references 
 
Study 
Case No 
 
Environmental 
Exception or Defense 
 
EE/D 
accepted 
 
Environmental Policy 
Permissible Outcome 
 
2 1 1 1 
3 1 1 1 
6 1 1 1 
13 1 1 1 
18 1 1 1 
19 1 1 1 
21 1 1 1 
22 1 1 1 
25 1 1 1 
26 1 1 1 
7 1 0 1 
8 1 0 1 
4 1 1 0 
5 1 1 0 
15 1 1 0 
27 1 1 0 
1 1 0 0 
9 1 0 0 
10 1 0 0 
11 1 0 0 
23 1 0 0 
24 1 0 0 
TOTAL 22 14 12 
 
 
Concentrating for a moment on these specific cases, the tribunal’s interpretation approach taken 
in these cases does not seem to matter in a meaningful way for either group, as illustrated in Table 7.12 
below. In the two cases of the first group in which the environmental exception or defense was not 
accepted as relevant but the outcome was nevertheless environmental policy permissible, one tribunal 
took a systemic-integration interpretation approach the other a treaty-specific interpretation approach. 
Among the four cases of the second group in in which the environmental exception or defense was 
accepted as relevant but the outcome was nevertheless environmental policy impermissible, two tribunals 
took a systemic-integration interpretation approach the other two a treaty-specific interpretation approach. 
 170 
 
Table 7.12: Specific observed cases with observed references to environmental exception or defense, 
observations regarding tribunal’s acceptance of such references and interpretation approach taken and case 
outcomes 
 
Study 
case no 
 
 
Environmental 
exception  or 
defense 
 
EE/D 
accepted 
 
 
Systemic –integration 
Interpretation 
approach  
 
Environmental 
policy permissible 
outcome 
 
7 1 0 1 1 
8 1 0 0 1 
5 1 1 1 0 
27 1 1 1 0 
4 1 1 0 0 
15 1 1 0 0 
TOTAL 6 4 3 2 
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Neither did the tribunal’s interpretation approach taken in cases in which no environmental 
exception or defense was observed and hence none could have been accepted seem to matter in a 
meaningful way for the outcome of the case, as illustrated in Table 7.13 below. 
 
Table 7.13: Specific observed cases with neither reference to environmental exception or defense, nor 
acceptance thereof, and interpretation approach taken and case outcomes 
 
Study  
case no 
 
Environmental 
exception  or defense 
 
EE/D 
accepted 
 
Systemic-integration 
interpretation approach  
 
Environmental policy 
permissible outcome 
 
30 0 0 0 1 
12 0 0 0 1 
28 0 0 0 1 
14 0 0 1 1 
17 0 0 1 1 
29 0 0 1 1 
TOTAL 
6 not  
observed 
6 not 
observed 3 6 
 
 
However, Table 7.14 shows that in the 12 cases in which both a reference to environmental 
exception or defense and an environmental policy permissible outcome was observed, ten cases observed 
the tribunal took an interpretation approach of systemic integration and only two cases in which the 
tribunal applied a treaty-specific interpretation approach. 
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Table 7.14: Observed cases with environmental policy permissible outcomes and reference to environmental 
exception or defense and observations regarding tribunal’s interpretation approach 
 
Study 
case no 
 
EE/D Environmental 
exception  or defense 
 
Systemic- integration 
interpretation approach 
 
Environmental policy 
permissible outcome 
 
26 1 1 1 
6 1 1 1 
2 1 1 1 
19 1 1 1 
3 1 1 1 
13 1 1 1 
18 1 1 1 
21 1 1 1 
22 1 1 1 
7 1 1 1 
8 1 0 1 
25 1 0 1 
TOTAL 12 10 12 
 
 
And Table 7.15 below shows that in the ten cases in which a reference to an environmental 
exception or defense was made but an environmental policy impermissible outcome was observed, seven 
cases observed the tribunal applied a treaty-specific interpretation approach and three cases in which the 
tribunal took an interpretation approach of systemic integration. 
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Table 7.15: Observed cases with environmental policy impermissible outcomes and reference to 
environmental exception or defense and observations regarding tribunal’s interpretation approach 
 
Study 
case no 
 
EE/D Environmental 
exception  or defense 
 
Systemic integration 
interpretation approach 
 
Environmental policy 
impermissible outcome 
 
5 1 1 0 
27 1 1 0 
23 1 1 0 
4 1 0 0 
15 1 0 0 
24 1 0 0 
1 1 0 0 
10 1 0 0 
9 1 0 0 
11 1 0 0 
TOTAL 
 
10 
 
3 systemic-integration 
 and 7 treaty-specific 
10 
impermissible outcomes 
 
 
Drawing our attention back from the specific cases investigated to the overall observations in this 
study, Table 7.16 below illustrates the reasonable expectation that in cases where a reference to an 
environmental exception or defense is made and the tribunal applies a systemic-integration interpretation 
approach the environmental exception is likely to be accepted, as is an environmental policy permissible 
outcome. Similarly, a tribunal applying a treaty-specific interpretation approach is less likely to accept the 
environmental exception or defense resulting more likely in a policy impermissible outcome. Some of the 
cases not following this trend have been discussed in detail above, including the Metalclad, Tecmed and 
Biwater cases. 
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Table 7.16: Observed cases in which environmental exception or defense was made with observations 
regarding the tribunal’s acceptance of the references and interpretation approach as well as case outcome 
 
Study 
Case 
No 
Environmental 
exception or defense 
ccepted 
Systemic-integration 
interpretation 
approach 
Environmental policy  
ermissible outcome 
 
26 1 1 1 
6 1 1 1 
2 1 1 1 
19 1 1 1 
3 1 1 1 
13 1 1 1 
18 1 1 1 
21 1 1 1 
22 1 1 1 
5 1 1 1 
27 1 1 1 
25 1 0 1 
4 1 0 0 
15 1 0 0 
7 0 1 0 
23 0 1 0 
8 0 0 0 
24 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 
9 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 
TOTAL 14 13 12 
 
 
In conclusion, the data does not confirm that reference to an environmental exception or defense 
as specific horizontal integration characteristic has individually a clear influence on case outcomes. The 
data, however, does appear to support the hypothesis that a tribunal’s acceptance of the reference to an 
environmental exception or defense is associated with environmentally permissive outcomes. The 
observations also supported as reasonable the expectation that in cases where a reference to an 
environmental exception or defense is made and the tribunal applies a systemic-integration interpretation 
approach the environmental exception is likely to be accepted, as is an environmental policy permissible 
outcome. Similarly, a tribunal applying a treaty-specific interpretation approach is less likely to accept the 
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environmental exception or defense resulting more likely in a policy impermissible outcome. From the 
above, including the raw data inspection, we can summarize the following findings. Environmental 
exception or defense references as characteristic of the horizontal integration indicator: 
 
• should be made clearly and numerously where applicable and when possible at both levels of 
horizontal integration to increase the likelihood of acceptance; 
 
• where a case involves potentially expropriatory acts, even for an environmental purpose, the 
obligation to pay compensation remains and the environmental purpose behind the acts may 
influence the calculation of compensation, (where the amount should be reasonably related to the 
value of the property and should ensure that the investor does not bear a disproportional burden 
for the policy aim); 
 
• for an environmental exception or defense to be successfully accepted and applied in a case, the 
environmental purpose of a measure should be clearly identified, at best on the basis of science 
and international standards, and should be recognized by all levels of governments, including not 
just local but also federal government agencies; and 
 
• for an environmental exception or defense to be successfully accepted and applied in a case, the 
measure should be designed and implemented within a legitimate scope. 
 
That scope, based on the review of these cases, includes that: 
 
o an investor has access to an effective due process; 
 
o the measure is designed and implemented in a way that is not gravely unjust, 
discriminatory or based on corruption; 
 
o the measure is reasonable and proportional to the aim of the policy, whereby practical 
effects, alternative policy options should have been considered in the determination of the 
most cost-effective solution and least investment-effecting available alternative; 
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o the measure or regulation is implemented in a transparent and coherent manner to allow 
the investor to access information regarding legal rules and requirements, including 
potential changes thereof; and 
 
o the measure or regulation is implemented in good faith observation of the treaty, and 
follows the general principle contained in VCLT Article 27, that internal laws may not be 
used as justification of failure to perform a treaty. 
 
 
7.2.3  Reference to a Multilateral Environmental Agreement 
Reference to a Multilateral Environmental Agreement: The data does not confirm that reference to an 
MEA as specific horizontal integration characteristic has individually a very strong influence on case 
outcomes, however confirms a tendency of such influence when an MEA reference is also accepted by 
the tribunal. 
The study found 18 cases in which a reference to an MEA was observed. A slight tendency of a 
potential influence could be observed in Table 7.17 below, showing 13 of these cases had an 
environmental policy permissible outcome, and only five of these cases (or less than one third) had an 
environmental policy impermissible outcome.  
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Table 7.17: Cases with observed reference to an MEA and case outcomes 
 
Study 
Case No 
 
MEA 
reference 
 
Environmental Policy 
Permissible Outcome 
 
2 1 1 
3 1 1 
6 1 1 
7 1 1 
13 1 1 
14 1 1 
17 1 1 
19 1 1 
21 1 1 
22 1 1 
26 1 1 
29 1 1 
30 1 1 
1 1 0 
4 1 0 
5 1 0 
10 1 0 
24 1 0 
Total 18 13 
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No clear tendency is observed contrariwise in Table 7.18 below, which shows that in 11 cases in which no 
reference to an MEA was made a tiny majority of six cases had an environmental policy impermissible 
outcome. The sectors addressed in all these cases (including tourism, mining, waste management and 
manufacturing in chemical products) don’t differ between the two groups (with observed MEA references 
and with absence of MEA references) and thus do not indicate support for a possible explanation that 
MEA references only occur in cases related to industry sectors in which MEAs have substantially 
evolved. 
 
 
Table 7.18: Case outcomes of cases with no observed reference to an MEA 
 
Study 
Case No 
 
MEA 
reference 
 
Environmental policy 
permissible Outcome 
 
8 0 1 
12 0 1 
18 0 1 
25 0 1 
28 0 1 
9 0 0 
11 0 0 
15 0 0 
16 0 0 
23 0 0 
27 0 0 
Total 
 
11 
 
5 
(that is 6 impermissible) 
 
 
Acceptance of an MEA reference: Looking further at whether a tribunal’s acceptance of the 
reference to an MEA could illuminate further a tendency of a potential influence of this individual 
characteristic of horizontal integration on the outcome, the data seems more supportive of such expected 
influence. 
In the five cases (highlighted in Table 7.17 above) in which an MEA reference was made but an 
environmental policy impermissible outcome was observed, four cases show that the tribunal did not 
accept the reference and only in one case did the tribunal did accept the MEA reference. Table 7.19 below 
shows a tendency that where an MEA reference is made and accepted, the outcome is likely 
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environmental policy permissible. A tendency of an MEA reference on outcome is also supported in 
Table 7.20 showing that even in the 11 cases where an MEA reference was not accepted still seven cases 
showed an environmental policy permissible outcome. 
 
 
Table 7.19: Case outcomes of cases with observed reference to an MEA and acceptance by the tribunal 
 
Study 
Case No 
 
MEA 
reference 
 
MEA 
accepted 
 
Environmental policy 
permissible Outcome 
 
13 1 1 1 
14 1 1 1 
17 1 1 1 
19 1 1 1 
29 1 1 1 
30 1 1 1 
5 1 1 0 
TOTAL 7 6 
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Table 7.20: Case outcomes of cases with observed reference to an MEA but no acceptance by the tribunal 
 
Study 
Case No 
 
MEA 
reference 
 
MEA 
accepted 
 
Environmental policy 
permissible Outcome 
 
2 1 0 1 
3 1 0 1 
6 1 0 1 
7 1 0 1 
21 1 0 1 
22 1 0 1 
26 1 0 1 
1 1 0 0 
4 1 0 0 
10 1 0 0 
24 1 0 0 
 
TOTAL 
 
11 
MEA reference  
but not accepted 
7 
permissible 
 
 
 
Examining the raw data of S.D. Myers v. Canada (the highlighted case in Table 7.19 above), in 
which an MEA reference was made and accepted as relevant however not successful as ultimate defense 
in this case, provides useful insights to the status of norm contestation. In this case, Canada made the 
reference to its MEA obligations under the Basel Convention at the horizontal integration level 1 (treaty-
specific), because this MEA is specifically listed in NAFTA text as to prevail over NAFTA provisions in 
case of conflict.  
The Tribunal accepted its relevance to this case, however determined Canada’s defense based on 
the MEA obligation as unsuccessful. The tribunal came to this conclusion by: noting NAFTA Annex 104 
provides the Basel Convention would have priority if and when it was ratified by the NAFTA parties, and 
the US had not yet ratified; emphasizing that even if it was ratified by the US, the MEA obligation 
required Canada to choose among alternatives the option least inconsistent with NAFTA to meet its 
obligation; and noting that the Basel Convention did permit “the continuation of the Transboundary 
Agreement with its emphasis on including cross-border movements as a means to be considered in 
achieving the most cost-effective and environmentally sound solution to hazardous waste 
management.”414 Emphasizing that Canada had alternative policy options available, the tribunal 
                                                     
414 S.D. Myers Inc. vs. Canada, NAFTA (UNCITRAL), Partial Award (13 November 2000) paragraphs 213-215. 
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ultimately found the measure was not implemented within the requirements of the obligation to choose an 
available least trade restrictive alternative.   
Although this specific explanation of the tribunal’s conclusion suggests a treaty-specific reading, 
and as noted the MEA reference was made at the treaty-specific HI level 1, the tribunal in this case 
overall applied an interpretation approach of specific systematic integration and mutual supportiveness, in 
line with VCLT Article 31(1) and (2),415 which the tribunal recited as guidance for its interpretation.  
Though the interpretation approach in this case does not warrant further inspection, the interpretation 
technique applied in cases where a MEA reference was not accepted in relation to case outcome could 
further illuminate the tendency of this characteristic of our horizontal integration indicator displayed so 
far. 
Interpretation Approach: Examining the eleven cases captured in Table 7.20 above in which an 
MEA reference was made but not accepted shows that an expected influence of interpretation approach 
on case outcome seems to be confirmed. Table 7.21 below illustrates this. All seven such cases in which 
the tribunal applied a systemic-integration interpretation approach concurred with an environmental 
policy permissible outcome, and all four such cases in which the tribunal applied a treaty-specific 
integration interpretation approach concurred with an environmental policy impermissible outcome. 
                                                     
415 Ibid., paragraphs 201 and 202. Specifically reciting only VCLT Article 31(1) and (2)(a) and (b) but not (3)(c) 
hence suggesting a level 1 focus (on the treaty text) in the interpretation. 
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Table 7.21: Case outcomes of all observed cases with MEA reference made but not accepted with 
interpretation approach 
 
Study 
Case No 
 
MEA 
reference 
 
MEA 
accepted 
 
Systemic-integration  
Interpretation approach 
 
Environmental policy 
permissible Outcome 
 
2 1 0 1 1 
3 1 0 1 1 
6 1 0 1 1 
7 1 0 1 1 
21 1 0 1 1 
22 1 0 1 1 
26 1 0 1 1 
1 1 0 0 0 
4 1 0 0 0 
10 1 0 0 0 
24 1 0 0 0 
TOTAL 
 
 
11  
MEA reference but 
not accepted 
 
7  
systemic-integration interpretation  
concurrent with permissible outcome 
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Looking at the raw data to detect a possible influence of interpretation approach on the 
acceptance of the MEA, the four cases in which tribunal the applied a treaty-specific integration 
interpretation approach concurred with an environmental policy impermissible outcome confirm this 
expectation. More specifically, a common feature in these cases is that the MEA reference was not at 
horizontal integration level 1 (treaty-specific). Some of these cases also presented fairly recent or new 
elements entering ongoing norm contestation in the economic-environment nexus of relevant regimes, 
such as the human rights-based approach and the ‘community core values’ approach. And the references 
in these cases were not made by the responding state. In one case the reference was made by the claimants 
accusing deviation from established standard principles in MEAs. It is unclear, whether a tribunal 
applying a systemic-integration interpretation approach would have been more likely to accept these 
specific MEA references as ultimate defense of actions taken by the responding state. In the Glamis Gold 
Ltd. v. USA case for example one amici submission, which also made several MEA references at level 2 
of horizontal integration (non-treaty specific), called on the tribunal to take a human rights-based 
approach416 in the interpretation of the case. This the tribunal, which ultimately took a systemic-
integration interpretation approach, however rejected by emphasizing its case-specific mandate. 
Furthermore, in one exceptional case among this group the data is not conclusive with regards to the 
interpretation technique.  
For example, in the Ethyl v. Canada case, Canada made an MEA reference at level 2 of 
horizontal integration. It did so by noting that a key component of international agreements to which 
Canada had committed itself in order to stabilize or reduce emissions of airborne pollutants, (including 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Protocols on VOCs and NOx and Canada-U.S. 
discussions concerning NOx and other transboundary pollutants) is the requirement for minimum national 
emission control standards for automobiles based upon the best available vehicle technology or specified 
emission control levels.417 However, in this exceptional case in this study the interpretation technique 
employed by the tribunal remains unconfirmed as the case was settled and did not reach an award on 
merits. Based on the award on jurisdiction only, acceptance of the MEA reference cannot be confirmed 
and one could argue the tribunal took a treaty-specific interpretation approach with a focus on an 
economic objective.418 For example, in its award on jurisdiction the tribunal implied a reluctance to 
                                                     
416 For an overview of the human right- based approach to foreign investment and biological and cultural diversity, 
see for example E. JORGE VIÑUALES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW   (Cambridge University Press. 2015) Chapter 8. 
417 Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, UNICTRAL, Statement of Defense, 27 November 1997, Notice of Intent to 
Submit a Claim to Arbitration, 10 September 1997, paragraphs 42-43, available at: http://www.naftalaw.org. 
418 Some may even argue a potential institutional biased based on jurisdictional assertion. However, without 
reaching the merits phase it is unclear what ultimate interpretation approach this tribunal would have taken in this 
case. 
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dismiss the claim despite several environmental policy-relevant arguments made by the responding and 
third party states.419  
In the Metalclad v. Mexico case the respondent referred to the North American Agreement on 
Environmental Co-operation (NAAEC) in its counter memorial, noting NAAEC’s preamble “includes 
reconfirming the importance of the environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA, including 
enhanced levels of environmental protection and emphasizing the importance of public participation in 
conserving and enhancing the environment.”420 The tribunal did not refer to this NAAC reference and 
instead took a narrow reading of NAFTA’s objectives stressing the economic over the environmental 
elements. 
On fairly recent approaches entering norm contestation in the economic-environment nexus of 
relevant regimes the following two cases are illustrative.  
Only when considering the current human-rights based approach taking place in MEAs and 
related regimes, which this study did not disregard, the Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona 
S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentina case observes that the amici made arguably an MEA 
reference at the horizontal integration level 2. Specifically, the amici brief discussed human rights law 
implicated in this case, including: “the right to water is essential for sustaining human life, protected 
under Article 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;” “Article 
14(2)(h) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women requiring 
States to take appropriate measures to ensure women’s right “[t]o enjoy adequate living conditions, 
particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, electricity and water supply;” and Article 12 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, requiring States to protect “the right of the child to the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of health” through appropriate measures ‘[t]o combat disease [...] 
through [...] the provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking water.’”421 It further noted that, 
inter alia: “The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on 
Human Rights protect the right to water in order to ensure the right to life.”422 The amici emphasized that 
“in light of the primacy of human rights law, a conflict of norms would be resolved in this case by 
justifying the treatment given to the water concessionaire on the basis of the human rights obligations of 
                                                     
419 Canada settled the case on July 20, 1998 by: paying Ethyl $13 million for costs and lost profits while the Act was 
in place; withdrawing the legislation that Ethyl opposed; and giving Ethyl a letter to use as it saw fit saying there 
was no scientific evidence of any health risk of MMT or any impact on car exhaust systems. 
420 Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID (Additional Facility) Respondent’s Counter Memorial,22 May 1998,  
paragraphs 838-9. 
421 Amici curiae submission ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 (April 4, 2007), reprinted in: University of Toronto, 
Faculty of Law, International Human Rights Program and CIEL: “Guide for Potential Amici in International 
Investment Arbitration,” January 2014, pages 63-4, available at 
http://ciel.org/Publications/Guide_PotentialAmici_Full_Jan2014.pdf (accessed 9/15/2016). 
422 Ibid. 
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the host State.”423 The tribunal noted the relevance but rejected the argument based on human rights law 
because Argentina could have respected both the BIT and human rights law in this case. 
The remaining two other cases of this group are exceptional in that in one the respondent called 
on adherence with MEAs and related principles.  
In the Claytons and Bilcon v. Canada case, it was claimants rather than Canada that critically 
referenced the Kyoto Protocol and principles found in other international instruments, such as the 
principle to consider traditional knowledge. Specifically claimants criticized “that the final Environmental 
Impact Study (EIS) departed substantially from the expected scientific and technical focus of an EIS, and 
also required Bilcon to address non-scientific and non-technical questions;” and “these requirements 
included a distorted precautionary principle, the influence of the NAFTA and the Kyoto Protocol on the 
Whites Point Quarry, the need to consider traditional knowledge, a strong emphasis on sustainable 
development, a more stringent ecosystem analysis approach, cumulative effects, as well as other improper 
considerations.”424 In their critic, claimants successively argued that “in relying on outside factors (such 
as public involvement, ecosystem approach, sustainable development, an improperly expansive 
precautionary principle, community core values and effects on future similar projects under the NAFTA), 
the Joint Review Panel taking actions in this case exceeded its Terms of Reference and effectively 
‘advance[d] its own view of environmental law reform.’”425  
Since cases in which no reference to an MEA was made, none could have by definition been 
accepted by the tribunal. Those cases are not further considered in this part of the analysis. 
In conclusion, from the above we can summarize the following findings. The data does not 
strongly support that reference to an MEA has individually a very strong influence on case outcomes, 
however confirms a tendency of such influence when an MEA reference is also accepted by a tribunal.  
References to MEA obligations as defense of an environmental policy is more likely to be considered by 
a tribunal when that MEA is ratified by all parties that are also party to the economic treaty. However, the 
study also found that in practice even if the MEA lacks ratification by all parties that are also party to the 
economic treaty, such may still be considered by a tribunal.426 
                                                     
423 Ibid. 
424 William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware Inc. 
v. Government of Canada, 1976 UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-04 (2015); NAFTA, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Liability, March 17, 2015, paragraph 201. 
425 Ibid., paragraph 214. 
426 In Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Spain the tribunal referenced the Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, February 25, 1991, (under the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE) to which only Spain but neither Argentina nor Chile are parties and the dispute 
was brought under the Spain-Argentina BIT (and the Spain-Chile BIT). The tribunal did so when it noted “the 
Environmental Impact Assessment procedure is basic for the adequate protection of the environment and the 
application of appropriate preventive measures. This is true, not only under Spanish and EEC law, but also 
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When referencing to MEA obligations as defense of an environmental policy, even at horizontal 
integration level 1, the state must still ensure that its measure meets the specific scope of such MEA 
obligations in relation to the economic treaty. Such was identified in the S.D. Myers v. Canada case in the 
relevant NAFTA provision to mean that the state should consider alternative measures and choose an 
option least inconsistent with NAFTA. Similarly, the tribunal in Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de 
Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentina implied alternative measures available to 
Argentina when emphasizing that Argentina could have respected both its obligations under the BIT and 
under human rights law in this case. 
As the Claytons and Bilcon v. Canada case showed, (in which Canada was found to have violated 
treaty provisions, because its environmental measure was not implemented in conformity of its own 
laws),427 when a government wishes to set a new environmental policy,428  including new procedures for 
environmental assessments, legal process must still be followed. The tribunal stressed that Canada can set 
demanding and broad environmental standards and can vest any mandate in various administrative bodies. 
The tribunal thus clarified that Canada’s legislator could have adopted different environmental 
assessments and processes than they had in place at the time of the Project, which in this case it did not. 
In addition, as was the case in the other characteristics of the horizontal integration indicator, due process 
must be followed. And in this case the tribunal noted that the government failed to ensure that investors’ 
experts that were invited to hearings concerning policy design and implementation were also given an 
effective opportunity to respond to questions.429 
The take from the descriptive findings from the data review so far suggests that of the three 
characteristics of horizontal integration an MEA reference especially when accepted, appears to show the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
increasingly so under international law”. Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/7); ICSID arbitration rules; BIT Spain - Argentina 1991 (and BIT Spain – Chile 1991); (Award, November 
13, 2000) at 22 footnote 17. 
427 The Tribunal stressed it “is not suggesting that there is the slightest issue with the level of protection for the 
environment provided in the laws of Canada and Nova Scotia. Each is free under NAFTA to adopt laws that are 
as demanding as they choose in exercising their sovereign authority. Canada and Nova Scotia have both adopted 
high standards. There can be absolutely no issue with that under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA. The Tribunal’s concern 
is actually that the rigorous and comprehensive evaluation defined and prescribed by the laws of Canada was not in 
fact carried out.“ The tribunal noted the that instead of not following its own laws, Canada had other choices: “It 
was open under NAFTA for legislatures to adopt different environmental assessment standards and processes than 
they had in place at the time of the Bilcon Project. Nova Scotia lawmakers could, for example, have provided that 
local governments must approve the project or that it could not proceed without support in a local referendum. 
Federal Canada could by legislation have relaxed its requirement that to be assessable, an effect must have a 
biophysical pathway.” It explained: “the problem in this case is whether the Investors’ application was assessed in a 
manner that complied with the laws that Canada and Nova Scotia actually chose to adopt. The Tribunal has 
considered all the evidence from participants and experts on both sides, and concluded, based on the reports of two 
highly experienced and respected experts in Canadian environmental law that there was in fact a fundamental 
departure from the methodology required by Canadian and Nova Scotia law.”  Ibid., paragraphs 598-601. 
428 Ibid., paragraph 214. 
429 Ibid., paragraph 553. 
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clearest tendency of influence on dispute outcomes. The next section of this analysis addresses the tests 
conducted regarding the findings above. 
7.2.4 Testing of findings 
The above analyzed observations are generally confirmed by the calculations of the delta measure for the 
occurrence of contradictions. However, the test results suggest a slight difference in the order of 
importance. 
Calculations of the measure for the occurrence of contradictions regarding the hypothesis that a 
reference to sustainable development made and accepted could have an influence on the dispute outcome 
resulted in a ∆1 of 0.07. This indicates a balance between co-occurrence and contradictions, however with 
a slight tendency of stronger observations of co-occurrences. 
Calculations of the measure for the occurrence of contradictions regarding the hypothesis that a 
reference to an MEA made and accepted could have an influence on the dispute outcome resulted in a ∆1 
of 0.22. This indicates still nearly a balance between co-occurrences and contradictions however with a 
good visible tendency of stronger observations of co-occurrences. 
The strongest support was found for my hypothesis that a reference to an environmental 
exception of defense made and accepted by the tribunal could have an influence on the case outcome. For 
that specific characteristic, the calculated ∆1 of 0.43 indicates a strong visible tendency of observations of 
co-occurrences.  
The above findings of the initial description of the data are further in line with the results of the 
Boolean analysis approach and resulting equations.  
Cases with an environmental policy permissible outcome co-occurred with specific horizontal 
integration characteristic combinations of: 
 
• reference to an environmental exception or defense made and accepted as defense and reference 
to an MEA was made but still not accepted and the tribunal taking a systemic-integration 
interpretation approach; or 
 
• reference to sustainable development and to an environmental exception or defense made and 
accepted and the tribunal still taking a treaty-specific interpretation approach; or 
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• reference to sustainable development and to an MEA made and accepted and the tribunal taking a 
systemic-integration interpretation approach; or 
 
• reference to an MEA was made and accepted no matter what interpretation approach was taken 
by the tribunal; or 
 
• reference to sustainable development and to an environmental exception or defense made but 
neither was still accepted and showing a treaty-specific interpretation approach was taken by the 
tribunal; or 
 
• references to sustainable development, an environmental exception or defense and an MEA made 
with still only the sustainable development reference accepted and the tribunal taking a systemic-
integration interpretation approach; or 
 
• reference to an environmental exception or defense made and accepted even if reference to an 
MEA was not accepted and the tribunal taking a systemic-integration interpretation approach; or 
 
• references to an environmental exception or defense and an MEA made with still only the 
environmental exception or defense reference accepted and the tribunal taking a systemic-
integration interpretation approach. 
 
The results of the Boolean equations show that the alternative explanation of interpretation 
approach taken by a tribunal, for which the calculated ∆1 of 0.428 also indicates a strong visible tendency 
of observations of co-occurrences, must be taken into account here as well. Several characteristic 
combinations co-occurring with the outcome of interest include a combination of a systemic-integration 
interpretation approach with the characteristic of environmental exception or defense made and accepted. 
However, the interpretation approach taken cannot be said to be at play alone, because combinations of a 
treaty-specific interpretation approach with reference to sustainable development and to an environmental 
exception or defense made whether accepted or not also showed co-occurrence with environmental policy 
permissible outcomes. In addition, cases where a reference to an MEA was made and accepted no matter 
what interpretation approach was taken by the tribunal also co-occurred with the outcome of interest. 
Finally, an important Boolean equation result shows that cases in which none of the horizontal 
integration characteristics were present and the tribunal was taking a treaty-specific interpretation 
approach also co-occurred with an environmental policy permissible outcome. The last observation is 
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particularly important and requires further elaboration. Looking at the raw data of the two specific cases 
in which this surprising scenario was observed reveals what other features of the cases mattered, namely 
the facts of the contractual nature of the dispute. In the Robert Azinian and others v. Mexico, the tribunal 
emphasized the contractual nature of the case, noting that: “NAFTA does not allow investors to seek 
international arbitration for mere contractual breaches;”430 and “the critical distinction between 
expropriation and an ordinary breach of contract is to be made.” 431  
In the only other case with this surprising combination, Waste Management, Inc. v. United 
Mexican States II, the tribunal did address contractual issues, noting “that it is one thing to expropriate a 
right under a contract and another to fail to comply with the contract; non-compliance by a government 
with contractual obligations is not the same thing as, or equivalent or tantamount to, an expropriation; and 
in the case the claimant did not lose its contractual rights.”432 However, the tribunal stressed in its 
conclusion that: 
 
“it is not the function of international law of expropriation as reflected in NAFTA Article 
1110 to eliminate the normal commercial risks of a foreign investor, or to place on Mexico the 
burden of compensating for the failure of a business plan which was, in the circumstances, 
founded on too narrow a client base and dependent for its success on unsustainable assumptions 
about customer uptake and contractual performance; a failing enterprise is not expropriated just 
because debts are not paid or other contractual obligations are not fulfilled; and the position may 
be different if the available legal avenues for redress are blocked or are evidently futile in the 
face of governmental intransigence. But this was not the case here.” 433   
 
This important observation underlines that elements of facts, evidence and applicable law are 
overriding features influencing the outcome of a case. These elements are also captured in the illustration 
presented in chapter 2 on my theoretical framework, where I showed why a precise influence of the 
characteristics of the theorized indicators on the case outcome was not intended in this study. Rather, this 
explorative research aimed at: inspecting whether such theoretical influences may exist, showing that 
such influences are best understood in an interactive way, and illustrating this based on observations 
made. 
                                                     
430 Robert Azinian and others v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2), Award of the Tribunal 
(November 1, 1999), paragraph 87. 
431 Ibid., paragraph 90. 
432 Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States; ICSID Additional Facility Arbitration Rules; ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/3; NAFTA; Award April 30, 2004, paragraph 175. 
433 Ibid., paragraph 177. 
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7.3 TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION 
7.3.1 Transparency 
An important caveat of this study concerns the difficult data collection process and the data entry of the 
characteristics of the transparency indicator with some data entries of presence being indefinite or not 
easily replicable.  
First, regarding the specific characteristics of document access during proceedings for example, 
the data entry for the Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania case is indefinite but ultimately was determined as 
“present, in part.” This is because Tanzania published some documents initially before the tribunal 
ordered: no restrictions on a party publishing its own submissions but restrictions on publication of 
minutes or opponents’ submissions, among others, during the course of the proceedings. Specifically in 
its Procedural Order No. 3, which came after the initial public disclosure activities by Tanzania, the 
tribunal recommended “for the duration of these arbitration proceedings, and in the absence of any 
agreement between the parties that all parties refrain from disclosing to third parties: the minutes or 
record of any hearings; any of the documents produced in the arbitral proceedings by the opposing party, 
whether pursuant to a disclosure exercise or otherwise; any of the Pleadings or Written Memorials (and 
any attached witness statements or expert reports); and any correspondence between the parties and/or the 
Arbitral Tribunal exchanged in respect of the arbitral proceedings.”434 
Second, data entries of publications of the intent to arbitrate and the final award cannot always be 
replicated by reference to the institutional website administering a case. For example, when a case is 
followed up by annulment procedures, the ICSID website will change the status of the case from 
“concluded” to “pending,” whereby previously available links to the documents disappear pending the 
conclusion of these proceedings. 
Third, data entries of “presence” of a characteristic of the transparency indicator include: cases in 
which documents are found on the internet as having occurred during the course of proceedings, as well 
as on the state department website of parties to the invoked economic treaty, or other data bases such as 
italaw.com. However, the exact time of publishing of such documents on such websites is not available.  
Fourth, while the wider public may be informed of a case when such is announced in well-
established and widely distributed newspapers, such as the Financial or New York Times, a case may well 
                                                     
434 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. (U.K.) v. United Republic of Tanzania ICSID (W. Bank) ICSID, ARB/05/22, 
Procedural Order No. 3, 29 September 2006, paragraphs 140-167. 
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go unnoticed when information is published on academic or specified institutional websites, such as under 
UNCTAD. 
Taking these limitations into account, Table 7.22 shows that among the three characteristics of 
the transparency indicator, public notice of intent and publication of final award are observed in most 
cases with few exceptions.435 This lack of variance undermines the value of calculating the measure delta 
for the occurrence of contradictions. Rather than confirming support for the hypothesis that the individual 
transparency characteristics of public notice of intent and publication of final award could have an 
influence on dispute outcome, the observed situation is best explained by the data collection problem of 
these characteristics in this study.  
For example, no variance on publication of final award and limited variance on notice of intent is 
the result of the research design and limited institutional transparency provisions. Since the research 
design required data with a case outcome, existing cases in the real world for which the researcher could 
not access any published final award informing of the outcome have not been considered in the study.  In 
Karl Popper’s sense of the word, there may well be a black swan out there.  
Compared to sighting a black swan the study’s observation that, where no public notice of intent 
is observed no document access during proceedings is observed, is unexciting and merely in line with the 
expectation that where the public is not aware of a case, the public is unable to request document access 
during the proceedings.  
These general observations explain further examination of document access during proceedings 
in relation to case outcome. 
                                                     
435 Cases in which no public notice of intent is observed include: Saar Papier Vertriebs GmbH v. Poland and Grand 
River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. USA, both which observed no administering institution; and Copper 
Mesa Mining Corporation (Canada) v. Ecuador, which is a UNCITRAL case administered by the PCA.  
Cases in which the data observed on the Final Award is indefinite though entered as public include: Saar Papier 
Vertriebs GmbH v. Poland; and Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de 
Barcelona S.A. and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. Argentine Republic in which the award is no 
longer available on the website of the administrating institution because annulment proceedings have commenced 
and are pending at the time of writing. 
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Table 7.22: Case outcomes and observed characteristics of the transparency indicator 
 
Study 
Case No 
 
Public Notice 
of Intent 
 
Document access 
during proceedings 
 
Publication of 
Final Award 
 
Environmental policy 
permissible Outcome 
 
19 1 1 1 1 
6 1 1 1 1 
7 1 1 1 1 
26 1 1 1 1 
25 1 1 1 1 
13 1 0 1 1 
14 1 0 1 1 
17 1 0 1 1 
29 1 0 1 1 
2 1 0 1 1 
3 1 0 1 1 
21 1 0 1 1 
22 1 0 1 1 
18 1 0 1 1 
8 1 0 1 1 
12 1 0 1 1 
28 1 0 1 1 
30 0 0 1 1 
5 1 1 1 0 
24 1 1 1 0 
1 1 0 1 0 
4 1 0 1 0 
10 1 0 1 0 
23 1 0 1 0 
27 0 0 1 0 
16 0 0 1 0 
11 1 0 1 0 
9 1 0 1 0 
15 1 0 1 0 
Total 26 7 29 18 
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The study observed 18 cases with an environmental policy permissible outcome. Table 7.23 
below shows that among all 17 cases with an environmental policy permissible outcome and where notice 
of intent was observed (thus request for document access was possible), five cases observed document 
access during the proceedings of the dispute. The study observed 11 cases with an environmental policy 
impermissible outcome. Table 7.24 below shows that among all nine cases with an environmental policy 
impermissible outcome and where notice of intent was observed (thus request for document access was 
possible), two cases observed document access during the proceedings of the dispute. 
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Table 7.23: Cases with an environmental policy permissible outcome and with notice of intent observed as 
well as observed instances of document access during proceedings 
 
Study 
Case No 
 
Document access 
during proceedings 
 
Environmental policy 
permissible Outcome 
 
19 1 1 
6 1 1 
7 1 1 
26 1 1 
25 1 1 
13 0 1 
14 0 1 
17 0 1 
29 0 1 
2 0 1 
3 0 1 
21 0 1 
22 0 1 
18 0 1 
8 0 1 
12 0 1 
28 0 1 
TOTAL  5 17 
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Table 7.24: Cases with environmental impermissible outcomes and with notice of intent observed as well as 
instances of observed document access during proceedings 
 
Study 
Case No 
 
No document access 
during proceedings 
 
Environmental policy 
impermissible Outcome 
 
5 1 0 
24 1 0 
1 0 0 
4 0 0 
10 0 0 
23 0 0 
9 0 0 
11 0 0 
15 0 0 
TOTAL  
 
2 
 
9 
impermissible outcome 
 
 
This illustrates only a slight tendency of stronger observations of co-occurrences regarding my 
hypothesis that document access during proceedings could have an influence on dispute outcome. 
Inspecting this statement further with the delta measure for the occurrence of contradictions confirms this 
observation. The calculations result of a ∆1 of 0.08 indicates a balance between co-occurrence and 
contradictions, however with a slight tendency of stronger observations of co-occurrences. 
This result seems to offer a rather weak support for my hypothesis regarding the transparency 
characteristic of document access during proceedings, especially when compared to result the calculations 
results of a ∆1 of 0.32 for my idea that public notice of intent could have an influence on dispute outcome 
is observed. 
Yet as noted above, the usefulness of such comparison must be treated with caution because of 
the practical significance of the specific transparency indicator observations with limited diversity. 
Therefore, it is important to stress that the influence of the document access characteristic of the 
transparency indicator on the case outcome is best understood in an interactive way. In this regard the 
presence of this characteristic in combination with characteristics of the other indicators, especially public 
representation and participation must be further examined. 
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Table 7.25: Cases with environmental permissible outcomes and observations regarding document access 
during proceedings, an acceptance of an amici curiae and the granting of observer status 
 
 
Study 
case 
no 
 
Document 
access during 
proceedings 
 
Amici 
Curiae 
Accepted 
 
Observer 
status 
Granted 
 
Environmental 
policy permissible 
Outcome 
 
6 1 1 1 1 
7 1 1 0 1 
26 1 1 1 1 
19 1 0 0 1 
25 1 0 0 1 
2 0 1 1 1 
30 0 1 1 1 
3 0 0 0 1 
8 0 0 0 1 
12 0 0 0 1 
13 0 0 0 1 
14 0 0 0 1 
17 0 0 0 1 
18 0 0 0 1 
21 0 0 0 1 
22 0 0 0 1 
28 0 0 0 1 
29 0 0 0 1 
TOTAL 
 
5 
 
5 
 
4 
 
18 
 
Table 7.25 above provides an overview of cases with environmental permissible outcomes and 
observations regarding document access during proceedings, an acceptance of an amici curiae and the 
granting of observer status. Two cases occurred where document access during proceedings was observed 
although no amici curiae submission was observed. Thus, document access during proceedings is not 
dependent on an amici application requesting such access. In fact, inspection of the raw data revealed that 
not every amici application does specify a request to access documents during proceedings, nor to be 
granted observer status during hearings. And, in cases where such specific request is made in an amici 
application, neither document access during proceedings nor observer status during hearings is 
necessarily granted.  
Moreover, examining the raw data does not confirm, that all amici would be necessarily 
interested in full transparency. For example, in the Glamis Gold v. USA case, one amici from the Quechan 
Council requested confidentiality. The tribunal in this case referred to a 2003 statement by the NAFTA 
 197 
Free Trade Commission (FTC) “that ‘nothing in the NAFTA imposes a general duty of confidentiality”. 
The tribunal also noted that “the FTC explained that each Party agreed to make available to the public all 
documents submitted in a NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute—including documents by non-disputing parties ---
subject to redaction,’” and explained “it was not willing to grant a request to keep the entire report 
confidential” but would consider requests for sections of the report to be redacted”.436 
Table 7.26 below shows cases with environmental impermissible outcomes and observations 
regarding document access during proceedings, an acceptance of an amici curiae and the granting of 
observer status. Two cases occurred where document access during proceedings was observed although 
no amici curiae submission was observed which is in line with the earlier observation that document 
access during proceedings seems not to necessitate an amici application requesting such access. And the 
raw data reveals that where an amici application does specifically request access to documents during 
proceedings and to be granted observer status during hearings, neither request may necessarily be granted 
by a tribunal. 
 
Table 7.26: Cases with environmental impermissible outcomes and observations regarding document access 
during proceedings, an acceptance of an amici curiae and the granting of observer status 
 
Study 
case 
no 
 
Document 
access during 
proceedings 
 
Amici 
curiae 
Accepted 
 
Observer 
status 
Granted 
 
Environmental policy 
impermissible 
Outcome 
 
5 1 0 0 0 
24 1 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 
9 0 0 0 0 
10 0 1 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 
16 0 0 0 0 
23 0 0 0 0 
27 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 2 1 1 
11  
impermissible 
 
The study confirms the practice that it is parties who ultimately determine whether access to 
documents during proceedings shall be granted. Generally state parties to relevant treaties specify therein 
                                                     
436 Glamis Gold Ltd. V. USA; ad hoc Tribunal; UNICTRAL; NAFTA; Award, (16 May 2009) paragraphs 589-97. 
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dispute settlement mechanisms, applicable arbitration rules and procedures. State parties can also 
subsequently amend these. Dependent on these rules, disputing parties during case procedures can agree 
or object to document access. For example, in Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and 
Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, (specified ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19) five non-
governmental organizations, filed a “Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae,” 
which claimants opposed and the respondent supported. The petitioners asserted that the case involved 
matters of basic public interest and the fundamental rights of people living in the area affected by the 
dispute in the case,” and “requested the tribunal to allow petitioners: access to the hearings in the case; 
opportunity to present legal arguments as amicus curiae; and timely, sufficient, and unrestricted access to 
all of the documents in the case”.437  The tribunal made several comments on the amici curiae petitioner’s 
request for access to records during the proceedings, which it ultimately denied. The tribunal explained 
that “the purpose in seeking access to the record is to enable a nonparty to act as amicus curiae in a 
meaningful way,” and decided to “defer a decision on petitioners’ request for access to documents until 
such time as the tribunal grants leave to a non-disputing party to file an amicus curiae brief.”438 In 
response to the later petition for an amici curiae submission, the tribunal, inter alia: 
• noted the subsequent “revision of the ICSID Arbitration Rules439 on amicus curiae did not deal 
with the amicus curiae’s access to the record and thus provided no guidance”;  
 
• suggested “as a general proposition, an amicus curiae must have sufficient information on the 
subject matter of the dispute to provide “perspectives, expertise and arguments”;  
 
• observed “in this case, the petitioners had sufficient information even without being granted 
access to the arbitration record”; 
  
                                                     
437 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/19; (Order in response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, May 
19, 2005), paragraph 1. 
438 Ibid., paragraphs 30 and 33 
439 Specifically the revised 2006 ICSID Arbitration Rules read: “After consulting both parties, the Tribunal may 
allow a person or entity that is not a party to the dispute (in this Rule called the “non- disputing party”) to file a 
written submission with the Tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute. In determining whether to 
allow such a filing, the Tribunal shall consider, among other things, the extent to which: (a) the non-disputing party 
submission would assist the Tribunal in the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding by 
bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the disputing parties; (b) the 
non-disputing party submission would address a matter within the scope of the dispute; (c) the non-disputing party 
has a significant interest in the proceeding. The Tribunal shall ensure that the non-disputing party submission does 
not disrupt the proceeding or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either party, and that both parties are given an 
opportunity to present their observations on the non-disputing party submission”. 
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• emphasized that “the role of an amicus curiae is not to challenge the arguments or evidence put 
forward by parties” but rather to “provide their perspective, expertise, arguments”; 
  
• referred to the tribunal’s earlier Decision on Jurisdiction on this case which contained information 
about the nature of the claims being advanced by parties; and 
 
• “dispensed with resolving the general question of a non-party’s access to the record”.440 
 
In conclusion, from the above we can summarize the following findings: 
Of the three characteristics of the transparency indicator only ‘document access during 
proceedings’ shows a meaningful variance in the data. Most cases observed ‘information about 
commencement of arbitration provided’ and all cases observed ‘publication of Final Award’. Therefore, 
support for the hypotheses of potential influence on dispute outcomes cannot be found for these two 
characteristics. The observations do not suggest that if all transparency characteristics are observed the 
case outcome would necessarily be environmental policy permissible, a scenario which was observed five 
times. Such cases with an environmental policy impermissible outcome observed two times. Finally, 
when the specific characteristic of document access during proceedings was observed only a slight 
tendency of potential influence on dispute outcome could be seen. 
Document access during proceedings only occurs when knowledge of the commencement of a 
dispute is publicly available. This confirms the assumption that only when the public is aware of a case 
can access to documents during proceedings be requested. However, such request for documents during 
proceedings to be made available is not always observed, nor is its success. 
Document access during proceedings in combination with public representation and participation 
indicator characteristics of amicus curiae accepted and observer status granted always observed an 
environmental policy permissible outcome. This observation supports the idea that document access 
during proceedings can strengthen public representation and participation. However, some cases also 
observed an environmental policy permissible outcome where no access to documents during proceedings 
was observed yet these combined characteristics of the public representation and participation indicator 
were present.  
                                                     
440 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/19; (Order in response to a petition by five non-governmental organizations for permission to 
make an amicus curiae submission), February 12, 2007, paragraph 24-5. 
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7.3.2 Testing of transparency characteristic combined with public representation and 
participation findings 
The above findings are further in line with the results of the test results based on a Boolean 
analysis approach and resulting equations.  Cases with an environmental policy permissible outcome co-
occurred with specific combinations of relevant characteristics of the transparency and public 
representation and participation indicators. These are characteristic combinations of: 
 
• document access during proceedings no matter whether an amici curiae was accepted or not and 
no observer status was granted and the tribunal taking a systemic-integration interpretation 
approach; or 
 
• a combination of neither public notice of intent nor document access during proceedings provided 
and an amici curiae accepted and observer status granted and a treaty-specific interpretation 
approach was taken by the tribunal; or 
 
• public notice of intent observed and amicus curiae accepted and observer status granted and a 
tribunal taking a systemic-integration interpretation approach; or 
 
• observing only public notice of intent among these specified relevant characteristics of the 
transparency and public representation and participation indicators. 
 
The first combination, with cases where the public representation and participation characteristics 
are absent, highlights again that the alternative explanation of a systemic-integration interpretation 
approach taken by the tribunal is notable. The next combinations listed indicate that neither interpretation 
approach taken nor document access during proceedings seem to matter when both amici curiae petitions 
and observer status are granted. With regards to the final combination, I can infer, based on my strong 
familiarity with the data, that since most cases observed public notice of intent the equation basically 
points to the fact that cases where none of the relevant transparency and public representation and 
participation characteristics are present, an  environmental policy permissible outcome is still possible. 
This is in line with the above observation of overriding features of facts, evidence and applicable law. It is 
also confirmed when inspecting the raw data on the specific cases where such scenarios where observed, 
as the cases either did not or should not have gone beyond jurisdictional matters based on the facts and 
evidence provided. 
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The next section addresses the data observations on the public representation and participation 
indicator more specifically and the chapter concludes with the presentation of the results of the Boolean 
analysis approach and resulting equations for combinations including all characteristics. With the findings 
of those results, the transparency characteristic of document access during proceedings will deserve new 
attention which the unsatisfying results of the observations so far wouldn’t necessarily suggest. This is 
because the study’s observations regarding what case characteristics (including six under the horizontal 
integration indicator) co-occur with environmental policy permissible outcomes provides valuable 
information to participating actors in a dispute. Adding document access during proceedings can 
empower especially amici curiae petitioners to adjust strategies in terms of what relevant elements to 
include in their submissions of limited word count. 
7.3.3 Public representation and participation 
Table 7.27 below shows that among the three characteristics of the public representation and participation 
indicator, no case observed a state-state dispute, reflecting that the study’s population concerns 
investment-state arbitrations only. Most of the 29 cases with conclusive data entries did neither observe 
an acceptance of an amicus curiae or a granting of observer status, with 18 of these observing an 
environmental policy permissible outcome and 11 observing an environmental impermissible outcome. 
Six cases accepted an amicus curiae and five cases granted observer status. 
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Table 7.27: Case outcomes of cases with observed characteristics of the public representation and 
participation indicators 
 
Study 
Case No 
 
Amicus Curiae 
accepted 
 
Observer status 
granted 
 
State-state 
dispute 
 
Environmental policy 
permissible Outcome 
 
6 1 1 0 1 
26 1 1 0 1 
2 1 1 0 1 
30 1 1 0 1 
7 1 0 0 1 
19 0 0 0 1 
25 0 0 0 1 
13 0 0 0 1 
14 0 0 0 1 
17 0 0 0 1 
29 0 0 0 1 
3 0 0 0 1 
21 0 0 0 1 
22 0 0 0 1 
18 0 0 0 1 
8 0 0 0 1 
12 0 0 0 1 
28 0 0 0 1 
10 1 0 0 0 
24 0 1 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 
23 0 0 0 0 
27 0 0 0 0 
9 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 
16 0 0 0 0 
Total  6 5 0 18 
 
Of the six cases in which an amicus curiae were accepted, five cases observed an environmental 
policy permissible outcome and only one an environmental policy impermissible outcome. Of the five 
cases in which observer status was granted, four cases observed an environmental policy permissible 
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outcome and only one an environmental policy impermissible outcome.  This suggests only a tendency 
that cases where an amicus curiae is accepted or an observer status is granted co-occur with an 
environmental policy permissible outcome. One case each with either an amicus curiae accepted or an 
observer status granted was observed to co-occur with an environmental impermissible outcome.   
A stronger tendency is observed in cases where both an amicus curiae is accepted and an 
observer status is granted since in those cases the outcome was always environmental policy permissible. 
Also observed is that of the five cases in which observer status was granted, four cases observed that an 
amicus curiae was accepted. This points at an interplay between an amici submission and observer status, 
because amici submissions most often contain a request for observer status. 
However, the inspection of the raw data revealed that not every amici application does specify a 
request to be granted observer status during hearings, as was also seen in regards to requests to access 
documents during proceedings. And, as noted earlier, in cases where such specific request is made in an 
amici application, neither observer status at hearings nor document access during proceedings is 
necessarily granted. 
The stated tendency that cases where an amicus curiae is accepted or an observer status is granted 
should co-occur with an environmental policy permissible outcome was further tested with the measure 
for the occurrence of contradictions. 
My hypothesis that the public representation and participation characteristic of observer status 
granted could have an influence on the case outcome seems more supported based on the ∆1 calculations 
of the study’s data. For that specific characteristic, the calculated ∆1 of almost 0.22 indicates still nearly a 
balance between co-occurrences and contradictions however with a good visible tendency of stronger 
observations of co-occurrences.  
An even stronger support was found for my hypothesis that the public representation and 
participation characteristic of amicus curiae accepted could have an influence on the case outcome. For 
that specific characteristic, the calculated ∆1 of nearly 0.27 indicates no longer a balance between co-
occurrences and contradictions but a strong visible tendency of observations of co-occurrences.  
The above findings of the initial description of the data and delta calculations are further in line 
with the results of my further testing with a Boolean analysis approach and resulting equations.  Cases 
with an environmental policy permissible outcome co-occurred with specific combinations of relevant 
characteristics of public representation and participation indicators. The next section considers the 
combinations of all characteristics identified in this study co-occurring with an environmental policy 
permissible outcome. 
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7.4 COMBINATIONS OF CASE CHARACTERISTICS WITH CASE OUTCOME OF 
INTEREST 
I also studied combinations of all characteristics identified in this study and the additional alternative 
explanation of interpretation approach in relation to my outcome of interest. Through careful investigation 
and analysis of the data using a Boolean truth table I could distill, from what seemed like a binary 
numeral ocean, specific case characteristic combinations that co-occur with an environmental policy 
permissible outcome. From the resulting Boolean equation and careful reading of the cases I could infer 
the following.  
 
Cases with an environmental policy permissible outcome co-occurred with characteristic 
combinations of: 
 
• an MEA reference made and accepted and an amicus curiae accepted and observer status granted 
and no access to documents during the proceedings and a tribunal taking still a treaty-specific 
interpretation approach; or 
 
• references to sustainable development, environmental exception or defense and an MEA made 
with only the environmental exception or defense reference being accepted and document access 
during proceedings and amicus curiae accepted and observer status granted and a tribunal taking 
a systemic-integration interpretation approach; or 
 
• references to sustainable development and an environmental exception or defense made and 
accepted and document access during proceedings observed but no amicus curiae accepted nor 
observer status granted and the tribunal taking still a treaty-specific interpretation approach; or 
 
• references to sustainable development, environmental exception or defense and an MEA made 
with only the sustainable development reference being accepted and document access during the 
proceedings and an amicus curiae accepted but no observer status granted and the tribunal taking 
a systemic-integration interpretation approach; or 
 
• references to sustainable development and an MEA made and accepted and the tribunal taking a 
systemic-integration interpretation approach but neither document access during proceedings nor 
amicus curiae accepted nor observer status granted; or 
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• references to sustainable development, an MEA and an environmental exception or defense made 
and only the latter accepted and amicus curiae accepted and observer status granted and the 
tribunal taking a systemic-integration interpretation approach; or 
 
• reference to an MEA made and accepted and the tribunal taking a systemic-integration 
interpretation approach but neither document access during proceedings nor amicus curiae 
accepted or observer status granted was observed; or 
 
• references to environmental exception or defense and an MEA made and accepted and the 
tribunal applying a systemic-integration interpretation approach but neither amicus curiae 
accepted or observer status granted was observed; or 
 
• references to environmental exception or defense made and accepted and the tribunal taking a 
systemic-integration interpretation approach but neither document access during proceedings nor 
amicus curiae accepted nor observer status granted was observed; or 
 
• references to an MEA and an environmental exception or defense made and only the latter 
accepted and the tribunal taking a systemic-integration interpretation approach but neither 
document access during proceedings nor amicus curiae accepted nor observer status granted was 
observed; or 
 
• references to sustainable development and environmental exception or defense made but not 
accepted and the tribunal still takes a treaty-specific interpretation approach and none of the other 
relevant characteristics are observed; or 
 
• none of the relevant characteristics are present. 
The Boolean equation results showing case characteristic combinations co-occurring with an 
environmental policy permissible outcome again highlight that the alternative explanation of 
interpretation approach taken by a tribunal cannot be ignored. In most characteristic combinations, the 
tribunal took as expected a systemic-integration interpretation approach. The few characteristic 
combinations with a treaty-specific interpretation approach show, after inspecting the raw data, as a 
common overriding case feature lack of evidence. The only arguable exception to this is the Grand River 
Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. USA case. However, in this case the interpretation approach 
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evaluation can be further qualified because the tribunal took a treaty-specific interpretation approach yet 
also with an understanding of mutual supportiveness. For example, one can detect the tribunal’s treaty-
specific interpretation approach in its statement that “this is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction; it has no 
mandate to decide claims based on treaties other than NAFTA.”441 This clarification was in response to 
claimants advocacy, opposed by respondent,  calling on the tribunal to take into account horizontal 
integration level 2 “treaties between the United States and Canada affecting the Haudenosaunee, 
customary law rules affecting indigenous peoples, and fundamental human rights norms, including but 
not limited to jus cogens principles,”442 and “invoked the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights in contending that their interests should be assessed in harmony with the communal 
property rights of indigenous peoples.” 443 In addition one can further qualify that the tribunal also took a 
mutual supportive interpretation approach looking at its statement that “NAFTA involves a balance of 
rights and obligations, and does not point unequivocally in a single direction. While NAFTA's preamble 
speaks of promoting investment, it also affirms the need to preserve the NAFTA Parties' "flexibility to 
safeguard the public welfare." 444 
The calculations of the measure for the occurrence of contradictions regarding the hypothesis that 
a systemic-interpretation interpretation approach taken by the tribunal could have an influence on the 
dispute outcome support the relevance of this alternative explanation. The calculated ∆1 of 0.4279 
indicates a strong visible tendency of observations of co-occurrences.  
The Boolean equation test also supports my hypotheses overall showing that a case with a 
combination of all relevant characteristics present co-occurs with an environmental policy permissible 
outcome. 
Another interesting finding from the Boolean equation test is that combination results including 
the characteristic of amicus curiae accepted also involve (besides some horizontal integration 
characteristics) also characteristics of observer status granted and/or document access during proceedings 
or both. This can be explained by the fact that often amicus curiae petitioners specifically request for 
document request and/or observer status.  In three characteristic combination results both amicus curiae 
accepted and observer status granted appear. In two characteristic combination results both amicus curiae 
accepted and document access during proceedings appear. In these latter two combination results, all 
references to all three horizontal integration characteristics are made. 
                                                     
441 Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United States of America; UNCITRAL 1976; NAFTA; 
Award, January 12, 2011; Paragraph 71. 
442 Ibid., Paragraph 66. 
443 Ibid., Paragraph 67. 
444 Ibid., Paragraph 69. 
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With regards to horizontal integration characteristics several interesting observations can be made 
from the Boolean equation results. First combination results for the co-occurrence with an environmental 
policy permissible outcome always involved at least the acceptance of one of the horizontal integration 
characteristics, (leaving aside cases where overriding features of lack of evidence was determined). 
Specifically, acceptance of an environmental exception or defense occurs most frequently in the 
combination results, with acceptance of MEA and acceptance of a reference to sustainable development 
following on second and third place respectively. This corresponds with their respective delta 
measurements for the occurrence of contradictions with: a ∆1 of over 0.43 for acceptance of an 
environmental exception or defense; a ∆1 of 0.22 for acceptance of an MEA; and a ∆1 of only 0.07 for 
acceptance of a reference to sustainable development.445  
Corresponding to these individual characteristic delta measures is also the following observation. 
Only acceptance to an environmental exception or defense or to an MEA succeeded as standalone 
horizontal integration characteristic among the combination results for the co-occurrence with an 
environmental policy permissible outcome. References to and acceptance of the concept of sustainable 
development always occurred in combination of a reference to at least one or both of the other horizontal 
integration characteristics. 
Second, the Boolean equation results for the co-occurrence of characteristic combinations with an 
environmental policy permissible outcome furthermore reveal that all combination results (besides those 
where none of the characteristics were present) involve a characteristic of the horizontal integration 
indicator. This is more than and can neither be observed for any of the other indicators (with regards to 
their respective relevant characteristics) nor for the alternative explanation or characteristic of 
interpretation approach. In addition, the Boolean equation results also show combinations with presence 
of horizontal integration characteristics alone and not in combination with characteristics of the 
transparency or public representation or participation indicators co-occur with environmental policy 
permissible outcomes. 
Perhaps the most important point visible from the last Boolean equation is that cases where none 
of the characteristics are present can still co-occur with an environmental policy permissible outcome. 
This is in line with the above observation of overriding features of facts, evidence and applicable law and 
the reality of empirical limitations. 
In the remaining chapters I discuss some recommendations one may see following from the 
findings, emphasize my studies limitations and explain why these results fall short of determining a 
                                                     
445 The importance of environmental exception and defense, which the initial descriptive data review suggested 
would come in second place after MEA seems to come in first place followed by MEA according to the additional 
delta measure and Boolean equation ‘referees’. Or, as the next paragraph suggests, could it be tie? 
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precise influence of the characteristics of the theorized indicators on a case outcome. However, the results 
confirm that such theoretical influence is best understood in an interactive way. 
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8.0  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following briefly summarizes some of the recommendations supported by the preliminary findings of 
my research. I then discuss in chapter 9 how the study overall contributes to our understanding of 
conflicts between international economic and environmental law and policy implications, and highlight 
the limitations of this explorative research. These limitations underscore calls to refrain from attributing 
exaggerated importance to the specific findings, such as of this study.446  
The findings from the analysis in chapter 7 imply several suggestions for government agencies 
and amici curiae petitioners and yet likewise provide an example of the risk of giving excessive weight or 
predicating proposed recommendations on limited findings. 447  For example, the findings of specific case 
characteristic combinations co-occurring with environmental policy permissible outcomes could be of use 
to government and non-government actors in their preparation for disputes. They can use the knowledge 
revealed in this study to tailor their legal arguments in their advocacy of an environmental policy 
permissible case outcome. For instance, especially disputing state parties with access to information on 
the dispute proceedings can emphasize specific elements in their legal arguments depending on the 
interpretation approach expected to be taken by arbitrators. Consider one could read the following two 
suggestions into the study’s findings. First, that where a tribunal is likely to take a treaty-specific 
interpretation approach, focus should be on making treaty-specific relevant MEA references, where 
possible, or alternatively making references to sustainable development and an environmental exception 
or defense combined. Or second, where a tribunal is likely to take a systemic-integration interpretation 
approach, the findings seem to suggest focus should lie on ensuring that at least one of the horizontal 
integration case characteristics will be accepted— even if only acceptance of a reference to sustainable 
development—seems possible. However, I find this reading of limited use in practice, because 
independent of an expected if not speculated interpretation approach to be taken by arbitrators, the study 
overall recommends that if possible, all and at best treaty-specific horizontal integration references should 
be made. And, legal arguments depend foremost on the case-specific contextual situation and availability 
                                                     
446 Catherine Rogers, The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators, 12 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014) at 234. 
447 Ibid., at 234. 
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or ability to have recourse to such references. To me, the findings from the qualitative analysis seem to 
offer more value as discussed below and in my conclusion. 
However, noting the risks of giving too much importance to specific findings does not mean that 
the study’s findings do not inform opportunities for prioritization strategies which some actors may have 
to consider. For example, international arbitration tribunals usually impose a set of restrictions on amici, 
such as page limits of their written briefs.448 Similarly, some states may lack the capacity of 
“sophisticated in-house legal departments or outside legal counsel,” which as Rogers notes can also be 
relevant for effectively “managing the arbitrator selection process”.449  And, in the difficult negotiation 
and renegotiation process of BITs and FTAs, prioritization is routine practice. Some of the findings may 
thus be of use in the law-applying and law-making processes. 
In the law-applying process, the findings confirm that amici curiae briefs in international 
investment disputes challenging environmental policies can matter with regards to an environmental 
policy permissible outcome. NGOs are encouraged to engage in such disputes using this avenue. Amici 
curiae petitioners should make specific requests in their submissions,450 including to access to documents 
and observer status by way of permission to attend and pose questions during oral proceedings. 
Furthermore, petitioners should use applicable law in their submissions and make, in their legal 
arguments, references to horizontal indicator characteristics identified in this study. In their legal 
arguments amici could also go beyond traditionally applicable law and highlight an expertise they can 
provide in areas of evolving standards, guidelines and practices in the science-policy or industry arenas. 
Such may be already adopted by organisations such as the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN) or the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). If this is the case, these 
links could be highlighted. The study further showed that even when amicus curiae petitions are denied, 
public representation can still be strengthened using the recommendations following from this study in 
advisory briefs to responding state parties in a dispute, or even non-disputing state parties engaged in the 
dispute. 
                                                     
448 Patrick Wieland, Why the Amicus Curia Institution is Ill-suited to address Indigenous Peoples’ Rights before 
Investor-State Arbitration Tribunals: Glamis Gold and the Right of Intervention, 3 TRADE, LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT (2011) at 335. 
449 She notes, “in selecting arbitrators, parties generally consider arbitrators’ background, experience, existing 
decisional history, and legal and cultural background. They seek, subject to standards for challenge based on bias, to 
ensure that the arbitrator they appoint will represent on the tribunal their perspectives on the case“. Catherine 
Rogers, The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators, 12 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014) at 246 and 252. 
450 See for example: Jennifer Liu Benjamin Miller, Ramin Wright, Jenny Yoo and Renu Mandhane, Marcos 
Orellana, David Scheiderman, Carmen Cheung (eds), Guide for Potential Amici in International Investment 
Arbitration  (International Human Rights Program at the University of Toronto, Faculty of Law and the Center for 
International Environmental Law 2014). 
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These states can consider some of the study’s findings in their legal arguments. Taking note of 
the above-mentioned risks, the findings suggest overall that references to environmental exceptions and 
defenses as well as MEAs should be emphasized over references to sustainable development. Again, clear 
treaty-specific references should be preferred over more vague formulations. Yet even where applicability 
is in question, the study’s observations from practice suggest that references to an MEA even if not 
ratified by all parties to the invoked economic treaty can also be referred to and considered by the 
tribunal.451 A legal argument may further request the tribunal for a fair consideration of legal arguments, 
whereby specific requests can be made to recognize a “broad” understanding of concepts such as: ‘in like 
circumstances’ progressively understood to include considerations of consumer or public preference; 
‘legitimate expectations’ understood to be balanced against ‘reasonable expectations’; ‘cost-benefit 
analysis’ understood to entail taking into account new developments and international standards; ‘science-
based evidence’ understood to include various knowledge sources; or ‘front-runner policy approaches’ 
evolving also among sub-national governments and other actors as a practice of pursuing environmental 
measures based on the precautionary principle or going beyond national commitments. 
Naturally, to be able to make any such references to horizontal integration especially at the treaty-
specific level in any dispute, the law-making process must have produce them. The above 
recommendations may thus also be considered by states engaging in negotiations and re-negotiations of 
BITs and FTAs. However generally these activities suggest states are perhaps politically unable to - or not 
so much focused on – drafting specific MEA linkages nor revising environmental exceptions or specific 
concepts in investment related provisions of such treaties. Instead, and not intuitive from the findings of 
this study, we see in new text more emphasis on sustainable development references often in close 
proximity of mentions of a mutual supportiveness approach. Still, my research’s findings support, in part, 
also the benefits of linking sustainable development references with the mutual supportiveness approach. 
Noteworthy are some FTA negotiation outcomes involving the European Union. The trade and 
sustainable development chapter452 in the EU-Korea FTA includes Article 13.5 on MEAs in which parties 
reaffirm their commitments to the effective implementation in their laws and practices of the MEAs to 
which they are party and makes specific reference to the UNFCCC. The chapter further clarifies in Article 
13.8 that parties recognize the importance, when preparing and implementing environmental measures 
that affect trade between the parties, of taking account of scientific and technical information, and 
relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations. And Article 13.10 commits parties to 
reviewing, monitoring and assessing the impact of the implementation of this agreement on sustainable 
                                                     
451 See Footnote 422 above. 
452 The chapter further provides, among others, a specific institutional mechanism, a civil society dialogue 
mechanism and government consultations process. 
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development through their respective participative processes and institutions, as well as through trade-
related sustainability impact assessments. All these treaty-specific references may be of use in legal 
arguments seeking their consideration in the interpretation of the entire treaty. But, as Frank Hoffmeister 
notes the chapter falls short on an effective enforcement mechanism overall.453  
In the context of investment agreements, the UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Framework for 
Sustainable Development454 provides various options for specific textual reforms and presents a variety of 
mechanisms to do so, such as by using hortatory language, clarifications, qualifications, reservations 
exceptions and omissions. In line with this study’s findings, the report lists options for treaty-specific 
horizontal integration references, including through preambular text on sustainable development, specific 
interpretation guidance on public policy exceptions and clarifications on the relationship to MEAs, to 
establish for example a hierarchy in case of competing international norms. The Framework also provides 
suggestions on how provisions such as FET, observed in this study as contentious, could be addressed in 
support of sustainable development. 
Yet, given the costs involved in disputes and the slow pace of international negotiations, the most 
important recommendations that could be considered from this research apply to the domestic policy 
design and implementation process. The findings of the qualitative analysis conducted for the study’s data 
collection provides several insights that were confirmed in the testing of the influence of references to an 
environmental exception or defense on an environmental policy permissible outcome. In short, to avoid 
that environmental measures face a potential challenge in international investment disputes the study 
supports that government agencies consider the following recommendations. 
First, ensure that general environmental regulations or environmental measures are clear, non-
discriminatory, enacted in accordance with due process and not contrary to any specific assurances or 
commitments given to an investor. Here, the design of the environmental policy aimed at achieving an 
environmental purposes should consider issues raised by the public, including investors during 
consultation processes to better ensure that the measure avoids a disproportional effect on an investor. In 
other words, make sure that support for a measure is achieved through a participatory and transparent 
process and is not based on lobbying efforts of an industry or too narrow community interest. The 
legitimacy of a measure can further be increased by assessing the feasibility or availability of alternative 
measures. When no alternative measure was determined to be available, an environmental exception or 
                                                     
453 Frank Hoffmeister, The Contribution of EU Trade Agreement s to the Development of International Investment 
Law, in SHIFTING PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW - MORE BALANCED, LESS 
ISOLATED, INCREASINGLY DIVERSIFIED (Steffen Hindelang and Markus Krajewski eds. 2016) at 361. 
454 UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable 
Development (2012 and 2015) at 85-121. 
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defense, which grants the state regulatory rights, is more likely to be accepted by a tribunal when shown 
that this right to regulate would be infringed if the measure is found impermissible.  
Second, ensure that coordination takes place between government agencies at all levels, so to 
warrant clarity, transparency and conformity of environmental policies, which in turn should be motivated 
by and determined based on science and international standards (which can involve evolving awareness). 
Following this approach can underscore the legitimacy of the purpose of the environmental measure.  
Third, in communicating with investors, demonstrate the harmonization of rules and requirements 
among government agencies and clearly link any assurances given to an investor with the state-
determined environmental requirements, including procedural needs of providing and passing 
environmental impact assessments and obtaining permits. In states embracing the principle of subsidiary, 
allocated competencies should be coordinated with – and confirmed by – federal government agencies as 
well as transparently communicated to inform investors. 
Forth, to ensure procedural fairness, implement rules and regulations in a regular, proper and 
timely manner. Finally, situations may occur, and have led to the situation, where a state of emergency 
requires government agencies to act in the heat of the moment. This may include taking environmental 
measures in response to an emergency so that grave impacts from such an emergency on the public or on 
public order are prevented. To avoid that such measures are seen and challenged as an abuse of state 
power with unjustifiable negative effects on an investor is tricky. Here states may have to review their 
investment agreements and clarify public security or national security exceptions, such as to include 
economic crisis, national circumstance of natural resources shortage or catastrophic weather events. 
In conclusion, some of the findings may provide useful suggestions for actors engaged in the law-
applying, law-making and policy implementation processes. However, they should be read with caution 
and checked against practical applicability to avoid the risk of giving too much importance to specific 
findings. In the following chapter, I present the study’s overall contribution to our understanding of 
conflicts between international economic and environmental law, potential policy implications, while also 
highlighting the limitations of this explorative research. 
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9.0  CONCLUSION 
The greatest sin of the age is to make the concrete abstract 
Nicholas Berdyaev 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research project was sparked by an initial interest in the problem of existing conflicts between 
economic and environmental policies, and was also motivated by many long nights spent at Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) and Multilateral Environmental Agreement (MEA) negotiations where a reoccurring 
question arose with the morning sun: does this all matter in the end? By “this” I am referring to 
discussions around drafting an innovative chapter in an international agreement, such a Chapter 13 of the 
EU-South Korea FTA on trade and sustainable development. I am also referring to exchanges on what 
words to be included or deleted from preambular or operational paragraphs in the drafting process of a 
given international agreement, such as the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. The difference between a “shall”, “should” or “can,” for example, clearly 
differentiates the understanding of obligations that parties take on under an agreement resulting from such 
drafting sessions. Potential policy problems can occur when obligations are undertaken under different 
regimes with distinctive policy objectives, such as economic growth or environmental protection, and are 
formulated by different policy experts, such as from economic or environmental ministries. And in line 
with a historic world view, norms that have been once defined through such processes can be challenged, 
contested and reformulated to adjust to an ever-evolving economic, social and environmental reality of 
concern to different societies.  
In this study, I explored the idea that existing conflicts between economic and environmental 
policy at the domestic and international level are the result of norm contestation taking place among 
various actors of societies and the international community. They can pose problems to policy makers in 
charge with pursuing formulated policy objectives and required to comply with sometimes seemingly 
 215 
conflicting obligations under different international law regimes.  To better understand the dynamics 
present when problems arise and their origins, I proposed the theory that institutional factors influence the 
respective power of organizations engaged in strategic social construction and norm contestation in 
international economic law disputes. My aim in this exploratory research was to explain norm 
contestation about sustainable development in the context of international investment law disputes in 
which environmental policies have been challenged as violation of an investor’s rights.  I examined what, 
in addition to facts provided in such cases, could matter in the determination of a case outcome. My 
outcome of interest was an environmental policy permissible ruling in such disputes.455 By looking at 
institutional factors observable at the systemic level that may influence case outcomes the study attempts 
to explain influences on case outcomes in a different light or perspective than some of the empirical 
studies and literature that have focused on individual factors or bias. To me, and in this context of this 
study, institutional factors include both procedural and substantive case characteristics.  
I tested my two hypotheses that cases in which procedural characteristics of transparency and of 
public representation and participation are present should result in environmental policy permissible 
outcomes. Transparency and public representation and participation constitute intra-institutional factors, 
because they depend on the governing rules for dispute settlement of the organization administering the 
dispute, where applicable. Categorized as inter-institutional factor that can have an influence on case 
outcomes is horizontal integration between international economic and environmental law. It is 
understood as an inter-institutional feature because it concerns the horizontal integration between two 
distinct international regimes. I also tested my third hypothesis that cases in which the substantive case 
characteristic of horizontal integration is observed should result in environmental permissible outcomes. 
As alternative explanation, the study examined the possible influence of an interpretation approach taken 
by a tribunal on case outcome. In addition to testing these hypothesized case features for their individual 
potential influence on case outcomes, I also examined what case characteristic combinations co-occur 
with environmental policy permissible case outcomes. 
In testing my three hypotheses, I developed specific ‘measurements’ or case characteristics for 
each of the three features, elaborated in chapters 3, 4 and 5. For example, an indication of horizontal 
integration was observed by the presence of a reference made to the concept of sustainable development, 
                                                     
455 Some authors, such as Catherine Rogers have suggested that “purportedly neutral empirical inquiries about the 
potential bias of investment arbitrators may themselves at times be colored by particular policy preferences”.  To 
clarify and avoid misunderstandings while welcoming disagreement, in this study I neither focus on detecting bias 
nor on determining what a legally correct outcome of a given case would or should be. And, I don’t shy away from 
my conviction that states’ “commitment to promote sustainable development and the development of international 
trade in such a way as to contribute to sustainable development” (as stated in the preamble of the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union and its Member States) is a policy choice 
of ethical and moral nature that ought to implemented as a de facto norm in the ‘real’ world political economy. 
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or to an environmental exception or defense or to a MEA, as well as the acceptance thereof by the tribunal 
in any given case. An indication of transparency was observed by publication of notice of intent or 
commencement of a case, document access during case proceedings, or publication of the final award. An 
indication of public representation and participation was measured by observed case characteristics of 
acceptance of an amicus curiae or the granting of observer status to hearings.  
9.2 MAIN FINDINGS 
The evidence from 29 cases investigated supports the hypotheses, that all three identified case features, 
namely the presence of horizontal integration, transparency, and public representation and participation 
can influence case outcomes in the direction of environmental policy permissible rulings, though to 
different degrees and under a variety of conditions. The long-night drafting sessions in which state parties 
negotiate what references and provisions to include in preambular and operational paragraphs of 
international treaties do seem to matter. Given the state-centric model of international law, they set the 
framework for the procedural and substantive case characteristics investigated here as to play out in the 
dynamics of international investment disputes. States determine the specific dispute settlement and 
compliance mechanisms and the transparency and public representation and participation rules applicable 
to parties of specific treaties. Through textual incorporation, they also facilitate horizontal integration by 
way of enabling that references to the concept of sustainable development, to environmental exceptions 
and defenses or to an MEA can be made in a dispute case. The findings showed, however, that the mere 
existence of such references even if specified in a treaty text is not sufficient. They must be referred to by 
an actor in a dispute case—and more importantly accepted by the tribunal—for us to detect their potential 
influence on an environmental policy permissible outcome. 
This influence could be seen in the patterns or trends that the observations of specific case 
characteristics concurring or co-occurring with case outcomes revealed. These patterns portrayed by the 
data were further tested to inspect whether any contradictions were observed for my given hypothesis 
about the co-occurrence of a case characteristic with a case outcome. First, using a measure for the 
occurrence of contradictions allowed the calculations and evaluations of the existence of contradictions 
for each of my hypotheses about the co-occurrence of an individual case characteristic with a case 
outcome. The evidence showed support for six of the nine hypothesized case characteristics, whereby the 
reason for the three undetermined conclusions is lack of diversity in data entries (and not a finding of a 
balance between co-occurrences and contradictions, nor a finding of co-occurrences in the opposite 
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direction than expected). Second, applying Charles Ragin’s Boolean truth table approach for qualitative 
comparative analysis allowed the testing for the effects of combinations of case characteristics. The 
Boolean equation results confirmed the study’s findings and illuminated further insights, for example that 
a case in which all my identified case characteristics are present co-occurs with an environmental policy 
permissible outcome. The evidence also showed that cases that resulted in an environmental policy 
permissible outcome always co-occurred with —or involved—at least the acceptance of one of the 
horizontal integration characteristics. 
9.2.1 The influence of three hypothesized case features –horizontal integration, transparency and 
public participation and representation—on case outcomes 
The tendencies of co-occurrences with environmental permissible case outcomes varied for each of the 
individual case characteristics of horizontal integration. Here, the strongest visible support was found 
for cases in which environmental exception or defense references were made and accepted by the tribunal, 
followed by acceptance of references made to an MEA and to sustainable development. 
The transparency feature in this study presents a unique situation because, of the three 
transparency characteristics, only ‘document access during proceedings’ showed a meaningful variance 
in the data. Only weak support was found for the hypothesis that document access during proceedings 
could have an influence on dispute outcome in the direction of environmental policy permissible rulings. 
However, in cases where document access during proceedings was given in combination with 
observed public representation and participation (with amicus curiae accepted and observer status 
granted) environmental policy permissible outcomes always occurred.  Looking at the public participation 
and representation case characteristics individually, the evidence showed a good visible tendency of 
stronger observations of cases with observer status granted co-occurring with environmental policy 
permissible dispute outcomes. An even stronger visible tendency in this direction was found in cases with 
amicus curiae accepted. 
The study also found that the alternative explanation –that the interpretation approach taken by 
a tribunal should have an influence on dispute outcomes –cannot be ignored. For example, in most case 
characteristic combinations co-occurring with an environmental policy permissible outcome the tribunal 
took, as expected, a systemic-integration interpretation approach. An influence or possible relationship 
between interpretation approach and individual horizontal integration characteristics on case outcome was 
also observed, although to different degrees and under specific conditions as noted in the discussion 
below. 
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9.2.2 The influence of the three horizontal integration case characteristics on case outcomes 
Acceptance of a reference to sustainable development: Considering each case characteristic specifically, 
the study found only some but no strong support for the hypothesis that acceptance of a reference to 
sustainable development should concur with environmental permissible outcomes. No clear influence or a 
possible relationship between interpretation approach and acceptance of a sustainable development 
reference on a specific case outcome was found. Specific and at best treaty-specific sustainable 
development references were shown to be more likely to be accepted by tribunals, no matter what 
interpretation approach was taken. Also observed was that a non-treaty specific sustainable development 
reference can be accepted, especially when the tribunal employs an understanding of mutual 
supportiveness, i.e. that the goals of environmental protection and economic development should and can 
be mutually supportive. The study highlighted that a sustainable development reference made might not 
be accepted as defense of a challenged measure when such substantive reference, including in a treaty-
specific preambular objective, is too vague vis a vis a treaty objective specifying increasing investment 
opportunities as purpose. A sustainable development reference made might also not be accepted as 
defense of a challenged measure when the challenged environmental measure was not implemented 
within the legitimate scope. This scope involves for example that the measure must be: least-NAFTA 
inconsistent, where NAFTA is applicable; least- trade or investment restrictive; following the norms of 
due process (in a timely, transparent and participatory manner); and implemented not in a gravely 
unilateral, protectionist or corrupt manner. 
Acceptance of a reference to an environmental exception or defense: A much stronger and 
visible support was found for the hypothesis that a tribunal’s acceptance of a reference to an 
environmental exception or defense is associated with environmentally permissible outcomes. The 
findings further suggest that references to an environmental exception or defense should be made clearly 
and be numerous where applicable and when possible at both levels of horizontal integration (treaty and 
non-treaty specific) to increase the likelihood of acceptance. The data also confirmed the expectation that 
a tribunal applying a systemic-integration interpretation approach seems to make the acceptance of an 
environmental exception and an environmental policy permissible outcome more likely than a tribunal 
applying a treaty-specific interpretation approach.  
In some cases, the tribunals determined the environmental exception or defense references made 
were relevant and applicable, yet found that they could not serve as decisive defense and therefore 
concluded with an environmental policy impermissible decision. This was the case when the referenced 
environmental exception did not require the measure to avoid infringement of state’s rights provided in 
that exception. Or, when evidence submitted to the tribunal showed that non-environmental related 
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political motivations were decisive in a case making the challenged measure unjustifiable. In addition, the 
findings show that in the context of environmental exception or defense references, a policy measure 
cannot easily be defended when that measure was not implemented within a legally required scope. Based 
on the review of the cases studied, these requirements can include that: 
• an investor has access to an effective due process; 
• the measure is designed and implemented in a way that is not gravely unjust, discriminatory or 
based on corruption; 
• the measure is reasonable and proportional to the aim of the policy, whereby practical effects and 
alternative policy options should have been considered in the determination of the most cost-
effective solution and least investment-affecting available alternative; 
• the measure or regulation is implemented in a transparent and coherent manner to allow the 
investor to access information regarding legal rules and requirements, including potential changes 
thereof; and 
• the measure or regulation is implemented in good faith observation of the treaty and follows the 
general principle contained in VCLT Article 27, that internal laws may not be used as 
justification of failure to perform a treaty. 
 
Furthermore, the study found that for an environmental exception or defense to be successfully 
accepted and applied in a case, the environmental purpose of a measure should be clearly identified, at 
best based on science and international standards, and recognized by all levels of government. However, 
in cases involving potentially expropriatory acts, even for an environmental purpose, the obligation to pay 
compensation remains, though the environmental purpose behind the acts may influence the calculation of 
compensation so that it is a reasonable reflection of the value of the property and ensures that the investor 
does not bear a disproportionate burden for the policy aim. 
Reference to a Multilateral Environmental Agreement: While the study could not clearly 
confirm that a reference to an MEA simply appearing in treaty text, or made in a case, influenced case 
outcomes in itself, the evidence shows what matters is that such reference is accepted by the tribunal as 
relevant and applicable. The data illuminated this hypothesized influence with a visible tendency of such 
cases concurring with environmental policy permissible case outcomes. In cases where an MEA reference 
was made but not accepted, the interpretation approach appeared to matter, finding that all such cases in 
which the tribunal applied a systemic-integration interpretation approach concurred with an 
environmental policy permissible outcome, and all such cases in which the tribunal applied a treaty-
specific integration interpretation approach concurred with an environmental policy impermissible 
outcome. The study also found that in practice, references to MEA as defense of an environmental policy 
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may still be considered by a tribunal even if the MEA lacks ratification by all parties that are also party to 
the economic treaty.456 And, when referencing to MEA obligations as defense of an environmental policy, 
even at the treaty-specific level, a responding state must still ensure that its measure meets the specific 
scope of such MEA obligations in relation to the economic treaty invoked. 
9.2.3 The influence of transparency case characteristic on case outcomes 
Of the three characteristics of the transparency indicator only ‘document access during proceedings’ 
showed a meaningful variance in the data so that support for the hypotheses of potential influence could 
not be determined or confirmed for the other two specific transparency characteristics. Less than 25 
percent of all studied cases showed the characteristic of document access during proceedings, indicating 
the institutional and procedural situation in these cases that the presence of this transparency characteristic 
required consent by disputing parties and a permitting ruling by the tribunal. For cases with the specific 
characteristic of document access during proceedings only a slight tendency of co-occurrences with 
environmental policy permissible dispute outcomes was observed. The data also showed that document 
access during proceedings only occurred when knowledge of the commencement of a dispute was 
publicly available. This supports the assumption that only when the public is aware of a case can access to 
documents during proceedings be requested. Notably ‘making such a request’ illustrates an action element 
in this dynamic interplay of the cases studied. Recent institutional reform developments, as discussed 
further below, may lead to institutional and procedural situations that “provide for transparency of 
[investor-state investment dispute] proceedings as default”.457 
Because of the qualified potential influence of the document access during proceedings, the study 
also examined the presence of this characteristic in combination with characteristics of the other 
indicators, especially the two characteristics of public representation and participation. For example, the 
study observed that document access follows typically from requests made in an amicus curiae petitions; 
however, the presence of the document access characteristic was not found to be dependent on an amici 
application requesting such access. Some cases where no amici petition was filed still observed document 
access during the proceedings, as parties agreed to - and the tribunal issued a confidentiality order -
permitting such. Moreover, the evidence revealed that not every amici application does specify a request 
to access documents during proceedings, nor to be granted observer status during hearings. Neither did 
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SHIFTING PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW - MORE BALANCED, LESS 
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the data confirm that all amici would be necessarily interested in full transparency. And, in cases where 
such specific request is made in an amici application, neither document access during proceedings nor 
observer status during hearings was necessarily granted. In those cases, the rules governing the dispute 
still provided disputing parties with the power to ultimately determine whether access to documents 
during proceedings shall be granted. As discussed further below, state parties to relevant treaties specify 
dispute settlement mechanisms, applicable arbitration rules, and procedures. State parties can also 
subsequently amend these. Dependent on these rules, disputing parties during case procedures can agree 
or object to document access. 
The findings further showed that cases in which document access during proceedings was present 
in combination with public representation and participation indicator characteristics (of amicus curiae 
accepted and observer status granted) an environmental policy permissible outcomes always occurred. 
This finding supports the idea that document access during proceedings can strengthen public 
representation and participation. However, the study also found that cases without document access 
during proceedings but with amicus curiae accepted and observer status granted can have an 
environmental policy permissible dispute outcome. 
9.2.4 The influence of public participation case characteristics on case outcomes 
The findings of the research supported my hypotheses that observer status granted and amici curiae 
accepted can have an influence on the case outcome in the direction of an environmental policy 
permissible ruling, with acceptance of an amici receiving more support. No case observed the presence of 
an initially considered third characteristics of the public representation and participation indicator, a state-
state dispute. This is because the study’s population concerns investor-state public investment law 
disputes only. 
Most of the 29 cases with conclusive data entries observed neither acceptance of an amicus 
curiae nor granting of observer status. The study observed that of the five cases in which observer status 
was granted, an amicus curiae was accepted in four of them. This points to an interplay between an amici 
submission and observer status, because amici submissions most often contain a request for observer 
status. Yet, not every amici application specifies a request to be granted observer status during hearings, 
as was also seen with regard to requests to access documents during proceedings. And, as noted earlier, in 
cases where such a specific request is made in an amici application, neither observer status at hearings nor 
document access during proceedings is necessarily granted. The study found that all cases in which both 
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an amicus curiae was accepted and observer status granted resulted in an environmental policy 
permissible outcome. 
9.2.5 The influence of all case characteristics in combination on a case outcome 
All case features investigated in this study are distinct, but the conceptual interconnection among them 
must be emphasized and the results of this study are best understood in a holistic way capturing the 
complexity of issues at play. 
Findings from the analysis of all relevant case characteristics in combination co-occurring with an 
environmental policy permissible outcome also support my hypotheses overall. As noted, the results 
confirmed that a case with a combination of all relevant characteristics present co-occurs with an 
environmental policy permissible outcome. And, combination results for the co-occurrence with an 
environmental policy permissible outcome always involved at least the acceptance of one of the 
horizontal integration characteristics. This is more than and could neither be observed for both the 
transparency and public participation and representation case characteristics nor for the alternative 
explanation or characteristic of interpretation approach. In addition, combinations with presence of 
horizontal integration characteristics alone (and not in combination with characteristics of the 
transparency or public representation or participation indicators) co-occur with environmental policy 
permissible outcomes. Only acceptance of an environmental exception or defense or of an MEA 
succeeded as a standalone horizontal integration characteristic among the combination results for the co-
occurrence with an environmental policy permissible outcome. References to and acceptance of the 
concept of sustainable development always occurred in combination with a reference to at least one or 
both of the other horizontal integration characteristics. Finally, an important point to be made is that cases 
where none of the characteristics are present can still result in an environmental policy permissible 
outcome. This is in line with the understanding of overriding features of facts, evidence and applicable 
law in any given case. 
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9.3 CONTRIBUTION TO OUR UNDERSTANDING OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS 
9.3.1 Limitations of this exploratory empirical research 
Catherine Rogers underscores the “limitations of empirical research as methodology for measuring 
phenomenon as complex as legal decision-making”.458 While emphasizing her aim “is not to discourage 
empirical research, or to discount the contributions it can make to our understanding of this emerging 
field,” I hardly feel encouraged by her point, well taken, that “empirical research can neither identify the 
extent to which extra-legal factors affect arbitral decision-making, nor disprove definitely the effect of 
those factors”.459 
In this section I provide some clarification to my research approach and its limitations before 
presenting the contributions my study may provide to our understanding of conflicts between 
international economic and environmental law and the possible policy implications of its findings that 
may be considered as a result. In full agreement with Rogers’ caution, my aim is to avoid 
misunderstandings among readers while welcoming disagreement and constructive critiques.  
First, Rogers correctly notes, as one of the methodological challenges raised by empirical 
research into adjudicatory decision making, that “absent control for the correct outcome, or at least the 
relative strength of a particular party’s case, the extent and even existence of deviations from it cannot be 
known for certain”.460 The outcome of interest in my study is an environmental policy permissible ruling 
in dispute cases in which an environmental policy measure has been challenged as violating investors 
rights under an economic treaty. I am thus not so much interested in detecting bias, but rather in what can 
be observed from the practice in such disputes, specifically the norm contestation process therein. 
However, bias is not disregarded but forms perhaps conceptual shadows to this study which is 
concerned in its most general terms with a paradigm shift in international political economy towards 
sustainable development. These shadows are produced by different public interest illuminations that are 
directed at decision-makers from various directions. I find Thomas Kuhn’s concept of paradigm shift also 
useful in the non-scientific legal, and particular law-applying context of disputes, as:  
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459 Ibid., at 234 and 254. 
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“The starting point of every contemporary legal doctrine is that legal decision-making 
always involve interpretation. The meaning of the existing law must be determined and the 
abstract rule adjusted to the requirements of the concrete situation. According to one 
understanding, as long as the process of reformulation is understood to be ‘semantic’ or 
‘deductive,’ in the sense of looking for the ‘meaning’ of words that compose the rule to be 
applied, it is not, in this understanding, rule making, even if the case is a hard one. However, 
judges constantly do something that can be better described as making rather than applying the 
law. At a minimum they must resolve gaps, conflicts or ambiguities in the legal system and by 
doing so, they make new rules rather than merely applying existing ones. The question then arises 
concerning the limits of such judicial creativity”.461 
Bias in epistemological communities among law makers and law interpreters may well exist. 
Likewise, in the context of international political economy Peter Haas observes “we are persuaded that 
our bias is justified because the epistemological presuppositions that accompany our notion of consensual 
knowledge seem to be emulated widely by non-Western cultures”.462 
Some elements of norm contestation about sustainable development in trade and investment law, 
such as issues of green protectionism or equitable sharing of the global carbon budget, may well be the 
result of such paradigms as economic growth being emulated by developing countries. 
Therefore, while my research question and outcome of interest were not designed to specifically 
identify or measure bias, the issue of bias cannot be considered as external to this study either. However, 
my point that my research design and outcome of interest followed from my interest in observing the 
practice of dispute proceedings rather than tribunal’s bias can be seen in that no ‘proper’ or ‘legally 
correct dispute’ outcome or interpretation approach were assigned, albeit perhaps contemplated. I 
nevertheless chose to use binary data for “ease” of analysis, where my aim was to inspect whether any 
contradictions were observed in the real world for my given hypotheses about the co-occurrence of a case 
characteristic with a case outcome. For this I used the measure delta for the occurrence of contradictions. 
I also employed Charles Ragin’s truth table approach making use of the binary logic of Boolean algebra 
to maximize the number of comparisons that can be made across cases in terms of the presence or absence 
of characteristics of analytical interest. Still, Rogers’ is correct in noting that “the complexity of outcomes 
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to legal disputes can lead to coding errors when reducing dispositions to binary outcomes”463 and I 
certainly am not immune to this risk. And because of the complexities involved, insuring against such 
risks through hiring secondary coders comes with the price tag of expert legal professionals. 
Second, this risk of coding errors applies not only to my outcome of interest but all my binary 
case characteristics whose presence or absence in each dispute I determined from observations. In this 
process, I undertook a thorough substantive and qualitative data collection, which further allowed 
refinement of case characteristics. For example, each of the three case characteristics of my horizontal 
integration indicator were further distinguished as occurring at a treaty-specific or non-treaty specific 
horizontal integration level. Likewise, data collection on outcomes included beyond environmental 
permissible or impermissible rulings or whether the responding state prevailed, specifics, such as: “claims 
for damages dismissed though state actions were found, in part, unreasonable and politically motivated - 
but lacking causation, no injury was observed”. By taking substantive observations into account in the 
coding process I tried to reduce the risk of coding errors stemming from simplification and accomplished 
a richer data set. Still even then, reasonable critics may still differ in their views on - and disagree with 
my -  coding as environmental policy permissible a tribunal’s ruling which determined an environmental 
measure as legitimate expropriation yet still requiring compensation.  
The most important limitation that my explorative study shares with other research projects, is 
that at best empirical data can only show correlation, which can provide support for a hypothesis, but 
cannot prove causation. Indeed, my study merely found tentative support of the likelihood of my 
hypotheses.464 To be clear on this point and avoid misunderstandings I explicated my methodological 
approach in chapter 6. I clarified that though my analysis refrains from concluding causality and from 
making predictions, it does inspect specifically whether any contradictions were observed for my given 
hypotheses about the co-occurrence of a case characteristic with a case outcome. As noted above, for this 
I used the measure delta for the occurrence of contradictions, because for any of my given hypotheses 
about the co-occurrence of a case characteristic with a case outcome, delta tells us about the existence of 
contradictions in regard to this hypothesis. The measure allowed me to evaluate my findings, whereby a 
finding of no contradictions would provide the strongest support for my hypothesis compared to a finding 
of a balance between co-occurrences and contradictions. And weakest support for my hypothesis would 
be a finding of co-occurrence in exactly the opposite direction of what I expected and without any 
contradictions. The study’s findings for my hypotheses that the identified cases characteristics could have 
an influence on the case outcome ranged from strong visible tendencies of observations of co-occurrences 
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to a balance between co-occurrence and contradictions, however with a slight tendency of stronger 
observations of co-occurrences. 
Therefore, the findings of this study should be considered as providing partial and provisional 
insights, and thus should be evaluated in light of other possible hypotheses in future research. As noted 
above, the study did consider as strong overriding alternative hypothesis that a case outcome is ultimately 
related to facts, contextual evidence, the applicable law or specific provisions in the economic treaty 
invoked, and, the way in which an environmental measure is designed and implemented. Yet there remain 
still other possible alternative hypotheses that could explain environmental policy permissible outcomes 
in the cases studied. 
9.3.2 Contribution to our understanding of conflicts between international economic and 
environmental law and policy implications 
Despite all these limitations, this exploratory research may nevertheless contribute to our understanding 
of the complexities around conflicts between economic vis a vis environmental –policies and international 
law. Among the most important contribution is perhaps that the study casts some light on procedural and 
substantive elements that inform dynamics at play among actors in environment related international 
public investment law disputes. Unlike previous research and literature, from which I greatly benefited, 
this study tested the influence of specified constructs of transparency, public participation and horizontal 
integration on outcomes in such disputes, as explained in chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6. As alternative 
explanation, I focused in this study also on the interpretation approach taken by a tribunal. The value of 
this approach should naturally be tested and evaluated in subsequent research and could be replicated in 
other specified settings. Perhaps refined constructs could be used, depending on the public interest issue 
at stake, for example public health, labor rights or human rights issues. One could thus also expand on the 
initial database which this research established from the data collection. 
In general terms, my academic background in international political economy and professional 
experience in international law-making processes stimulated me to take a more holistic approach to study 
norm contestation about sustainable development in the context of international public investment law 
disputes. I proposed the theory that institutional factors influence the respective power of organizations 
engaged in strategic social construction and norm contestation in international economic law disputes. To 
measure the influence of hypothesized institutional factors on case outcomes, I constructed the above 
listed procedural and substantive case characteristics to capture both: power distribution among 
organizations, and, some of the outcomes of norm contestations resulting from national and international 
 227 
law-making processes. I then explored whether –and found that indeed some of –these case characteristics 
seem to show an influence on case outcomes, that is in the realm of an international law-application 
process.  
In this way, the study integrated international law-application and law-making processes, 
suggesting that existing conflicts between environmental and economic policies could be understood as 
the outcome of a norm contestation processes in different arenas engaging different actors. Finding 
support for the hypotheses that transparency, public participation and horizontal integration as well as 
interpretation approach can matter in international public investment law disputes informs the law-making 
process and thus can have policy implications, as further described below. However, resulting policies in 
turn depend on outcomes of norm contestation among various actors in the law-making process and the 
decisions taken by states. This circular flow involving various processes at the domestic and international 
level was explicated in chapter 2, presenting a model of interactions among actors in the context of norm 
contestation about sustainable development. 
In more specific terms, each of the study’s findings in the three focus areas, (i.e. procedural case 
characteristics, substantive case characteristics and a tribunal’s interpretation approach) informs different 
reform options to improve international public investment law in the direction of contributing to 
sustainable development. 
First, power inequalities among actors in the international political economy and specifically 
among stakeholders in international public investment law disputes exist. States have, in part, some power 
to address such power inequalities, for example by providing participatory access to stakeholders in the 
law-making and law-applying processes. It is a difficult task for any government to find the right balance 
in considering economic, environmental and social impacts of their sustainable development policies. In 
this law-making process governments can benefit from inputs from various organizations, and advocacy 
groups vary in interests pursued, motivation and methods of influence. And such input can have an 
influence on policy outcomes.  
The study’s findings encourage governments to be mindful that also in the law-applying process 
of international economic disputes, inputs from various organizations can have an influence on such case 
outcomes. Some governments already seem to have considered that and have decided to give some 
organizations, namely investors, direct and meaningful participatory access in the law-applying process of 
international public investment law disputes. In fact, in some instances they have provided investors with 
equal footing in investor-state dispute settlement provisions, allowing, often ‘multinational’, corporations 
to represent themselves in claims against any state party of such economic treaty, including themselves. 
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Conceivably, this transfer of power was motivated by considerations of how to shift the burden of 
financial465 costs of such disputes. 
Finding that the presence of transparency and public participation case characteristics can have a 
positive influence on environmental policy permissible outcomes in such disputes suggests that 
governments could further consider to open participatory access up to a wider range of organizations. 
States can do so either by amending existing treaty provisions and rules governing dispute settlement, or 
in disputes themselves by considering to welcome rather than oppose transparency and public 
participation and representation requests made by relevant groups.  
Some reforms on procedural aspects of transparency and public participation and representation 
in this direction are already being considered and undertaken since this study began, though scholars 
differ in their evaluation of consistent and actual progress.466 For example, the UN Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) suggested in its Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable 
Development467 that states “can increase transparency of procedures” in Investor-State Dispute 
Settlements.468 The report further recommended, as policy option for “introducing improvements and 
refinements to the arbitral process in international investment agreements” that states provide, inter alia, 
“for more transparency, including by granting public access to arbitration documents (including 
settlement agreements) and arbitral hearings as well as allowing participation of interested non-disputing 
parties such as civil society organizations in proceedings”.469 
The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (discussed in 
chapter 4) and the UN Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (Mauritius 
Convention) have recently been adopted and can also be regarded as initial steps in the right direction. 
The Mauritius Convention builds on - and “facilitates States opting into the regime of transparency and 
participation created by” - the UNICTRAL Transparency Rules. It does so by providing a mechanism for 
States to apply these rules moreover, also to arbitrations under investment treaties entered into prior to 1 
April 2014, as well as non-UNCITRAL arbitrations.470 States have also issued binding interpretative 
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statements471 on procedural aspects of disputes and specified such in new trade and investment treaties. In 
the recently signed Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA), Canada and the EU decided 
to clarify their position on transparency and non-disputing party participation in Articles 8.36 (on 
transparency of proceedings) and 8.38 (on respondent’s obligation and timeline to provide information to 
non-disputing parties on request, tribunal’s acceptance of non-disputing parties submissions and non-
disputing parties’ attendance to hearings). The preliminary findings of this study based on the studied 
disputes, (i.e. that that the presence of transparency and public participation case characteristics can have 
a positive influence on environmental policy permissible outcomes in such disputes) supports these 
developments and proposals of textual reforms on procedural matters. 
Second, my findings that case characteristics of horizontal integration can have a positive 
influence on environmental policy permissible outcomes supports also proposals of textual reforms on 
substantive matters in international trade and investment agreements. The evidence supports the inclusion, 
in such treaties, of more specific, clear and concrete language and provisions on: sustainable 
development, environmental exception and defenses and MEA linkages. Moreover, the study identified, 
through the qualitative analysis of disputes, core and substantive textual issues of norm contestation 
relevant to dispute outcomes and presented these in a sketch of the status of embedded liberalism (chapter 
2) and in the specific recommendations for actions by various actors in law-applying and law-making and 
implementation processes (chapter 8). These insights to substantive textual issues include in part some of 
the required scope described above within which environmental measures should be designed and 
implemented in order to increase the likelihood for an environmental policy permissible ruling in a 
dispute. Should a required scope seem to be lacking clarity or impeding other considerations, states can 
address such inadequacies through textual negotiations of international investment and trade agreements, 
and make use of the sketch of the status of embedded liberalism provided in this study.  
Certainly, all negotiations and in particular re-negotiations of such treaties are difficult and take a 
long time. Regarding difficulty, some have noted the need to resolve questions about “what competences 
the contracting (governmental) parties in fact retain after entering into treaties aimed at the protection of 
non-governmental actors such as private foreign investors”.472 Norm contestation involving various actors 
in different arenas will slow down this law-making or law-remaking process. However, the outcomes of 
such process can further inform and improve law-applying processes in the future. And despite these 
                                                     
471 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, NAFTA Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, 31 July 
2001. 
472 Karsten Nowrot, Termination and Renegotiation of International Investment Agreements, in SHIFTING 
PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (Steffen Hindelang and Markus Krajewski eds. 2016) 
at 265. 
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complexities, one can already see developments in proposals being made and state action being taken 
with regards to substantive textual reforms since this research began.  
We find examples of proposals for - and negotiations of - textual reforms on substantive matters 
again in UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development and the European 
Union negotiations of economic treaties with several countries, among other similar state initiatives. 
Looking at Europe’s “transformative power,” Frank Hoffmeister points out recent developments towards 
the view that “the EU’s Common Commercial Policy should be conducted in line with its external action 
objectives” including “the eradication of poverty by fostering the sustainable […] development of 
developing countries”.473 Observing developments of textual redesign in several EU FTA negotiations, he 
notices “the EU does not present the concept of sustainable development as simply serving host State 
interests,” but rather emphasizes the mutual supportiveness474 between trade and investment and 
sustainable development.475 In addition, he further notes “the EU reform agenda is an expression of an 
internal policy discussion about public preferences with respect to granting rights to investors against 
European measures”.476 The value of his tracking of this trail of communication is that it describes 
different concerns flowing into norm contestation processes that can be understood as directional pulls, 
including, as exemplified here, towards: serving sustainable development needs of the global community, 
of the domestic community needs, and preserving domestic policy space.  
More specific textual reforms on substantive matters are manifested in the inclusion of 
sustainable development chapters and provisions, and specific refinements of preambular and operational 
paragraphs. This also includes updating investment related provisions in which contentions around the 
status of embedded liberalism can be clarified, for example referencing evolving legal concepts and 
emerging standards, among others. Like the recommendations supported by the findings of the study, the 
UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development lists various options for states to 
consider in this regard. Several scholars have also examined what approaches states from various regions 
                                                     
473 Frank Hoffmeister and Gabriela Alexandru, A First Glimpse of Light on the Emerging Invisible EU Model BIT, 
15 THE JOURNAL OF WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE (2014), and Frank Hoffmeister, in Ibid., at 360. 
474 Some have described mutual supportiveness as mainly being a policy goal, noting his does not mean that 
references to mutual supportiveness have no legal value. Yet others question its value based on the ecological limits 
within a global economy focused on economic growth cannot be sustained. E. JORGE VIÑUALES, FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW   (Cambridge University Press. 2015) 
at 148-51; and HERMAN  DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT   (Beacon Press. 1996). 
475 Frank Hoffmeister, The Contribution of EU Trade Agreement s to the Development of International Investment 
Law, in SHIFTING PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW - MORE BALANCED, LESS 
ISOLATED, INCREASINGLY DIVERSIFIED (Steffen Hindelang and Markus Krajewski eds. 2016) at 362. 
476 Ibid., at 365. 
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have recently chosen to address institutional and sustainable development concerns raised in the context 
of their international investment law obligations.477 
Third, my findings highlight that horizontal integration case characteristics (i.e. reference to 
sustainable development, environmental exception and defenses and MEAs) whether treaty-specific or 
not must actively be referred to in legal arguments and applied, in practice, by a tribunal to increase the 
likelihood for an environmental policy permissible outcome in a dispute case. Textual reforms on 
substantive and procedural matters accomplishable through re-drafting in international treaties enable that 
horizontal integration references can be used for legal arguments in the law-applying process. To address 
the issue of application of such references by a tribunal, further clarification on interpretation approaches 
can be pursued. The study found that a systemic-integration interpretation approach taken by a tribunal 
can have a positive influence on environmental policy permissible outcomes and supports further 
guidance in this direction. Supported are recommendations for various activities, including to raise 
awareness among investment arbitrators and investors about mutual supportiveness approaches and the 
evolution of non-treaty specific sustainable development norms, standards and practices. Calls for further 
clarification are reflected in valuable studies about fragmentation in international law, such as by the 
International Law Commission (ILC). The ILC recently noted in a draft guideline that  
 
“The rules of international law relating to the protection of the atmosphere and other 
relevant rules of international law, including inter alia the rules of international trade and 
investment law, of the law of the sea and of international human rights law, should, to the extent 
possible, be identified, interpreted and applied in order to give rise to a single set of compatible 
obligations, in line with the principles of harmonization and systemic integration, and with a view 
to avoiding conflicts. This should be done in accordance with the relevant rules set forth in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [VCLT] of 1969, including articles 30 and 31, 
paragraph 3(c), and the principles and rules of customary international law”.478 
 
Another recommendation for clarification comes from Katherina Berner, who has proposed that 
“applying the [VCLT] rules can help reconcile investment protection with external concerns such as 
                                                     
477 STEFFEN HINDELANG AND MARKUS KRAJEWSKI, SHIFTING PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW - MORE BALANCED, LESS ISOLATED, INCREASINGLY DIVERSIFIED (Oxford 
University Press. 2016), in particular section IV. 
478 Draft Guideline 9 (on Interrelationship among relevant rules) on the protection of the atmosphere, together with 
preambular paragraphs, provisionally adopted so far by the International Law Commission in Commission in its 
Report of the Sixty-ninth session (1 May-2 June and 3 July-4 August 2017) General Assembly Official Records 
Seventy-second Session Supplement No. 10 (A/72/10). 
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sustainable development”.479 She argues that “the Vienna Rules are in an impartial way, inherently open-
minded to encompassing new developments and to adapting treaties to changed conditions.”480 My 
research approach differs from Berner’s study in that I focused on tribunals’ practice. For this purpose, I 
also constructed a very specific differentiation between treaty-specific and systemic-integration 
interpretation approaches taken by tribunals. The former approach is characterized by - what Berner 
identifies as legally incorrect – a separation of VCLT Article 31(3)(c) from the remainder of the general 
rule and an introduction of “the very interpretive hierarchy which the drafters of the Convention did not 
want to establish”.481 However, my study supports Berner’s conclusion that “it would be desirable to 
insist –and, if necessary, to ensure through procedural changes – that arbitral tribunals faithfully and 
openly apply the Vienna rules as they ought to apply any other element of the applicable law”. 482    
To ensure that they are applied, states can use textual formulations of provisions on substantive 
and procedural matters in treaties to specify their intentions. The CETA chapter on investment, for 
example, states in Article 8.31(1) (on applicable law and interpretation): “When rendering its decision, 
the Tribunal established under this Section shall apply this Agreement as interpreted in accordance with 
the VCLT, and other rules and principles of international law applicable between the Parties”. This study 
also supports suggestions that states utilize interpretation mechanisms to clarify their intentions. 
However, this study does not provide input to institutional and procedural reforms such as establishing 
appeals mechanism or even a new permanent international investment court which other scholars have 
suggested states should consider. My study underscores instead, that states can provide guidance to an 
international judge or arbitrator serving in any such law-applying institutional setting. They can do so by 
clearly expressing in treaty text or interpretative statements, their intended interlinkages between different 
regimes or their expanding understanding of concepts, such as: ‘in like circumstances’ increasingly 
understood to include considerations of consumer or public preference; ‘legitimate expectations’ 
understood to be balanced against ‘reasonable expectations’; ‘cost-benefit analysis’ understood to entail 
taking into account new developments and international standards; ‘science-based evidence’ understood 
to include various knowledge sources; or ‘front-runner policy approaches’ evolving also among sub-
national governments and other actors as a practice of pursuing environmental measures based on the 
precautionary principle or going beyond national commitments. In this way, states can make best use of 
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PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW - MORE BALANCED, LESS ISOLATED, 
INCREASINGLY DIVERSIFIED (Steffen Hindelang and Markus Krajewski eds. 2016) at 202. 
480 Ibid., at 202. 
481 Ibid., at 197. 
482 Ibid., at 203. 
 233 
their power, keep such decisions within the law-making process and facilitate that VCLT rules and any 
other element of the applicable law are properly applied in law-applying processes. 
9.3.3 Conclusion 
Conflicts between economic vis-à-vis environmental policies and international law are a sign of an 
unsettled compromise of John Ruggie’s embedded liberalism in the context of sustainable development. 
The state-centric international law process has not yet produced a norm-transforming change that he 
suggests occurs at the level of the normative framework itself. Without a paradigm shift, will sustainable 
development remain an oxymoron? 
And even when sustainable development will be established as a de jure norm – making it a de 
facto norm resulting in the implementation of large-scale economic transformations such as phasing-out 
emissions entirely will require actions by sub-national government and non-state actors, including 
businesses, as well. This has been recognized in several MEA processes. However, in international 
investment disputes, we have seen environmental policies implemented by sub-national governments 
being challenged by investors. Some of these challenges may be a sign of business resisting a paradigm 
shift towards sustainable development. Yet there exist also many corporations in today’s global economy 
that qualify as front-runners paving the way for a paradigm shift, and even demanding clear and stricter 
environmental regulations which could reward them with a competitive advantage.483 
Existing conflicts and unsettled compromises support the idea explored in this research that an 
ongoing process of norm contestation about sustainable development among various actors takes place in 
various law-making and law applying arenas. In my introduction, I suggested that norms once defined 
through such processes can be challenged, contested and reformulated to adjust to an ever-evolving 
economic, social and environmental reality of concern to different societies. Norms do however evolve. 
And Martin Luther King Jr. believed they do historically progress when he said, “the arc of the moral 
universe is long, but it bends toward justice.” Progressive steps in the evolution of norms can be observed 
in the discussions, deliberations and considerations of international investment disputes. However, the 
study suggests that these steps, though their marks can be tracked in dispute rulings, are to be taken by 
states on their path to improving international public investment law in the direction of contributing to 
sustainable development. 
                                                     
483 For example for their leadership in reducing negative social and environmental impacts or implementing circular-
economy or zero-emission business models. 
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My findings that specific procedural and substantive case characteristics can influence dispute 
outcomes towards environmental policy permissible rulings informs states in their consideration of 
updating treaty text on procedural and substantive matters. As international law ‘makers’ states can 
amend existing or create new treaty provisions and rules governing dispute settlement. As disputing 
parties, states can make references to horizontal integration in their legal arguments and support 
procedural transparency and public participation in such disputes. 
Finding that cases where transparency and public participation is observed can have an influence 
on environmental policy permissible rulings informs also activity policies of civil society groups. Their 
influence on the evolution of norms should not be considered as to end in the law-making process, 
including at the international level. This research showed clearly that achieving the inclusion of 
references to sustainable development, environmental exceptions or MEAs in an economic treaty may 
only matter to outcomes of international economic law disputes in which an environmental policy is 
challenged when such references are being actively referred to. Therefore, the study also suggests civil 
society groups consider their influence and role in the law-applying process as well, and pursue and refine 
their participation in relevant disputes.  
This requires also an interest among practitioners and researchers, or the courage to engage, in 
disciplinary cross pollination to grow awareness about developments in different fields, such as of 
economic and environmental law. Perhaps it is time to reconsider the benefits of a specialization trend 
observed in professional fields and educational disciplines which has produced experts in complexities of 
one or another field of international public law. And I am referring here not only to fostering systemic-
integration interpretation approaches to be taken- by legal professionals sitting in tribunals of 
international investment disputes, which the study’s findings also support.  
Encouraging in this regard is the recent trend of economic experts from government and the 
business sector taking part in international environmental law negotiations. Inter-governmental 
organizations, such as UNCTAD, non-governmental civil society organizations, such as the International 
Institute for Sustainable Development and several other research organizations have promoted the 
development of expertise in the nexus between economic and environmental law regimes. In the legal 
profession, the International Law Commission has also produced useful studies about fragmentation in 
international law, and has recently supported principles of harmonization and systemic integration. All 
these developments, suggest to me that there is already some recognition of an increased potential to 
realize sustainable development when interdisciplinary expertise and multi-stakeholder engagement have 
influence on policy development, implementation and review. Based on my research I can endorse these 
developments. And the ideas assessed and presented in this study are themselves a result of an 
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interdisciplinary research, which may resonate with some readers or encourage others to examine the 
benefits thereof. 
As natural - rather than social - scientist, Rachel Carson arguably spread the idea for a needed 
paradigm shift that moves beyond the post-WWII focus on economic growth to make the world a better 
and more peaceful place towards a recognition that ecological impacts and limits must be taken into 
account in the pursuit of this goal. Naturally, such a fundamental change involves a difficult process and 
norm contestation still continues long after her book “Silent Spring,” was published in 1962. One could 
easily be discouraged by the slow pace towards this shift, by the technicalities of this process and the 
realities of unequal powers among actors involved. And yet another biologist, Wangari Maathai inspires 
us with her story of being a humming bird that less pondering upon abstract ideas and more concrete 
actions should be pursued by everyone. 
At the end of the day, to realize the idea of sustainable development, decision makers must weigh 
in all three aspects of its unique scale, namely economic, social and environmental impacts of their 
decisions, before determining how to balance them so to reach an equilibrium. Human societal evolution 
shows for better and for ‘worst’ past experiences in balancing power, justice and wisdom and continues to 
demand such exercise to achieve development that is sustainable. 
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